




# Foundations of the European House of Major Events Security

A Manual for the  
International Coordination of  
Major Events Security Research in Europe



**unicri**  
United Nations  
Interregional Crime and Justice  
Research Institute



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For the production of this manual, UNICRI would like to extend gratitude to Ms. Kristiina Kangaspunta, Mr. Stefano Giachi, Ms. Marina Mazzini, Ms. Federica Caselli and Mr. Enrico Mattiazzo for their support in the completion of the manual.

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One last acknowledgement must go to the unknown young girl in the photo on p. 2, for providing the inspiration and anchoring focus of this manual during its writing phase.



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EU-SEC II

FOUNDATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN HOUSE OF MAJOR EVENTS SECURITY  
A MANUAL FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION  
OF MAJOR EVENTS SECURITY RESEARCH IN EUROPE

Task led by:  
UNICRI

October 2011



## FOREWORD by Director Lucas



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UNICRI takes great pride in the partnership with the European Commission in the development and implementation of EU-SEC II, undertaken within its security governance/counter-terrorism framework. Following the launch of the International Permanent Observatory (IPO) on Security during Major Events, UNICRI developed specialised expertise in the field of major event security. The work done with UNICRI's IPO resulted in the United Nations Economic and Social Council resolution 2006/28, which mandated it to continue and expand its work on the Observatory, via the provision of technical assistance and advisory services on security during major events.

Owing to their scale and/or high visibility, major events can be a target for unlawful activities, including terrorism, and can be exploited by organized criminal groups to further their illegal activities.

Security planning for a Major Event, defined as an event requiring international cooperation with respect to its security planning, such as large sporting events, including the Olympic Games, high-level summits and other mass events, such as national and religious festivals, is a complex and challenging exercise. When putting a city, region, country or even several countries in the spotlight, security is a key factor for success. This task involves many actors ranging from ministries, city councils, the private sector, the media and law enforcement agencies operating at local, national and international levels.

This manual lays the foundation for improved coordination and strengthened cooperation for security planning among national authorities in EU Member States. The 40-month project, financed by the European Commission, involving EUROPOL and a consortium of twenty-two European Union Member States security planners, played a fundamental role in coordinating research programmes and policies, to facilitate the sharing of knowledge and relevant best practice related to security at all types of major events. The commitment of the EU-SEC II Consortium Members also contributed to the development of pragmatic analytical tools and methodologies to enhance the capacity of host countries to strengthen their capacity to manage security at such international events.

EU-SEC II reflects the will and commitment of European Union Member States to work together to achieve a more collaborative and cooperative research-based approach to security planning for major events. Moreover, the initiation of the European House of Major Events Security, an outcome of the project, is based on the acknowledgement of the importance of better coordination and cooperation, at the local, national and international levels for improved efficiency in the identification and mitigation of risks in a timely manner.

*Jonathan Lucas*

Director

United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute

## PREFACE by Vice-President Tajani



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DG Enterprise and Industry plays a key role in security research and development in Europe. It is under the auspices of the Seventh Framework Programme that EU-SEC II was financed. This project, successfully coordinated by the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), is the embodiment of what we are trying to achieve through this important instrument that is shaping the policy landscape in this field.

EU-SEC II is a rare example of a Consortium composed exclusively of public body end-users. Thus it is well placed to inform policy-makers of the key areas where research can help to define the requisites to facilitate a coordinated approach to security in the field of Major Event. Hence the main outcome of the project, the European House of Major Events Security, optimising the use of available resources, will enhance public sector capabilities in this field, at the same time rendering Europe stronger and more unified.

This Manual provides the key recommendations that will help foster better coordination of national research programmes and policies in the field of Major Event security. For this I congratulate UNICRI, the 22 EU Member States and EUROPOL that have worked on this project rendering it a success. Major Events are windows of opportunity that in this instance also provide the occasion to create mechanisms to ensure that all European citizens are able to enjoy the same levels of security.

Further, EU-SEC II exemplifies the excellent results that collaboration between the European Commission and the United Nations can bring about. To this end the work done in this project has received a special mention by Mr. Ban ki-Moon in "Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Global Counter-terrorism Strategy: Activities of the United Nations System in Implementing the Strategy".

The European House of Major Events Security, beyond being a tool to coordinate national research programmes and policies in the field of Major Event security, would also lead the way for a truly integrated European approach to security planning at Major Events.



*Antonio Tajani*  
Vice-President of the European Commission  
Commissioner for Industry and Entrepreneurship



## PREFACE by Commissioner Malmström



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Freedom, security and justice are fundamental pillars of the European Union. Ensuring that European citizens are able to fully enjoy these rights is something that we strive to maintain and improve. The Stockholm Programme adopted in 2009 envisages the delivery of a European area of freedom, security and justice. The European House of Major Event Security (the House), launched by the EU-SEC II Consortium under the successful coordination of the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), will contribute to the development of the European area for freedom, security and justice.

The launch of the European House of Major Events Security is serendipitous as it fits within the framework set by the EU Internal Security Strategy (ISS) that the European Commission proposed in 2010. The ISS has been developed to focus the EU's energies, resources and expertise on where it most adds value. It has put forward a shared security agenda for EU institutions and Member States, for public and private sector. The ISS strives for a common understanding of scenarios and a common assessment of risks and threats, as well as coherence of research with strategic security objectives.

Conceived after seven years of activity within the EU-SEC and EU-SECII Consortia, the European House of Major Events Security exploits the potential of the coordination of research developing technical assistance mechanisms and tools that are available to security practitioners. Consequently, the House not only contributes by reinforcing the European Research Area through an enhanced coordination effort, but it also shows that coordinated, end-users driven, research is conducive to impact on the policy-making mechanisms applied across Europe, as it is sketched out by the ISS.

In this sense, the House would create an effective forum through which security planners will be able to establish working relations with colleagues in other parts of Europe, laying the foundations for a working relationship based on mutual trust and understanding. This essential work will enable the fostering of a common European Policing approach for security planning at Major Events.

Ultimately, I wish to stress that those who will truly benefit from this enhanced coordinated approach to security planning for Major Events will, of course, be European citizens: by experiencing the same levels of security across Europe, citizens will be able to take advantage of the hundreds of events that take place in the Union and, at the same time, enjoy a harmonised policing culture, which would also have a long-term impact on their daily lives.

A handwritten signature in black ink, which appears to read 'Cecilia Malmström'.

*Cecilia Malmström*  
Commissioner for Home Affairs

## MEMBERS OF THE CONSORTIUM

The EU-SEC II Consortium consisted of representatives from the following participant organisations:

	<b>Participant Organization Name</b>	<b>Short Name</b>	<b>Country</b>
1	United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute	UNICRI	Italy
2	European Police Office	EUROPOL	The Netherlands
3	Bundesministerium für Inneres	BM.I	Austria
4	German Police University	DHPol	Germany
5	Cuerpo Nacional de Policía	CNP	Spain
6	Ministry of the Interior – Police Department	SMPO	Finland
7	Direction Générale de la Police Nationale	D.G.P.N.	France
8	Metropolitan Police Service	MetPo	UK
9	An Garda Síochána	An Garda Síochána	Ireland
10	Ministero degli Interni	MinInterno	Italy
11	Ministry of Justice	MinJus	The Netherlands
12	Ministry of the Interior	GCS/MAI	Portugal
13	Centre for Security Studies	KEMEA	Greece
14	Police Academy of Latvia <sup>1</sup>	LPA	Latvia
15	Ministry of Interior and Administration Reform	MoAI	Romania
16	Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic	MINV	Slovakia
17	Academy of the Ministry of the Interior	Academy of MoI	Bulgaria
18	Policijska uprava Maribor (Police Directorate Maribor)	PU Maribor	Slovenia
19	Estonian Police and Border Guard Board	MoI	Estonia
20	Cyprus Police	Cyprus Police	Cyprus
21	Hungarian National Police Headquarters	ORFK	Hungary
22	Malta Police Force	MinMALTA	Malta
23	Swedish National Police	Polisen	Sweden
24	National Police Department – National Police College	POSD	Denmark
25	State Police of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Latvia	State Police <sup>2</sup>	Latvia

Participant organization names and short names reproduced from EU-SEC II Document of Work (Annex 1 dated 16/02/2011).

<sup>1</sup>The Latvian Police Academy ceased to exist in December 2009.

<sup>2</sup>The State Police took over the role of the Latvian Police Academy on the Consortium from January 2010.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This manual lays foundations for the further development of international coordination services aimed at improving and strengthening European level cooperation over major event security research and planning among national authorities in EU Member States. It represents the final report of the 40 month EU-SEC II project (2008-2011) *Coordinating National Research Programmes and Policies on Security at Major Events in Europe* and concrete outcomes of activities between an EU-wide Consortium of 22 Member States.

Coordinated within the framework of the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute's (UNICRI's) work on Security Governance / Counter-terrorism, the project received €2.52 million under the 7<sup>th</sup> Framework Programme of the European Commission. This investment by the EC builds upon the €1.8 million of funding invested in the initial EU-SEC project (2004-2008), which was financed under the 6<sup>th</sup> Framework Programme. As a manual of guidance for seven specific coordination services, it makes a direct and centrally supporting contribution to the proposed third phase of the EU-SEC Programme<sup>3</sup>.

For 'the House', the project defines a 'Major Event' simply as '*an event requiring international cooperation in respect of its security planning*'. The Olympics, G8 and EU summits typify such events and the challenging complexities of security planning in relation to them. This is particularly so due to the cross-border international cooperation dynamic they present, the public delivery of which is regularly under the critical scrutiny of world media.

To assist coordinate this in the interests of developing an EU level of consistency as well as improved security delivery, the EU-SEC II project has resulted in the production/adoption of seven prototype 'coordination tools/methodologies' (CTMs), or services, for future use by EU member states in relation to planning for such international events. They are:

CTM 1 - The IPO Security Planning Model: A model that can be used as a common benchmark and checklist/evaluation tool by national authorities in respect of their own planning. Developed by UNICRI it has been successfully field tested during the project.

CTM 2 – Best Practices in Public-Private Partnerships: A common guidance document for assessing and establishing good practices and core principles in relation to the division of responsibilities and the regulation of private sector involvement in security planning.

CTM 3 – Media Management Guidelines: Closely connected to and building upon ethical considerations in relation to major event security, guides planners toward the importance of international consistency and professionalism in police press-office management.

CTM 4 – Ethical and Operational Standards for Security Products: A set of statements that contextualize and reflect compliance to relevant aspects of the Council of Europe's *European Code of Police Ethics* as a common set of professional standards to reflect upon and promote.

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<sup>3</sup> EU-SEC Programme refers to the two projects EU-SEC and EU-SEC II.

These four serve as common House policies in relation to planning and evaluation activities. The remaining three serve as common House tools for coordinating up-to-date research, technologies and training in relation to major event security planning at EU level:

CTM 5 – Specialist Technical Equipment Pool (STEP): A data-base to support planning and procurement decisions by storing availability/reviews of required technical resources. Cooperation on information sharing for this tool was successfully tested during EU-SEC II.

CTM 6 – European Major Events Register (EMER): For common registration of an event as ‘major’ by a hosting authority, its recognition as such by the House and the medium through which to access House services. It will also build up longer-term research data.

CTM 7 – Training & Networking: Modules and curriculum on major event security standards in collaboration with the European Police College (CEPOL). Raises awareness and promotes use of House services among relevant national policy makers and practitioners.

Chapters of this manual detail each CTM separately. Supporting chapters detail the project’s EU-wide survey and findings in relation to the state of international security research and planning coordination among national authorities over major events and potential legal/cultural obstacles to continued and future international cooperation in respect of it.

In finding a general need and opportunity to develop a commonality of policing in Europe through major event security planning, it also found that there were no significant legal or cultural obstacles to moving in that direction. In particular, the EU’s 2008 *Prüm* Decision was found to be a potentially supportive European level legal instrument in need of monitoring. Consequently the project’s strategic roadmap, detailed toward the end of this manual, emphasizes the importance of the continued commitment of national authorities to the building of the House and their ownership of its CTMs under the EU-SEC programme.

This is because the broader contribution of the House’s coordination efforts goes beyond improved international cooperation in relation to Major Event security planning alone. Major Events are windows of opportunity. Thus the work done in EU-SEC II reflected in this manual provides policy recommendations and guidance for the key players in this field. The House (the main policy recommendation of this project) has the potential to impact positively upon the EU’s Stockholm Programme (2010-2014) and its agenda of developing the EU as an area of freedom security and justice.

In this regard the EU-SEC II project and this manual have made clear the importance of understanding that the planning and delivery of Major Event security has to balance the need to ensure respect for the fundamental democratic freedoms of European citizens whilst at the same time guarantee security at the event, nationally and in Europe. Major events in Europe can be seen as 21<sup>st</sup> century ‘test-sites’ *par excellence* in both these respects.

The EU-SEC II project has had tremendous results in achieving this understanding. As testimony to a determined will to collaborative work among 22 national authorities in Europe, This manual reflects those results and that understanding in what has and will be a programme of work that spans over a nine year period of EU development from 2004 to 2013.

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## LIST OF TASK REPORTS

EU-SEC Programme Task Reports and associated documents used to produce this manual:

### EU-SEC (2004-2008)

Third NSC Meeting Report, Dublin.	UNICRI		Dec 2005
Task 2.1 Report on Ideas for Future Joint Activities	SMPO	Finland	Jun 2006
Task 2.2 Report on Obstacles to Coordination	MetPo	UK	Nov 2006
Elaboration of STEP and EMER Ideas (Task 2.1)	SMPO	Finland	Feb 2007
Work Package 5 Report on Ethical Considerations	PFA/DHPol	Germany	May 2008
EU-SEC Manual of Best Practices (WP5)	UNICRI		Jul 2008

### EU-SEC II (2008-2011)

Task 1.2 State of National Research Programmes	GCS/MAI	Portugal	Oct 2009
Toward a European House of Major Events Security	UNICRI		Apr 2009
Task 2.1 Survey Analysis and Recommendations	SMPO	Finland	May 2009
Task 2.4 Report of WP2 Meeting	MoAI	Romania	Jun 2009
Task 2.2 Obstacles Affecting Coordination	MinJus	Netherlands	Jul 2009
Task 2.3 Testing STEP (Managing Resources)	MinInterno	Italy	Nov 2009
Task 3.2 Common Research Standards	BM.I	Austria	May 2010
Task 3.1 Public-Private Partnerships	MetPo	UK	Oct 2010
Task 3.3 Media Management Guidelines	DHPol	Germany	Oct 2010
The European House of Major Events Security	UNICRI		Nov 2010
The House Proposal for FP7 Funding	UNICRI		Dec 2010
Press Release: Launch of EU-SEC II Roadmap	UNICRI		Jan 2011
Task 3.4 Draft Security Research Strategic Roadmap	DGPN	France	Mar 2011



### **Associated EU & Council of Europe Documents**

The European Code of Police Ethics	Council of Europe	Sep 2001
The Prüm Convention (10900/05)	Council of EU	Jul 2005
The Prüm Decision (2008/615/JHA)	Council of EU	Jun 2008
The Stockholm Programme (17024/09)	Council of EU	Dec 2009

### **Associated IPO Programme Documents**

The IPO Security of Major Events Toolkit	UNICRI	Nov 2005
The IPO Security Planning Model	UNICRI	Oct 2007
ECOSOC Resolution 2006/28 on IPO	UN ECOSOC	Jul 2006

## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

**CEPOL** – The European Police College

**CTM** – Coordination Tool/Methodology: Representing core services of the House developed in the EU-SEC programme, namely – EMER; STEP; IPO Security Planning Model; Best Practice Guidance on PPPs; Guidance on Media Management; Common Standards for Security Products; Networking and Training.

**CTMO** – CTM Owner: A House project partner responsible for the development of the CTM within the terms of EU-SECIII.

**CoE** – Council of Europe

**CoEU** – Council of the European Union

**EMER** – European Major Events Register: A proposed data base for registering an event as ‘major’ with the House and affording access to its services.

**ESRP** – European Security Research Programme

**EUROPOL** – The European Police Office

**EU-SEC** – Coordinating National Research Programmes on Security during Major Events in Europe<sup>4</sup>

**EU-SEC II** - Coordinating National Research Programmes and Policies on Security at Major Events in Europe<sup>5</sup>

**IPO** – International Permanent Observatory on Security during Major Events programme<sup>6</sup>

**ME** – Major Event

**MEO** – Major Event Organiser: The organiser of a Major Event requiring security provision during the event.

**MES** – Major Event Security

**PPP** – Public-Private Partnerships: A working relationship between the public sector and private sector as providers of security services to a major event organiser.

**PSI** – Private Security Industry

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<sup>4</sup> Project funded by the European Commission under the 6<sup>th</sup> Framework Programme.

<sup>5</sup> Project funded by the European Commission under the 7<sup>th</sup> Framework Programme.

<sup>6</sup> This programme is run by UNICRI and is officially mandated by the United Nations Economic and Social Council (E/2006/28) to provide security planning assistance to Member States.

**STEP** – Specialist Technical Equipment Pool: A proposed data base for registering and researching the internationally cooperative availability and suitability of specialist equipment.

**STILT** – Strategic, Tactical, Informational, Legal, Technical: A provisional security product classification acronym for use with STEP and other House services.

**UNICRI** – United National Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute

## GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS FOR USE WITHIN THE HOUSE

(These terms have been thematically grouped)

### *Major Events in General*

**Major Event** – an event that requires international cooperation in respect of its security planning (see chapter two of this manual for full discussion on the development of this term).

**Security** – in terms of outcomes: the absence of various foreseeable adverse or unwanted facts that can cause harm during a Major Event. It always refers to threat evaluation and how to prevent potential risks from happening.

### *Security Threats & Products*

**Security** – the prevented harm of a potential threat (as categorised for a ‘Major Event’).

**(Security) Threat** – the existing potential to cause harm (to or at the Major Event).

**Security Tool** – any instrument intended to prevent threats from materialising as harm.

**Security Product** – anything specifically produced for use as a tool in relation to a threat.

### *Security Planning Processes*

**Security Research** – the process of producing knowledge about security at Major Events: this is primarily in terms of potential threats to it, tools to counter them, the overall security plan, its evaluation and the threat assessment the plan responded to.

**Security Planning** – the process of drafting the security plan for a Major Event by utilising the elements outlined in the IPO Security Planning Model<sup>7</sup>.

### *Security Research Programmes*

**Research Programme** – any documented programme (in whole or part) of research and innovation (or similar initiative) carried out by or on behalf of, or referred to by, an EU Member State’s national authority (or body recognised by them) on the subject of Security during Major Events in Europe.

**Programme** – a coherent set of questions or issues in relation to the research subject (i.e. Major Event security) to be pursued through research activity over a given period of time in the name of the national authority. It includes researching the potential of threats and their preventive measures, as well as the evaluation of them and the plan’s delivery of security.

### *Terminological Distinctions*

**Programme/Process** – a programme is a plan of activities for achieving something (e.g. security, via a security plan). A process is a series of activities to make something (e.g. a security plan, carried out in order to achieve security).

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<sup>7</sup> (DHPol, 2010, p. 5)

**Planning/Research** – planning refers to preparation in anticipation of something. Research refers to retrospective study of something. Research may be part of the planning.

**Research/Innovation** – research is the establishment of facts to answer questions and/or reach new conclusions in respect existing knowledge on the research subject. Innovation is the introduction of new topics, themes, and/or ideas in relation to the research subject: it includes the development of existing topics, themes and/or ideas towards new form.

**Strategic/Tactical** – a strategy is an operational plan to gain a position of advantage over a threat/problem. A tactic is the means by which that advantage is obtained in the field.

**Taxonomy/Terminology** – taxonomy refers to ‘a common classification system’. Terminology refers to ‘a common technical language’. Terminology is broader in scope than taxonomy and accommodating of it.

**Public Sector** – ‘those government ministries, police and other national security actors, including the military, who have responsibilities for aspects of MES’<sup>8</sup>

**Private Sector** – both *partners* and *stakeholders*, including those with the capacity to contribute to MES by the provision of trained personnel and security equipment and technology, where *partners* are defined by their direct responsibility for delivering all or some part of an event security plan and *stakeholders* are defined by their ability to influence the shape of the security operation while having no direct security responsibilities<sup>9</sup>.

**Media & PR Strategy** – a set of activities and procedures to ensure the external provision of coordinated, accurate and timely information related to security during a Major Event.

#### **Other relevant terms in accepted common use within academic police studies**

(Drawn from *Handbook of Policing* and *Dictionary of Policing* as denoted)<sup>10</sup>

**Accountability** – generally thought of as a system for controlling agencies and individuals. In relation to policing a distinction is often drawn between individual forms of accountability and organisational accountability. (Handbook)

**Governance** – a term from political science and sociology that focuses on the systems of regulation and ordering (governing) contemporary societies. Where once this might have focused on the agencies/institutions of the state, the term is now generally taken to refer to strategies of governing both within and beyond the state. (Handbook)

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<sup>8</sup> (MetPo, 2010a, p. 2)

<sup>9</sup> (MetPo, 2010a, p. 2)

<sup>10</sup> (Newburn, 2003, p. glossary) and (Newburn & Neyroud, 2008) – all terms taken from these key sources.

**Human Rights** – the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that:

*Everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.*

The increasing attention paid to human rights principles has led to a developing debate over the implications of this for the nature and delivery of policing. (Handbook)

**International Police Cooperation** – encompasses activities and structures designed to assist the police forces and agencies of different states to tackle criminality that crosses international borders more effectively. Such cooperation can also assist police professional development in the participating states. (Dictionary)

**Managerialism** – a term associated with the shift in government policy towards ‘new public management’ characterised by, *inter alia*: elements of privatisation; marketisation; the increased use of performance indicators; a growing emphasis on outputs and outcomes; partnership working; and the redesignation of clients as ‘customers’. (Handbook)

**Marketisation** – a term referring to a process that has been taking place since the early 1980s which has had as its goal improving the cost efficiency and performance effectiveness of public [police organisations] via the imposition of ‘market disciplines’ on the police service. (Handbook)

**Mass private property** – large ‘public’ spaces which are often privately owned but which are, to differing extents, open to access by the public [e.g. shopping malls]. Their central significance for policing is that they are generally guarded by private security and, indeed, the growth of such spaces has been held to be a key factor in the growth of private policing. [Major Events can be seen as ‘temporary’ mass private spaces in this respect]. (Handbook)

**Organized Crime** – ‘A structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences... in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.’ (Dictionary – citing Article 2 of the 2000 UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime)

**Privatisation** – (simply put) the shift of ownership and control from the public to the private sector. In practice, privatisation can cover a range of policies including civilianisation, ‘contracting out’, the increasing use of sponsorship and private finance and the establishment of public-private partnerships. (Handbook)

**Public Order** – distinguished by its relatively large-scale deployment of officers in group formations subject to superior command and control. It is easily visible to the media. When it is used, force is more likely to be directed at groups rather than individuals. (Dictionary).

**Security** – a term now regularly invoked in connection with an array of phenomena, ranging from a general sense of well-being, to the activities of private policing bodies, all the way to the general territory of protecting the nation-state from outside threats – namely, national security. (Dictionary)

**Schengen** – an agreement, covering a number of European countries, whose aim is to establish an area uninhibited by border controls, thus providing the conditions for the freedom of movement of people and goods. (Dictionary)

**Terrorism** – most commonly used [as a term] to describe ‘revolutionary’ or sub-state violence for political ends. Terrorists seek to raise – through the ‘propaganda of the deed’ – public consciousness of their own cause and also to provoke their state opponents into over-reaction and public alienation. (Dictionary)

**Transnational Policing** – broadly speaking, policing other than that authorised and practiced within the territorial boundaries and institutions of the state. However, and in contrast with certain forms of ‘international policing’, transnational policing refers to the activities of individuals and organisations that draw their authority from outside individual nation-states – i.e. non-state communities, such as the EU. (Handbook)





## INTRODUCTION: A QUESTION OF BALANCE AND HOW TO USE THIS GUIDE

This is a manual for the international coordination of Major Event security research in Europe. It is the consolidation of cooperative results from the coordinated activities of twenty-two European Union Member States to the project **Coordinating National Research Programmes and Policies on Security at Major Events in Europe** (EU-SEC II, July 2008 – October 2011). Continuing from the initial EU-SEC<sup>11</sup> project (Aug 2004 – July 2008), EU-SEC II has successfully established both a comprehensive EU-wide network of national authorities in the field of Major Event security planning and basic principles of common policies by which to enhance future European coordination at an international level. To this end, the manual represents instruction as to a set of foundational practices and policies upon which such future coordination can be built.

Conventionally, a manual is a set of instructions for *doing something*. As the consolidation of results obtained through coordinated joint activities between EU Member States, this manual instructs on practices and policies developed during EU-SEC II as the foundations of the European House of Major Events Security – ‘the House’. As a set of future research programme services intended for offer to national authorities, the House is to serve as a tool to assist in the coordination of Major Event security planning and provision in Europe. The enhancement of this initiative is subject to a proposal for future joint activities which, besides its practical research coordination merits, will help Member States implement aspects of the Stockholm Programme (2010-2014). This will be particularly so in areas of effective policies for further European law enforcement cooperation over large public events, such as the London 2012 Olympics<sup>12</sup> - a Major Event for security planning and aspects of its international coordination and harmonisation of common policies by any definition of the term.

The significance of advances in Major Event security cooperation in Europe cannot be understated. Within the overall EU-SEC programme<sup>13</sup> itself Major Events are readily recognised as ‘windows of opportunities’ for contribution to research coordination in the European Research Area concerning security<sup>14</sup>. In practical terms, they drive forward cutting-edge development in security technologies and domestic policing in relation to crime, safety, public-order and counter-terrorism. In terms of policy, they can facilitate transformative development in inter-state cooperation and a growing *commonality* of contemporary policing (both public and private) in Europe – all areas that have been dealt with in EU-SEC II.

Moreover, with regard to fundamental principles of European citizenship that Major Event security often engages, they increasingly come to embody (in intensely challenging ways) what it means to be ‘European’ for a 21<sup>st</sup> Century generation in terms of ‘freedom, security and justice’, particularly around issues of peaceful protest as well as simple participation and enjoyment.

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<sup>11</sup> Full title: “Coordinating National Research Programmes on Security during Major Events in Europe”.

<sup>12</sup> The Stockholm Programme, s 4.3.1 (CoEU, 2009, p. 40)

<sup>13</sup> By EU-SEC Programme we make reference to both EU-SEC and EU-SEC II projects.

<sup>14</sup> UNICRI’s ‘THE HOUSE’ ERA NET project proposal 2010 (UNICRI, 2010b, p. 3).



Fig 1. Young demonstrator and police lines, Copenhagen Climate Summit December 2009

The above media image<sup>15</sup> captures this critical but often unstated social significance in a simple photo. It is of a young demonstrator posing in front of police lines preventing entry to activist campaigners at the December 2009 Copenhagen Climate Change Conference. She's dressed as a clown. Police security practitioners will be familiar with 'The Rebel Clown's Army' as international activists intent on provoking by non-violent means the police into an embarrassing display of violence against them in front of world media. Whether the girl is part of some such deliberate activism, or simply playing with a dress-code that has come to symbolise the carnival-like atmosphere of peaceful public protest, the image attests to the importance of police professionalism in the face of provocation. In this sense the Rebel Clowns themselves can be seen more a *test* of security than *threat* to it.

In this sense, the image helps one see Major Events as key sites in which the practicalities of national security and public safety must be finely balanced (under the scrutiny of world media) with preservation of civil rights based democratic citizenship in Europe. In other words, temporary public theatres in which a Europe that is both 'open and secure in the service and protection of the citizen' (as the Stockholm Programme explicitly re-affirms) can be performed and rendered visible with lasting effect. This requires an appreciation of the social significance of Major Events and the temporary but extraordinary 'security bubbles' that accompany them from the very start of the security planning stages: A testing demonstration of policing in Europe as being *above* non-violent provocation.

It is worth re-iterating the social significance of Major Event security in Europe for 21<sup>st</sup> century policing and society more broadly. Addressing the EU-SEC network steering committee as a guest speaker in Helsinki in June 2007, leading criminologist in the field of contemporary policing, Professor Eugene McLaughlin from City University London, recognised Major Events as 'potent sources of global expression' and their security as providing 'important test-sites for what is going on in policing'. Having recently published one of the most comprehensive reviews of police studies literature to date<sup>16</sup> McLaughlin acknowledged the relatively under-researched nature of Major Event security within

<sup>15</sup> Photo: © Jeff.J.Mitchell/Getty Images. Guardian.co.uk 16 December 2009.

A young demonstrator poses in front of police lines as protesters attempt to break through outside the Bella Centre at the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, 16 December 2009. Article can be found at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/gallery/2009/dec/16/reclaim-power-march-copenhagen?INTCMP=SRCH#/?picture=357004275&index=15> (accessed 6 January 2011)

<sup>16</sup> (McLaughlin, 2007)

academia itself. In an informal talk aptly entitled *When the Circus Comes to Town* his simple question for more complex reflection was ‘who benefits from Major Events and what do they signify?’<sup>17</sup>

It is beyond the scope of this instruction manual of international coordination practices to follow-up on these broader theoretical research questions (though one can point to recent academic publication concerning the politics of ‘showcasing security’ at Major Events in answer to precisely such a question<sup>18</sup>). Suffice to note here McLaughlin’s recognition of Major Event security as representing an ‘exceptional policing challenge’ in terms of being what he called ‘an accelerated environment to work in’, often under intense multi-media scrutiny: for it is precisely this defining *exceptionality* of the policing challenge that Major Event security presents practitioners across Europe that the EU-SEC programme responds to. Portugal’s task report, discussed in Chapter 1, on the current state of national research programmes for Major Event security in Europe goes some considerable way in recognising Major Events as ‘symbolic expressions of a predominantly urban society’ defined more by their world media coverage as localised global events than any other characteristic<sup>19</sup>.

Beyond this, though, is the legacy potential of Major Event security. That is, the precedents it sets for future security planning practices and provision more routinely. For McLaughlin this includes not simply a ‘wider cultural transformation of the police themselves’ amid the emerging counter-terrorist discourse within contemporary policing in Europe, but the very development of a ‘transnational police consciousness’ that significantly transcends its traditional national framing. In this sense, Major Events can be seen as strategic spaces in which such social and political transformations can and are likely to be taking place through the pan-European policing of them. The symbolic value of Major Events and their security provision in this respect is the subject of separate international police research publication by the author of this manual dealing with them in terms of social change in Europe historically<sup>20</sup>.

Accordingly, a defining feature of a Major Event (i.e. what makes the event ‘major’ at a European level as opposed to just large or important at a national level), can be thought of in terms of how the security concerns it raises come to *dominate* and subsequently *define* or *redefine* a national authority’s programme of research, planning and eventual provision of security measures at it and at future events. Similar to the way in which some urban social theorists have described the contemporary cities that host them<sup>21</sup>, they are sites where *newness* enters the world. For social theorists in the field of policing and security, this transformational aspect is new ground. Again, though, there remains little independent empirical social research on these important questions of Major Event security legacy for contemporary policing and citizenry in Europe. It is hoped that users of this manual might consider them in the international context of planning for future events that come to dominate and define their more practice and policy based security research programmes nationally.

The body of this manual, however, concerns itself with instruction based upon the outcomes of the four EU-SEC II Work Packages aimed at building the ‘European House of Major Events Security’: for while the subject matter of EU-SEC unavoidably raises broader theoretical questions of development in European policing, it remains focused on supporting the practical coordination of national research

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<sup>17</sup> Author’s notes (6<sup>th</sup> EU-SEC NSC meeting, Helsinki, 4<sup>th</sup> June 2007).

<sup>18</sup> (Martin, 2011) Examines the politics of policing of the 2007 Sydney APEC meeting in terms of a host nation’s effort to promote host their cities a safe places for tourism and capital investment. International events seen as subjecting the police to supranational pressures of market forces under global neoliberal influences.

<sup>19</sup> Final Report of Task 1.2, Portugal (GCS/MAI, 2009, p. 64)

<sup>20</sup> (Hadley, 2011) Critically examines major events in terms of 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century capacity for political expression in Europe alongside potential for contemporary expression of democratic European values.

<sup>21</sup> (Keith, 2005, p. 15)

programmes at a European level for security provision at specific Major Events locally. These are the planned programmes of detailed research undertaken by national authorities for the preparations required to meet the complex security challenges of a specific event whose security concerns come to dominate others by virtue of their requirement for *international* cooperation.

### How to use this Guide

This guide has been written with the ‘builders’ of the House in mind. That is, those Consortium members nominated by UNICRI in its proposal for EU funding with ‘owning’ and progressing the foundational ‘coordination tools and methodology’ (CTM) services of the House that have been so far established during the seven or so years of the EU-SEC (I & II) programme.

There are seven established CTMs for live testing and developing in various ways in the proposed House project for late 2011 to late 2013.

CTM 1	The IPO Security Planning Model	Denmark
CTM 2	Best Practices in Public-Private Partnerships	UK
CTM 3	Media Management Guidelines for Major Events	Italy
CTM 4	Ethical & Operational Standards for Security Products	Austria
CTM 5	Specialist Technical Equipment Pool (STEP.)	Estonia
CTM 6	European Major Events Register (EMER)	Portugal
CTM 7	Networking & Training/CEPOL	France

In two parts (II & III) chapters 3 to 10 of this manual deal with each in turn as Common House Policies. An ‘owner’ of any CTM, or any other Consortium partner involved in task related team work in respect of it, can use the respective CTM chapters as reference points for description, discussion and guidance in relation to it. Original source material from EU-SEC II documents and other associated reports are drawn on but not necessarily covered in full. Where indicated, these source reports should be used as primary material by CTM owners in conjunction with the guidance. They are available from UNICRI.

Some CTMs are more developed than others. The content of this guide seeks only to offer suggestions as to their further development, not to be prescriptive or specify in any binding way as to how it should be done. What is important though, and why this manual should be read in full by all parties involved in the building of the House, is an understanding of how the seven CTMs relate to each other, their backgrounds and broader picture to which they intend to speak for the future. Knowledge of and attention to the third EU-SEC project plan (THE HOUSE) in this respect will be critical. Whilst not becoming detached from original purpose as coordination tools and methodologies for common Major Event security planning processes in Europe, the guidance in this document should be seen as ‘live’. That is, development to be based on live field-testing reflection and refinement in the name of the House.

To this end, and with the laying of the foundations of the House in mind, Part I deals largely with the outcomes of EU-SEC II’s Work Package 1 on the status and understanding of Major Events across various national security research programmes in Europe during 2008.

Chapter 1 reviews the main findings of Portugal’s extensive Task 1.2 report in this respect. Based on a survey of national police authorities from 22 participating Consortium partners to the project, it distils from this important and productive pioneering exercise methodological considerations as to obtaining and maintaining up-to-date knowledge of contemporary topics and issues facing security planners and coordinators of Major Events in Europe. It also covers provisional findings in relation to specific EU-SEC II topics of Public-Private Partnerships, media management and security planning in general.

Following Finland's Task 2.1 review of the survey, these are all topics of further development within the programme in terms of the need for international cooperation and development of common House policies as CTMs in respect of them.

Chapter 2 revisits and fully reviews the EU-SEC programmes working definition of 'Major Event'. A shortened definition focussed on an event's requirement for international cooperation in respect of its security planning is presented for use within the House and the means by which to assess access to and development of its CTM services. Other key terms of 'Security Planning', 'Security' and 'Security Product', along with its associated acronym of 'STILT' as a classification system developed during EU-SEC II are included and briefly outlined in this chapter. The Glossary of Terms at the start of this manual (see p.xvi) was largely derived from the review process and the one page diagram of the House definition of Major Event and associated terms at the end of the chapter can be read in conjunction with it.

As mentioned, Parts II & III deal in practical terms with each of the seven CTMs as Common House Policies. These two parts divide their coverage of the CTMs 1-4 and 3-7 respectively in short 5-7 page chapters. The two parts are divided along the lines set by the thematic areas of the future Work Packages envisaged for the House under the EU-SEC III project proposal. That is, as common planning and evaluation standards for CTMs 1-4 (Part II) and for CTMs 3-7 as tools for coordinating research, technologies and networks (Part III).

Chapter 3 introduces the envisaged Work Packages for the House in relation to the development of the CTMs by their owners. It then proceeds to cover CTM 1, the *IPO Security Planning Model*, and suggestions for its implementation and use as a common benchmark and evaluation tool as developed by Denmark and Ireland under Austria's Task 3.2 during 2009. Denmark's evaluation checklist, based on it, ends the chapter.

Chapter 4 deals with CTM 2, *Best Practices in PPPs*, as developed under Task 3.1 by the UK partner. It focuses on issues of assessing good practices and core principles of responsibility and regulation in terms of partnerships at Major Events. The UK report's guidance as a summary of recommendations is included at the end of the chapter for owner/user reference.

Chapter 5 deals with CTM 3, *Media Management Guidelines*. Developed by Germany as Task 3.3 during 2009 and 2010, and building upon Germany's previous contributions to the EU-SEC programme on ethics, the chapter focuses on the importance of international consistency for the police in world media relations. Stressing professionalism in police press office management, it concludes with direct reference to the *European Code of Police Ethics*.

Chapter 6 then picks up from the previous chapter with CTM 4, *Ethical and Operational Standards for Security Products*. This deals with a set of statements developed under Austria's Task 3.2 aimed at encouraging reflection on and active promotion of the European Code of Police Ethics in a country's Major Event security planning process. The 'gold' and 'platinum' compliance statements are reproduced at the end of the chapter. The relevant articles of the *European Code of Police Ethics* that they are derived from appear in the annexes to this manual.

Moving into Part III, Chapter 7 engages the main outcomes of Work Package 2 that of The Netherland's Task 2.2 report on obstacles to cooperation. In pointing out the more attitudinal than legal nature of obstacles, the chapter accentuates the positive outlook provided by the report in its discussion of the manifest will to initiate the movement of activity between member states as the means to overcome such

obstacles. The EU's 2008 *Prüm Decision* as an instrument to facilitate international police cooperation, which is explicit in respect of Major Events, and its relation to House interests receives critical attention.

Chapter 8 covers STEP as CTM 5. Provisionally tested by Italy under Task 2.3, the detail of the original 2006 idea is returned to and included in this chapter for consideration. This includes reference to its potential use by police under commercial pressure for both the planning for and procurement of ever-more sophisticated and actively marketed security products (as specialist technical equipment) in response to security budgets and needs. This and CTM 6 can be read in line with the 'common research and technology taxonomies' themes of future Task activities envisaged for the House under the proposal for the third phase of the EU-SEC programme.

Chapter 9 covers EMER as CTM 6 and the accompaniment of STEP. Again, the will to cooperation and sharing of information is pointed to by virtue of Task 2.3 and all the work carried out between partners in the EU-SEC programme. The detail of the original 2006 idea is also similarly laid out in this chapter for its developer's future reference and guidance. As a central EU level Register of Major Events and basic data in relation to them, its potential to serve as a broader and longer-term security research database for the House is one acknowledged by the Netherland's Task 2.1 report and outlined in the earlier Chapter 7.

Chapter 10 reflects the Networking and Training Task theme of the third phase of the EU-SEC programme in its coverage of CTM 7 as *Networking and Training through CEPOL*. Drawing on developments within Austria's Task 3.2 as to how to best use CEPOL as a resource for the House, France's work under Task 3.4 informs this chapter's considerations on the promotion and recognition of the other House CTMs through CEPOL. This is based upon an assessment of Consortium member needs carried out during 2010 and consideration of the potential for an annual CEPOL seminar on the House and its CTM services for Major Event Security planning.

Part IV brings the Manual onto the wider contributions of the House to the EU's Stockholm Programme (2010-2014) and the aspiration of a commonality of policing in Europe. Its two chapters draw upon and heavily reflect the work of UNICRI and France's Task 3.4 Draft Roadmap during the later parts of Work Packages 3 and 4 of the EU-SEC II project.

Chapter 11 discusses the structuring of the future of the House and its relations to CEPOL. This is in keeping with what will be UNICRI's main task during the House building programme of the proposed third phase of the project in relation to a Task theme of framework and governance. Key issues in this chapter cover the role of a new 'advisory group' and 'coordination unit' along with the continued commitment of national authorities to the House.

Chapter 12 provides guidance as to the impact potential of the House and its CTMs on relevant aspects of the EU's Stockholm Programme. This material is for the consideration of Consortium members tasked with this responsibility under Work Package 2 of the proposed third phase of the project for late 2011 and general consumption of all.

A short concluding chapter returns to this Manual's running theme of working toward a commonality of policing in a democratic Europe as the added value of the House and its CTM services for the international coordination of Major Event security planning; the production of this Manual itself being the 2011 outcome of EU-SEC II's Work Package 5.

## Security as an Expression of European Freedoms

Portugal's task report reminds EU-SEC partners (as members of the House) of the need to be aware that a Major Event represents an expression of contemporary freedom in Europe. Furthermore, that as a core concept in our common democratic way of life, this sense and expression of freedom is one that must be preserved and respected in the security planning process<sup>22</sup>. These are not just warm words. It must continue to be stressed that the provision of security at Major Events in Europe has to be balanced with (if not be a demonstrable public expression of) the rights and freedoms enjoyed by the citizens of a democratic society *as citizens*, be they participants, protestors, or even perpetrators of crimes of whatever degree for the judicial process of law that must follow. Otherwise one has to question what, exactly, is being secured, if not the very freedoms and values of contemporary European society?

As the UK's Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) lead on uniformed operations, Chief Constable Meredydd Hughes, has commented following formal criticism<sup>23</sup> of the Metropolitan Police handling of riots at the April 2009 London G20 Summit Major Event:

*The police have to balance the competing rights of those who wish to protest with the rights of the wider community, and our duty to protect people and property from the threat of harm or injury. Balancing such competing rights is challenging, particularly in a world with such a wide spectrum of protests, instant communication and complex burden of legislation.*<sup>24</sup>

In other words, to plan and provide security at Major Event based on principles governed by human rights and the minimum use of force. That is, the *facilitation* of peaceful protest (as a legitimate form of communication from a people to a government in a democratic society), not the *suppression* of it as a threat. Again, it is worth reflecting on how the activist clowns actually end up *testing* rather than *breaching* the limits of security provision in practice.

Similarly, in the wake of large scale student demonstrations turning to disorder in London on 10 November 2010, this view is echoed locally by the Metropolitan Police's recently appointed (December 2010) lead officer for public order policing in London, Assistant Commissioner Lynne Owens. For her, the capacity to both facilitate peaceful demonstration and respond to serious disorder needs to be built into the planning stages of policing protests (at Major Events or otherwise) and the critical importance of working *with* demonstrators in those planning stages is understood by the Metropolitan Police<sup>25</sup>.

Thus it is important for members of the House to understand and accept (as they implicitly do) that where freedom and justice for the European citizen are defining democratic values, then security at Major Events in Europe is not simply about securing the event and its participants from physical threats in themselves. But that it must also balance as a public expression of respect *for* and protection *of* democratic freedom and the securing of justice for those who may, for whatever reason, have their civil rights put at risk or infringed by the event and the nature of its policing in itself. It is hoped that the media image used in this manual's introduction is instructive in helping to keep that in mind during the security planning stages of Major Events in a democratically free, secure and just Europe to come.

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<sup>22</sup> (GCS/MAI, 2009, p. 2)

<sup>23</sup> (HMIC, 2009). Available from <http://inspectorates.justice.gov.uk/hmic>

<sup>24</sup> (Hughes, 2010, pp. 7; 16-17)

<sup>25</sup> (Owens, 2011, pp. 16-17)





## **PART I - RESEARCHING & DEFINING 'MAJOR EVENTS' IN EUROPE**

The following two chapters review and consolidate the main outcomes of Work Package 1 within the EU-SEC II project.

They can be read as background to and supporting material for Parts II and III of the manual.



## **CHAPTER 1 - RESEARCHING MAJOR EVENTS SECURITY IN EUROPE**

This chapter consolidates the formative work led by Portugal to survey the current state of national research programmes for Major Event security provision in Europe (Task 1.2). As the core outcome of Work Package 1, it presents general findings and recommendations based on a self-completion questionnaire designed for that purpose. The questionnaire was responded to by nineteen out of twenty-two EU Member States actively participating<sup>26</sup> in EU-SEC II and had been refined from that of the original EU-SEC questionnaire piloted among the then ten member consortium in 2005. It is based upon Portugal's 2009 Task report<sup>27</sup>.

### **Report's Main Findings**

That a general consensus currently exists among EU Member States to exchange information; that there are many overlapping security research topics of interest to field practitioners; and that there is a need for common terminology regarding some of the concepts being used<sup>28</sup>.

That there is a diversity of departments responsible for drafting security plans; that there is a diversity of rank of officer in charge of security operations during events; and that this dispersion of effort and lack of coherence hinders international cooperation.

That there seems little coordination of common mission in public-private partnerships; also there seems little legislation or guidance on media management for public authorities; and there are relational and organizational obstacles to cooperation with media & private sectors.

That the concept of 'Major Event' is generally well perceived (but needs definition for the House); that EU Member States require the capacity to work efficiently with different organizational cultures; and that they increasingly reflect the complexities of contemporary society.

That international media coverage changes the nature of an event as a risk factor itself; that security planning is harder in the international context and needs coordination; (but) that the culture of information sharing has improved in response to international security threats.

### **Report's Key Recommendations**

- Further examine organizational culture as an obstacle to efficiency and cooperation.
- Clarify the criteria for what constitutes 'good practice' with regard to sharing lessons.
- Debate the range of technical information that can actually be shared, exactly.
- Consider web-based applications for quicker, easier, more comprehensive, surveys.
- Further research the longer term impact of Major Events on their social environments.

These findings and recommendations have largely been followed during subsequent EU-SEC II tasks. The results are reflected in this manual. The work leading to them is reviewed here.

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<sup>26</sup> Of the 24 total consortium partners listed. UNICRI and EUROPOL did not respond to the questionnaire.

<sup>27</sup> (GCS/MAI, 2009)

<sup>28</sup> Though not specified in the report, see this manual's glossary for development of this point.

### **The Questionnaire – Portugal’s Role**

Portugal was represented in both EU-SEC projects, latterly by the Internal Security Coordinating Office (GCS) within the Portuguese Ministry of Interior (MAI), with the work being coordinated by the *Instituto Superior de Ciências Policiais e Segurança Interna* (ISCPSI). Prior to the first EU-SEC project, Portugal’s GCS office was already in cooperation with UNICRI and Europol in the development of the International Permanent Observatory on Security Measures during Major Events programme (IPO) in 2003. Having participated in all UNICRI’s closed-door meetings for IPO, in particular that held in Lisbon late that year, Portugal took on responsibility within the then forthcoming EU-SEC project for implementing Task 1.2 and obtaining a description of the *status quo* of national research programmes from its ten participating EU Member States. Achieved by way of a two-part questionnaire (Parts A & B), the main results were presented to the original EU-SEC project consortium in Dublin, December 2005.

This was a first attempt at a challenging task. It provided a satisfactory overview of national research programmes and good practices on security during Major Events among participating EU member states. It also allowed for some rough conclusions to be drawn about the general state-of-the-art in the European field. Despite some recognised operational problems with design and interpretation, the original questionnaire introduced a common platform and working methodology from which to improve coordination at a European level: national authorities were now at least talking to each other through a network of regular contacts over Major Events and their security planning as a common concern. As an exercise in information exchange, it also revealed some basic intra-country and inter-country obstacles to coordinated cooperation in the field of Major Event security research processes.

Recognising significant field developments in Major Event security since the first EU-SEC and the expansion of EU membership itself to twenty-seven countries by 2007, Portugal refined the original questionnaire for 2009 use among the twenty-two participating countries of EU-SEC II. In consultation with UNICRI and Finland, the new questionnaire (in contrast to the original) was substantially reduced in size and several questions that had raised difficulties were either redrafted or eliminated. The two-part self-completion questionnaire became more topic-focused (on ‘national research programmes’, ‘public-private partnerships’ and ‘media management’) and was also accompanied by a glossary of terms to help clarify interpretation and ensure a better quality of replies. Data from it served as the empirical basis for further project tasks.

### **PARTS A AND PARTS B – General Planning and Specific Events**

Part A of the questionnaire was designed to take a macroscopic approach to Major Events in respondent countries. Its 23 questions sought general data on national research programmes, existing legal frameworks and available bibliographic references in relation to Major Event security planning, along with descriptive elements as to the main characteristics of public-private partnerships and media management in the field of Major Event security planning. In analysis, the exercise proved that there was a general consensus to foster the exchange of information on the topic among EU-SEC consortium partners<sup>29</sup>. Furthermore, that despite being less conclusive about research programmes more generally, it was able to produce a thematic list of security topics of general research interest to the field<sup>30</sup>. This has been reproduced as Table 1 and is briefly discussed later below.

Part B was designed to take a microscopic approach by gathering detailed data on specific Major Events from respondent countries. Between January and April 2009, nineteen countries returned data on 34

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<sup>29</sup> (GCS/MAI, 2009, p. 22)

<sup>30</sup> (GCS/MAI, 2009, p. 26)

separate Major Events via the questionnaire's twelve questions. Despite a high number of 'non-answers'<sup>31</sup> the exercise confirmed that the concept of 'Major Event' was generally well perceived among EU-SEC consortium partners subjectively, though the concept continued to be debated as the project progressed and has consequently been revised for the purpose of identifying Major Events that are of objective interest to the House by virtue of their requirement for international cooperation (see Chapter 2).

Of equal notability, however, was the diversity of departments responsible for drafting security plans for such events, as well as diversity in the rank of officer in charge of operations providing security during them<sup>32</sup>. This echoed a 'dispersion of effort' and 'lack of coherence' mentioned in Portugal's report that was hindering interaction and cooperation between national stake-holders over cost-effective security solutions to problems posed by Major Events. The report noted that the creation of the House had the proven potential to overcome these problems in terms of its capacity for international coordination<sup>33</sup>.

Part B had asked for examples of recent Major Events (regardless of any international planning requirement) along with the name of the department responsible for the *planning* of its security and the officer in charge of security *during* the event. Whilst planner and commander are not necessarily the same, the result is a provisional list of specialist police departments across Europe with direct knowledge of researching and preparing security plans and police commanders with experience of implementing them (a synthesis of the two is reproduced as Annex A). As indicative only, a more comprehensive list of national contact points for Major Events requiring international cooperation in respect of their security planning process could be developed by the House. Unanimous support for the establishment of a national contact point for the House was born out by the results of France's roadmap survey carried out during summer 2010 and replied to by 18 of the 22 consortium countries it was sent to, CEPOL being looked to as the mechanism through which to provide and keep such a list up-to-date<sup>34</sup>. Consideration, however, should be made of the 2008 *Prüm Decision* discussed in Chapter 7 and referred to later in Chapters 9, 10 and 11 in particular, with regard to 'National Contact Points' for Major Events and data exchange.

It can be noted that the events offered in reply to the 2009 Portugal survey as recent examples of 'Major Events' were self-selected by respondents on the basis of the definition of 'Major Event' in use at the time for the purpose of the questionnaire. Not all of these events would be regarded as 'Major Events' for the purpose of the House under its revised definition focused on an event's requirement for international cooperation in respect of its security planning.

Regarding the variance of departments responsible for security planning and ranks of commanding officers in operational charge of security during the events, a key question for further consideration would be to ask Member States by what criteria is the security planning for any given event allocated to any particular department and what determines who the officer in operational charge of security during the event is to be.

The services of the House are being developed in respect of supporting the coordination of international cooperation required for the national level security planning stages of any given event. The event in question should therefore be of sufficient scale to require national level responsibility for its security planning (regardless of territorial location) and of sufficient scope to require international cooperation in

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<sup>31</sup> (GCS/MAI, 2009, p. 61 & 77)

<sup>32</sup> (GCS/MAI, 2009, p. 61) – Consolidated in Annex A of this manual

<sup>33</sup> (GCS/MAI, 2009, pp. 3-4)

<sup>34</sup> (DGPN, 2011, p. 8 & 26)

that planning process (regardless of the event's size or importance) as a response to the researched security threats it poses.

The rank of officer in overall operational charge of the event on the day should therefore be determined by the level of authority required to command the available resources and security measures planned for potential deployment and use to ensure security during the event itself. The Gold/Silver operational command structure adopted by *inter alia* Denmark and the UK may serve as a useful common template in this respect.

### ***Methodological Issues & Limitations of Results***

On the whole, Part B was better answered than Part A, though much remained hostage to conceptual interpretation. In application it had been necessary to present and explain to project partners the form, content and objectives of the questionnaire. This was carried out during a Network Steering Committee (NSC) meeting at UN HQ in New York, January 2009, prior to dissemination. The aim was to ensure that the intended purpose and application of the questionnaire was clear, since common terminology within EU-SEC remained formative (including that of 'Major Event'). Yet despite this, and all the efforts made to modernize the questionnaire as a survey tool, it was acknowledged that the number of responses to many of the questions proved insufficient for more conclusive analysis<sup>35</sup>.

The available results, though, based on replies from nineteen out of twenty-two participating countries, were presented to the project in June (Bucharest) and reported on formally in October 2009. An instructive recommendation of the report was for similar future initiatives to consider using web-based applications that facilitate a quicker and more comprehensive completion of a questionnaire by providing contextual aids and instruction for each question<sup>36</sup>.

The view of this manual is that for such future surveys it would be important to ensure delivery to the senior police officer in charge of *planning* the overall security operation for a *specific and most recent* Major Event and that it is framed in plain, non-technical, language with clear categories and easy to answer questions. Its basic aim should simply be to assess current planning processes against a common model and build a bank of 'lessons learnt' and 'good practices' from contemporary experiences as feedback. The EMER programme discussed in Chapter 9 as a CTM service of the House could help facilitate this.

Where the House is concerned with surveying research programmes as planning processes for specific events, best practice would be to take a specific event as a survey's starting point and ask questions about the programme of planning for it, rather than start with questions about planning programmes in general and work toward specific events in relation to them.

Better still would be for the House to pick a particular event of specific interest (in conjunction with the EMER service) and send a monitoring/evaluation survey to the person in charge of security for it. This could be a function of a future web-based survey and data gathering mechanism for sharable experiences and good practices from real events in real time. However, while the report acknowledges a general consensus to 'foster exchange of information' in this respect<sup>37</sup> it rightly makes a point of asking by what criteria 'good practice' may be assessed as 'good'<sup>38</sup>. This should be addressed. For example, the practice's consistency with the guiding principles of the *European Code of Police Ethics* might be one cornerstone of governing criteria. The extent to which it serves the end goal of actually achieving and maintaining

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<sup>35</sup> (GCS/MAI, 2009, p. 75)

<sup>36</sup> (GCS/MAI, 2009, p. 75)

<sup>37</sup> (GCS/MAI, 2009, p. 22)

<sup>38</sup> (GCS/MAI, 2009, p. 26) See 'assessing good practice' in Chapter 3 *post* based on UK's Task 3.1 report.

security against potential threats posed when tested in the field might be another. Ease of operational implementation against cost effectiveness another cornerstone of criteria yet still (see ‘assessing good practice’ in Chapter 4 *post*).

#### **PART A: Research Programmes, Public-Private Partnerships and Media Management**

With regard to Part A, the report concluded that efficiency was the defining interest in the potential of cooperative partnerships with the private sector and relations with the media. It also concluded that an obstacle to cooperation with the private sector and media could be found in the organizational cultures of some police and public authorities. Accordingly, it recommended that organizational culture as an obstacle to the realization of cooperation and efficiency with other actors should be further examined in future.<sup>39</sup>

In this regard it advised inquiry as to the reasons why different countries either coincide or diverge in their evaluation as to the beneficial impacts of research findings for the planning of security at Major Events. It is suggested that such differences may derive from specific features of the organizational cultures concerned and that these need to be understood as pre-existing the occupational culture required for the overall goal of a European House of Major Events Security<sup>40</sup>. Such a question might form part of a longer term supporting (socially scientific rather than national security based) research programme for the House.

#### ***On National Research Programmes and Policies***

The survey’s attempt to look at broad research programmes and policies (perhaps now better understood as the security planning processes) was relatively inconclusive. One could not be sure if all respondents were reading the questions and concepts the same way.

Despite this, the survey demonstrated a will to cooperate in the aims of EU-SEC II and a consensus to support information sharing in relation to it. What it did produce, from well answered questions, was material for a list of thematic topic areas of current and future research interest in the field (see Table 1 below).

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<sup>39</sup> (GCS/MAI, 2009, p. 76)

<sup>40</sup> (GCS/MAI, 2009, p. 76)

Security Research Topics for Major Events	Participant Country
Crowd control – special police tactics, Human Rights,	Swe, Por,
Deterrence/repression policies, social prevention of violence	Por
Security awareness and visibility of measures, psychology	Net, Bul
Crisis & consequence management, riot control & assistance	Por, Bul, Lat, Slk
Riot control and football hooliganism, crowd psychology	Bul
Racial hatred and extremist penetration of social events	Slk
Intervention unit systems, security of political events	Slk, Lat
Technology – development, use, support for security/safety	Swe, Por, Mal, Hun, Sln
Mass screening of crowds for explosives/CBRN	UK
CCTV imaging to ID suspects & suspicious behaviour	UK, Por
International vetting, identification and accreditation	UK, Mal
Practical EU police co-operation during ME's, intelligence	Swe, Mal, Sln
Deployment of security personnel with VIPs	Mal,
Problems of media coverage, & communication policies	Fin, Por, Lat
Threat analysis – fast/on-line international info exchange	Fin, Den, Mal, Hun
Evaluation – learning from, follow up by planners, tools	Spa, Por, Den, Ire
Evaluation of adequacy of crisis management tools	Slk
Coordination of knowledge sources & research findings	UK
Communication/leadership structures, liaison contacts	Aus, Den, Hun, Lat
Coordination – methodology, resource management	Ire, Slk,
Coordination of internal and external bodies, activities	Slk, Sln
Inter-agency relations & cooperation (public & private)	Fin, Aus, Por, Bul, Hun, Lat
Cause and effect of increased private security sector role	Fin
Command – qualification, mental/ethical fitness, allocation	Hun, Lat
Legislation, administrative regimes	Sln, Lat

Table 1: Security research topics of interest to security planners in the field.

Source: Final Report of Task 3.2, B.M.I Austria (B.M.I, 2010, p. 38).

Security planning specialists were asked for their opinion as to Major Event security topics that were *already being* researched and needed further development, as well as topics that were *not being* researched but they felt should be (Part A, questions 11 & 12). Of 18 replies 12 respondents were senior police officers, the others were researchers or training/policy specialists within relevant police institutions. The answers represent a crude but valid and reliable indication as to the kind of security research topics thought to be important by field operatives themselves. The survey questions that produced them are worth retaining and refining for future use in conjunction with the STILT categorisation system for the research and development of new 'security products' referred to in the next chapter.

Of the 79 suggested topics, there was much overlap, some being more specific than others. Some belong to preparation phases, others implementation phases and others evaluation phases of a security planning programme. Some were focused on the research of security threats, while others on the production of security measures to counter those threats. They are not definitive or comprehensive but they help demonstrate the breadth of a security research programme for Major Events and the development of their security provision in general.



### ***On Public-Private Partnerships (PPP):***

The survey found 'PPP' serving as the new articulation for the relationship between state and non-state actors for the purpose of more effective state intervention.

Found in all three types (categories) of event – sport, political and cultural (football being the main source) – it was noted that governing law, policies and programmes seem to emerge from 1990s onwards. This is in keeping with much academic observation as to the general growth of the private security sector in relation to traditional areas of public policing in Europe since the 1990s. However, the survey report notes an apparent conflict between benefits and obstacles: where PPPs are generally seen in terms of efficiency via cooperation with public authorities, obstacles to this efficiency are seen as organizational and a lack of will to cooperation (see also glossary terms 'marketisation' and 'privatisation'):

*What stands out [from the analysis] is that, in addition to the brief history of [public and private sector] association, operability between [public and private] bodies is hindered by serious limitations (in terms of practices and/or at a representative/symbolic level) imposed by the different mission they are in charge of and by difficulties in communication.*<sup>41</sup>

There are two main problems identified: one is about competing priorities, so there is no coordination of an overall sense of *common mission*. The other is communication difficulties, so there is no coordination of an overall system of *representation* between partner agencies.

The general problem of PPP (in terms of its 2009 status) is therefore said to rest in the organization and management of security in both the planning stages and its provision. More will be said and explored regarding public and private sector partnerships in Chapter 4, particularly in respect of understanding and developing the relationship between the two.

### ***On Media Management:***

Authorities need to plan for media cooperation<sup>42</sup>. The survey confirmed that as of 2009 there is generally very little legislation, policy, programmes or guidance on Media Management. There is therefore scope for the future development of this topic. For example, courses on media management lessons learnt from Major Events:

*The advantages of media management policies are seen as efficiency but, again, blocked by relational and organizational obstacles to cooperation based on perceptions of media partiality: "The advantages represented by the increase in efficacy that results from the elaboration of media management policies is opposed by two obstacles: the partiality of the media and relational and organizational difficulties."*<sup>43</sup>

As with its overall conclusions, the Portugal report is pointing to a police perception of efficiency through cooperation with both media and private sector in security planning and provision. But one that is paradoxically hindered by police occupational cultures and organizational structures as obstacles to cooperation based on perceptions of media partiality, differing private sector interests in security and poor working relations with the two.

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<sup>41</sup> (GCS/MAI, 2009, p. 46)

<sup>42</sup> (GCS/MAI, 2009, p. 51)

<sup>43</sup> (GCS/MAI, 2009, p. 57)

## **PART B: Research Based Security Planning for Specific Major Events**

With regard to Part B, the report concluded that the distribution of different types of event (sporting, political, cultural) highlighted the importance of assessing risks, threats and vulnerabilities at an international level as part of an integrated research based planning process, one centred on ‘intelligence led policing’<sup>44</sup> In this respect, a better understanding of the type of occupational opposition that might be at the root of lower organizational level opposition to information sharing is needed. This was with particular regard to the need for sharing procedure-oriented technical references on security planning.

Another important finding was the impact of the reported events on the daily routines of the venues where they take place, mainly urban areas. The report notes that the urban way of life and the ways in which events with high media coverage manifest themselves today are closely related, and for that reason gain a spectacular magnitude. Yet it is also this proximity between events with high media coverage and the “lived space” where they occur that dramatically increases the risks and threats associated with Major Events. This is not only for their protagonists and organizers, but also for the citizens who experience that proximity.<sup>45</sup> To this end, the local social impacts of Major Events should also be researched.

Both the above points were recognized in France’s 2010 survey based Draft Strategic Roadmap. With regard to developing common procedures in relation to security planning, it was noted that some countries are not keen on changing their established practices and doctrines and are likely to structurally resist changes. And with regard to adopting new technical tools for security provision it was noted that each country has its own organizational doctrine to apply over the adoption and use of certain technologies. Furthermore, the reaction of local populations to the use of new security technologies at Major Events needs to be considered as a topic of research in the planning phases.<sup>46</sup>

### ***On organisational cultures and the sharing of security plans***

The survey found that the nature of a Major Event requires the capacity for national authorities to work efficiently with different organizational cultures regarding risk assessments.<sup>47</sup> Acknowledging that Major Events increasingly reflect the complexities of contemporary society, it recognised that security planning is that much harder in the international context: hence the need for the coordination of international security planning via the House.

The report strongly recommends a technical debate on the range of information sharing as to what can be shared<sup>48</sup>. For Portugal’s purpose of building a reference library of security plans, the survey found that it was easier to make general plans available than specific ones<sup>49</sup>. Of specific security plans, only five were actually made available to Portugal for its library. The reason for this low rate of information sharing between national authorities over specific plans was understood as their internal classification systems for documents.

Otherwise, the survey found that the culture of sharing practices, information, procedures, common planning criteria and training regarding the protection of VIPs etc, has (generally speaking) improved in Europe over recent years in response to the internationalisation of organised crime and terrorism<sup>50</sup>.

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<sup>44</sup> (GCS/MAI, 2009, p. 77)

<sup>45</sup> (GCS/MAI, 2009, p. 77)

<sup>46</sup> (DGPN, 2011, pp. 5-6)

<sup>47</sup> (GCS/MAI, 2009, p. 62)

<sup>48</sup> (GCS/MAI, 2009, p. 68)

<sup>49</sup> (GCS/MAI, 2009, p. 66)

<sup>50</sup> (GCS/MAI, 2009, p. 68)

As suggested later in the Roadmap<sup>51</sup>, an alternative way forward for the international coordination of security planning might be to use the IPO Security Planning Model as a common benchmark, or reference point, against which planners can check and revise their specific security plans. For it can be noted from the survey that other manuals/reference documents listed as used in producing security plans ranged from academic publication, to organiser's programmes, to intelligence reports, as well as security plans themselves supplied by private security companies<sup>52</sup>. Given the mix of conceptual ambiguity, organizational cultures and prohibitive document classification systems, a gauging of planning processes against a common template may be more productive. This idea was later developed as a common standard and is expanded on in Chapter 3 of this manual as CTM 1.

One could add to this the web-based database for evaluative 'lessons learnt', 'good practices' and 'new products' developed within the plan within the scope of House services: a place to share and file new experiences for an EU network of 'security planners forum' of sorts. Again, this is expanded on in relation to EMER as a House service, along with Networking and Training in collaboration with CEPOL in Chapters 6 and 7.

### ***On Security Threats and Vulnerabilities***

Whilst unable to draw any conclusions over security threats to Major Events in respect of different categories, the survey identified public order as the main threat in general. The main vulnerabilities for Major Event security, however, were human resources and logistic support.

What also emerged was evidence of a police view that vulnerabilities were mostly *external* to a police locus of control<sup>53</sup>. The police occupational tendency is therefore not to regard those vulnerabilities as areas of police responsibility. However, if the provision of security at a Major Event needs to be taken as the common mission of *all* parties involved, then this police occupational view needs to be challenged and overcome. This is particularly so in both international cooperation with other authorities as well as private sector partnership.

### ***The Local and Global of Major Events – Need for International Cooperation***

Due to their characteristics and symbolic meaning, Major Events must be regarded as typical targets of attack. Even countries with low crime risks, especially in terms of terrorist attacks, can find themselves on the agenda of international crime organizations simply because they host a Major Event that mobilizes thousands of people and involves the presence of political world leaders or important VIPs<sup>54</sup>.

It is pointed out that the implications of globalization include the intensified displacement of risks and threats to other local settings: "Major events that take place at any given venue on the planet face an increasingly higher probability of being influenced by forces generated at an unspecified distance from that venue."<sup>55</sup> Due to its scale and complexity, they draw on the experience of the IPO programme to warn against underestimating a Major Event's ability to disrupt normal business, attract scrutiny and criticism from internal and external bodies, and bring significant pressure to satisfy the widest imaginable range of stakeholders.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> (DGP, 2011, pp. 11-13)

<sup>52</sup> (GCS/MAI, 2009, pp. 160-169. Appendix A, answers to q.12)

<sup>53</sup> (GCS/MAI, 2009, p. 73)

<sup>54</sup> (GCS/MAI, 2009, p. 2)

<sup>55</sup> (GCS/MAI, 2009, p. 2)

<sup>56</sup> (GCS/MAI, 2009, p. 2)

Thus, in a globalized world the theme of security becomes more and more a strategic factor of development and competition between countries, regions and cities, and a deciding factor as far as investment options are concerned. To illustrate this Portugal emphasizes the importance given to security in the assessment of a country's bid to host a Major Event. Good candidature, they point out, to organize and host international sporting competitions such as the Olympics can be seriously harmed or even put aside if criminal risks are judged too high against a potential host's available security capacity.

As such, globalization requires states to cooperate internationally to counter the local materialization on national territory of threats and risks set beyond national borders<sup>57</sup>. The growing awareness among European societies is that the security problems faced by one State are inevitably the same security problems faced by other Member-States. This presses the authorities to take on an ever more collaborative attitude and to work together in more effective ways<sup>58</sup>.

### ***Further descriptive qualities of Major Events***

From these typologies, the Portugal report points out, one can understand Major Events and related security research from two main perspectives:

First, from the *international* level of security planning for the host: for this accentuates the need for the capacity to be able to work efficiently with different organizational cultures both domestically and internationally. For example, the assessment of risks and vulnerabilities will have to take place at an international level.

Moreover, because Major Events involve the participation of key figures from the worlds of politics, sports or culture (or otherwise), either individually or as a group and from countries other than the host country, it becomes absolutely necessary to resort to a highly complex security research strategy that requires the integration of planning means and resources, the interoperability of technology and complementary data analysis procedures in order to be intelligence-led in preparation and provision.<sup>59</sup>

Secondly, from the crucial acknowledgement that Major Events characterised (increasingly) by high media coverage are more and more *characteristic of contemporary societies*<sup>60</sup>. From this perspective, the report observes that regardless of where they take place, the reported events were mostly international and, largely speaking, took place in cities, reflecting the urban environment of them accordingly. This led the task-team to conclude:

*Major events are symbolic expressions of a predominantly urban society, and that their level of complexity, threat, risk and above all their level of vulnerability, are direct consequences of the fact that they take place in densely populated urban areas, with numerous property and citizens that need to be protected against possible collateral damage of any given incident.*<sup>61</sup>

This is an important quality to emphasise. Because it means that security provision cannot be focused purely on threats to the event as an object of protection in itself, but also the threat the event itself potentially poses to the wider social environment it is located in. This is a critical point of observation and understanding about Major Events: that they themselves bring danger to the localities they visit upon.

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<sup>57</sup> (GCS/MAI, 2009, p. 3)

<sup>58</sup> (GCS/MAI, 2009, p. 4)

<sup>59</sup> (GCS/MAI, 2009, pp. 61-62)

<sup>60</sup> (GCS/MAI, 2009, p. 62)

<sup>61</sup> (GCS/MAI, 2009, p. 64)

Security during the event is therefore *not* confined to the interests of the event itself, but the wider interests of the social environment in which they temporally and spatially (and perhaps also culturally) occur.

### **Conclusion: a need to develop commonality**

This chapter has primarily reviewed the background work and issues raised by Portugal's ground-laying survey of the EU-SECII Consortium's 22 Member States.

The survey's main findings as to the status quo of Major Event security research in Europe in 2009 and its key recommendations in respect of developing the EU-SEC programme in relation to laying the foundations of the House support the continued development of common practices to better coordinate international cooperation in the planning phases of Major Event security. This all points towards the need for a broader commonality of policing in Europe, a topic returned to and discussed later in the concluding section of this manual for the House.

For their part the Finnish partners reviewed the initial results of the survey in 2009 to make similar conclusions<sup>62</sup>. In particular that:

Research is considered important in planning optimal security for Major Events. That partners favour exchange of information and coordination methodologies in relation to evaluation and resource management. And that there are probably no systematic problems to international cooperation in this respect in the field.

Also, most problems in relation to public-private partnerships (PPPs) were primarily seen in terms of confidentiality and commercial over public interests. However, PPPs were also seen as benefiting the public sector by reducing costs and improving flexibility, albeit issues around information exchange and sharing of public accountability would remain significant.

With regard to media management, challenges were mostly internal and structural and to do with the flow and quality of information. In this respect, good media management was seen in terms of a clear media strategy centred on quality information flows through a common single spokesperson.

These findings from the Finnish report on Task 2.1 and its recommendations relating to them for future joint activities within the EU-SEC II programme were taken up in the respective Work Package 3 Tasks during the remainder of 2009 and 2010, along with the results and recommendations from the Portuguese Report. They are taken as guiding points in the preparation of this manual as a foundation for the House in 2011.

In the interests of progressing common terminology as a significant issue emerging from the survey, the next chapter discusses the definition of 'Major Event' for the purposes of the House and other key concepts. The glossary of key terms for use in the House and other related terms at the beginning of this manual should also be referred to in that light.

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<sup>62</sup> (SMPO, 2009, pp. 26-29)

## CHAPTER 2 - DEFINING A ‘MAJOR EVENT’ FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE HOUSE

A definition is a statement that describes, clearly and exactly, what something is or what a word or phrase means. Meaning tends to come from the purpose of intended use.

### ***‘Major Event’***

In researching Major Event security programmes in Europe over the last seven years, EU-SEC has regularly reviewed its working definition of a ‘Major Event’. First formulated in early 2005 for survey purposes and later revised for purposes of the 2007 IPO Security Planning Model<sup>63</sup> it was again reviewed at the 5<sup>th</sup> EU-SEC II Network Steering Committee meeting in Stockholm on 26 January 2011 for the purpose of its use within this manual and the House.

The outcome of that discussion and consequent feedback was to recast the 2007 IPO Security Planning Model definition in simpler terms for use as a key to access the future services of the House. These services, it should be noted, are concerned with the *coordination* of international cooperation over the *planning* stages of Major Event security, not the *provision* of it during the event itself. So the defining emphasis is on the *international* aspect of *preparations* for a given event’s security operation. As ‘the House definition’, it reads:

<p><b>A Major Event is an event that requires international cooperation in respect of its security planning</b></p>
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### ***‘Security Planning’***

The preparations (i.e. the security planning) spoken of have been commonly referred to in the EU-SEC programme as ‘research programmes’. They start months (or even years in the case of events like the Olympics) ahead of the event itself as specific preparations for specific events (of variable category) that, by virtue of one’s ability to plan for them, are in some way foreseeable to the national authorities responsible for the provisions of security during them.

Key elements of the security planning *process* advocated by the House are spelt out in Chapter 2 of UNICRI’s 2007 IPO Security Planning Model. In this context, the term ‘security planning’ is understood within the EU-SEC programme as “The process of drafting the security plan for a Major Event by utilising the elements outlined in the IPO Model.”<sup>64</sup> It is a *process* informed by a programme of research that produces the knowledge upon which the plan is built. The *plan*, of course, is one aimed at providing *security* during the event.

### ***‘Security’***<sup>65</sup>

Defined in the glossary and derived from the 2005 IPO Toolkit, the ‘security’ spoken of refers to the prevented harm of a potential threat – a ‘threat’ being the existing potential to cause harm (to or at the event). Threats, therefore, are always seen as a test of security and security is only proven to exist when it actually prevents the harm of a threat. Until then, ‘security’ is only theoretical:

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<sup>63</sup> (UNICRI, 2007, p. 8)

<sup>64</sup> (DHPol, 2010, p. 5)

<sup>65</sup> The UK’s Task 3.1 report notes that the commonly used term ‘security’ remains a contested concept among Member States and other EU Event Manuals (MetPo, 2010a, p. 1).

[Evaluated or judged] *in terms of outcomes, security can be defined as the absence of various adverse [factors] that can cause harm during a Major Event. Security therefore always refers to threats – the potential of [factors] causing harm – while security tools refer to all the instruments at the disposal of the authorities and organisers to prevent [such] threats from materialising.*<sup>66</sup>

Understood this way, and for the purposes of the House, a ‘security tool’ amounts to anything intended to prevent the materialisation of a potential threat to or at the event. The focus of the tool’s application is just as likely to be the neutralisation of the threat as a means to prevent the potential of its harm in the first instance as it is the shielding of the event from the harm once released by the threat. Consequently, *ethical standards* appertaining to the production and use of such tools (as measures, instruments or otherwise) become an important element for House consideration in the international coordination of security planning in Europe.

### **‘Security Product’**

Following the above, a ‘security product’ spoken of in the House is anything specifically produced (or procured) for use as a ‘security tool’ in relation to a given ‘security threat’. In other words, any researched product of the security planning process. This would include, among other things, both the pre-planning ‘threat’ assessment upon which the eventual security plan is based and the post-event evaluation of ‘security’ provision during the event, not to mention the security plan itself. All of which are produced, it can be said, by a programme of research within the overall security planning process.

For House purposes, different types of security products can be provisionally categorised using the STILT classification system, developed within EU-SEC II’s work on common research standards<sup>67</sup>:

- **Strategic** (e.g. the overall security plan and contingency plans within it)
- **Tactical** (specific police operations within the plan, e.g. public order)
- **Informational** (e.g. intelligence, threat assessments, evaluation of the plan)
- **Legal** (e.g. restriction orders and temporary powers given for use within the plan)
- **Technical** (special equipment for use within the plan, e.g. taser gun)

With these basic concepts in mind, the remainder of this chapter will more explicitly review the House definition of ‘Major Event’ and its premise within the IPO Programme, along with additional elements for use in applying it.

A diagrammatic summary of the House definition of Major Event and its additional elements will appear at the end of the chapter for reference.

### **‘Major Event’ - The House Definition**

As introduced, for the purpose of accessing the services of the House a Major Event can, on reflection, be more simply and directionally defined as:

**An event that requires international cooperation in respect of its security planning**

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<sup>66</sup> (UNICRI, 2005, p. 10)

<sup>67</sup> (B.M.I, 2010, p. 11) for B.M.I (Austria).

It directs the House user toward the international cooperation element of an event's security planning needs. However, based upon what has gone before, this core statement of meaning needs expanding on for the sake of clarity and self-assessment by EU Member States as to their use of the House in respect of events that they would otherwise regard as 'Major Events' by their own respective criteria for their own internal domestic purposes.

First, the event (whether requiring international cooperation or not) when considered as 'major' by the host authority, will typically be *characterised* by one or more of the following:

1. **Large/international (world) media attraction/coverage**
2. **Their historical, political, cultural significance or popularity**
3. **Participation by large or international crowds, potential target groups, or VIP/dignitaries**

Second, the security planning spoken of will be in response to the potential of (security) threats posed to the event. Those threats may be *categorised* as (but not limited to):

1. **Threats to public safety (including road safety)**
2. **Threats to public order (including violent protest)**
3. **Terrorism (domestic and international)**
4. **Criminality (international, organised and petty)**
5. **Threats of public disorder (e.g. hooliganism and violent behaviour)**
6. **Other events potentially embarrassing to the authorities (e.g. unauthorised activity)**

Finally, the production and provision of that security response will be the result of:

- **A programme of research based planning to counter those threats during the event.**

In other words, a *security* research programme as part of a security planning *process*: one which leads to the formulation of a researched and threat assessment based security *plan* for implementation during the event. So, security is planned against the potential of threats.

With these key elements in mind, a user of this manual should be able to readily identify a 'Major Event' as defined for the purpose of accessing the services of the House. That is, in terms of accessing the House's coordination services for international cooperation during the security planning phases for the event.

Since it has been subject to much revision, some space should be given to further consider the development of the definition of 'Major Event' for the House.

### **Origins in previous definitions**

Below is the original EU-SEC definition that the above was derived from. It was formulated by the EU-SEC I Task-team in Dublin between April and August 2005 and used in both the 2005 questionnaire and the subsequent 2009 questionnaire for EU-SEC II. Although a revised version was used in the 2007 IPO Security Model, the original was again reverted to in the THE HOUSE proposal for future joint activities to enhance the European House of Major Events Security during 2011-2013. It has been empirically tested against what Member States consider to be 'Major Events' in the field and it can be seen how the characterising elements, security threat categories, and research based planning programme requirements above have been derived from it:



### Questionnaire Definition (Apr/Aug 2005):

Any gathering of people, characterized by one or more of the following:

1. Historical and/or political significance and/or popularity;
2. Large media coverage and/or international media attendance;
3. Participation of citizens from different countries and/or possible target groups;
4. Participation of dignitaries and or VIPs;
5. More than 200,000 expected to be present at the event;

AND

has produced, or is likely to produce (in view of the host security planning country) relevant practices and/or research with regard to one or more of the specific categories of security threats\* envisaged by the EU-SEC Consortium.

\*(Threats to/of: public safety; public order; terrorism; criminality and delinquency; violent unauthorised demonstrations; other events potentially embarrassing to the authorities).

It was a review of Portugal's findings and other project documents that helped re-appraise its adequacy for continued use as a key to accessing the future services of the House.

Notwithstanding methodological problems of missing data values, the Portuguese team looked at the objective characteristics the 34 recent events subjectively reported as Major Events by the 19 respondent countries to Part B of the questionnaire<sup>68</sup>. Despite the significant weight of all but one of the characteristics within the definition, for each Major Event reported on (most of which had taken place within three years of the study) that of 'large media coverage and/or international media attendance' featured most prominently.

Found in all 34 cases, the importance of this single attribute confirmed for the task-team the intrinsic relationship between an event and its coverage by the media: that high (world) media coverage can, itself, change the nature of an event to give it added dimensions that require security considerations beyond the routine norm. As the report noted, "Sometimes, media coverage constitutes in itself an added risk factor for the security of the event."<sup>69</sup>

This stood in stark contrast to the relevance of the given definition's demographic attribute of 'more than 200,000 expected to be present at the event' as a defining characteristic in the view of respondents. The frequency of Major Events described as being characterised by this attribute was a very low 7 out of the 34 cases. Comparatively, objective attributes of 'historical/political significance/popularity', 'participation of citizens from different countries/possible target groups' both had high frequencies of 26, with 'participation of dignitaries/VIPs' found in a similarly high 27 of the 34 cases.<sup>70</sup> What was concluded was that in terms of defining what *is* and what is *not* a 'major' event, the (large) number of people was not an eliminating feature.<sup>71</sup>

Following this, the primary reading of a Major Event as 'any gathering of people' is an equally inconsequential element and arguably spurious to any definition of it. Two countries, for example, reported on the security for the physical receipt, transportation and transference of euro cash to the banks as a Major

<sup>68</sup> (GCS/MAI, 2009, p. 60)

<sup>69</sup> (GCS/MAI, 2009, p. 64)

<sup>70</sup> (GCS/MAI, 2009, pp. 63, table 24)

<sup>71</sup> (GCS/MAI, 2009, p. 63)

Event in relation to the euromonitorization of their country as a Major Event.<sup>72</sup> This would not be regarded as ‘a gathering of people’ in the conventional sense, but as an event with major (i.e. *extra-ordinary*) security implications for the host country to plan all the same.

From Portugal’s report, what was more pertinent concerning the characterizing attributes was the overwhelmingly *international* nature of the 34 events reported on. This was both in terms of their participants as well as the media coverage it attracted. A further finding was the consequently subjective *extra-ordinariness* of the security requirements for the host in relation to that international dynamic.<sup>73</sup> It was therefore appropriate to reappraise the standing EU-SEC definition in these terms and return to some aspects of the alternatives that have been variously discussed previously within both the EU-SEC and IPO programmes.

***Subjective and objective elements:***

Within the IPO programme, it had been noted that no accepted definition of ‘Major Event’ existed in the field of security planning but one could be arrived at *objectively* or *subjectively*.

Objectively, Major Events could be defined by “the quality or quantity of people they mobilise, or the time and place they occur in, and threats they thereby attract”. The important element here being in its relation to the (security) threats it *attracts*.

Subjectively, Major Events could be defined by “their requirement for knowledge, skills or resources in excess of those readily available to key participants”. The important element here is the requirement in *excess* of the host country’s *available* security capacity.<sup>74</sup>

In these terms, what makes an event ‘major’ is a balance between the characteristics of the event itself on the one hand (objective) and the security burden placed on its host on the other (subjective). Understood this way, an event is ‘major’ by virtue of what it *attracts* in terms of security threats *in conjunction with* what those threats *require* the host to produce in terms of security provision for them in *excess* of the host’s ordinary routine capacity and norm.

In other words, by the *extra-ordinariness* of the event’s security implications *for the country hosting it*. As such, what defines an event as ‘major’ is more subjective than objective: it is more to do with the security burden *for the host* than it is to do with the characteristics of the event *itself* in terms of size, scale, importance, location, participants, etc.

The 2007 IPO Security Planning Model maintains recognition of this subjective element in stating that: “planning security for a Major Event is a very complex exercise that requires a range of measures and activities *beyond those normally encountered*.” (Emphasis added)<sup>75</sup>. It also recognises the likelihood of *new* structures and practices being introduced in response.

***The requirement of international cooperation over the threat potential***

Below is the ‘operational definition’ arrived at through EU-SEC workshop discussion in December 2005, provisionally accepted as valid by the third Network Steering Committee<sup>76</sup> and actually used as a common definition in the 2007 IPO Security Planning Model:

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<sup>72</sup> (GCS/MAI, 2009, p. 144. Appendix C)

<sup>73</sup> (GCS/MAI, 2009, pp. 61-64)

<sup>74</sup> (UNICRI, 2008, pp. 14-15) acknowledging Dr. Marc Otten and (UNICRI, 2007, p. 7).

<sup>75</sup> (UNICRI, 2007, p. 9)

<sup>76</sup> (UNICRI, 2005); (SMPO, 2006, p. 12); (UNICRI, 2008, p. 15).

**Operational Definition of Major Event (Dublin, Dec 2005 & IPO Security Planning Model, 2007)**

A major event is a foreseeable event that should have at least one of the following characteristics:

1. Historical, political significance or popularity;
2. Large media coverage and/or international media attendance;
3. Participation of citizens from different countries and/or possible target groups;
4. Participation of dignitaries and/or VIPs;
5. High numbers of persons;

AND

poses the potential of threats and therefore may require international cooperation and assistance.

Though lacking in explicit reference to the subjective element of the original one (i.e. ‘in the view of the host country’), it replaced ‘any gathering of people’ with ‘foreseeable event’ to distinguish it from more spontaneous events (or ‘incidents’), such as riots, against which no special security planning or research programme can be prepared other than as general contingencies. It focused the definition on complex events that are organised and authorised in advance and whose security provision can thus be researched and planned for in preparation.

As with the original questionnaire definition, the characterising attributes serve more as a testable guide to field recognition than as defining elements. It is actually the last part of the definition that contains its more essentially defining elements: that it poses the potential of (security) threats for which (the host authority) may require international help in countering.

To quote the previous EU-SEC manual: “*The potential of threats and requirement of international cooperation were the two defining elements of a foreseeable event that would make it ‘major’ in the opinion of the host national authority.*”<sup>77</sup>

In other words, the subjective burden element is the required international response to the security threat potential. An alternative short definition was mooted to this effect in April 2006 and further alluded to in June 2006 reports<sup>78</sup> and the EU-SEC manual of July 2008:

**Alternative Short Definition (EU-SEC Task 2.1 Report, April 2006)**

A Major Event is a foreseeable event that poses the potential of threats and, in the opinion of the hosting authority, may require international cooperation and assistance.

However, it is the later 2005 Dublin definition as used in the 2007 IPO Security Planning Model and a variant of its short alternative that is now used here as the House definition.

***The international and domestic elements of producing new security measures***

As continued reflection and empirical testing of the original questionnaire definition tends to show, it is conceivable that while some Major Events are (objectively) international in nature by virtue of their participants or media attention, the *extra-ordinary* security measures they require of the host authority in *excess* of their available domestic capacity might not necessarily be (subjectively) international in nature.

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<sup>77</sup> (UNICRI, 2008, p. 15)

<sup>78</sup> (SMPO, 2006, p. 13)

In these cases, a host authority may simply research and produce its *own* new security products (i.e. measures, tools, resources and technologies) in preparation of a specific event's extra-ordinary security needs. Yet it remains conceivable that those new measures, if considered 'good practices', may then go on to be an internationally sharable source of knowledge within the *European House of Major Events Security*. Or that the simple international importation of measures (as products) from cooperating countries represents something *new* to the host country. This led to a re-tailoring of the definition during 2009 for the Austrian team's purpose of considering common standards within EU-SEC II for the subjective production of *new* security measures (or 'tools') as 'security products' for Major Events<sup>79</sup>:

**Common Standards Definition (Vienna, September 2009)**

A Major Event is a foreseeable event that, in the view of the national authority responsible for security at the event, poses the potential of security threats that either:

- a) Produce or is likely to produce new research and/or practices with regard to the planning or provision of security in relation to those threats; or
- b) Requires or may require international co-operation and/or assistance in the planning or provision of security in relation to those threats.

This was put more succinctly in the resulting report as: an event requiring either the domestic production or international importation of some *new* security measure (or 'product') in response to the extra-ordinary nature of the event's security implications: in other words, the security requirement of something *new* for the host authority<sup>80</sup>.

The aspect of 'newness' as a significant feature of a Major Event is further alluded to in the 2007 IPO Security Planning Model's acknowledgement of what the sheer complexity of a Major Event may entail:

"Due to their complexity, Major Events are likely to demand the creation of an **extraordinary and possibly temporary response**. Existing structures and procedures may not be sufficient and may even require the creation of a new organizational set-up, the planning of a wide range of tactical options to address problems that may affect the course of the event, the involvement of new staff and logistics, the coordination and amalgamation of different forces and other extraordinary efforts." (original emphasis).<sup>81</sup>

It was precisely with this regard for the propensity of Major Events to introduce lasting structural and procedural effects, as well as require the production of new knowledge, technologies and resources with potential as lasting practices that focused the attention of the Austrian team on new 'security products' within its definition for common standards.

***Stockholm Proposal and debate – January 2011***

In an attempt to consolidate the significant elements of the above definitions, the following was proposed as a core definition at the 5<sup>th</sup> Network Steering Committee of the EU-SEC II Consortium in Stockholm on the 26<sup>th</sup> January 2011:

**Proposed Definition (Stockholm, January 2011)**

A Major Event is a foreseeable event that poses the potential of security threats which require the production of knowledge, technologies or resources in excess of the host's routine availability.

<sup>79</sup> (B.M.I, 2010, p. 31)

<sup>80</sup> (B.M.I, 2010, p. 11)

<sup>81</sup> (UNICRI, 2007, p. 9)

The ensuing debate led to its further revision and functional House definition simply as:

**A Major Event is an event that requires  
international cooperation in respect of its security planning**

Dropping ‘foreseeable’ allowed for short notice contingencies (such as state funerals). ‘Poses the potential of security threats’ was dropped on the basis that the potential of threats is implicit in any requirement for security planning and such threats can be separately detailed. In other words, security is always planned against the potential of threats posed to the event.

‘The production of knowledge, technologies or resources’ (i.e. the ‘research and planning’ element) and ‘in excess of the host’s routine activity’ (i.e. the subjective ‘newness’ element) was also dropped. This was on the basis that they represented variable points of interest in what members called ‘Major Events’ subjectively but were not defining aspects for the purpose of access to the House and its services. For such services are aimed at the coordination of international cooperation in respect of security planning for what they would otherwise recognise as a ‘Major Event’.

Hence the short statement as ‘the House definition’ and its IPO derived additional elements.

#### **Recognised Typologies and Qualities of Major Events**

Along with the typical *characteristics* of a Major Event and the Consortium recognised *categories* of potential security threats listed earlier, what can also be added is the categorisation of Major Events by one of four given *typologies* (systems of categorisation):

- 1. Sporting events (e.g. Olympics/World Championships)**
- 2. Political events (e.g. Summits/State Visits)**
- 3. Cultural events (e.g. Carnivals, Festivals, Celebrations)**
- 4. Other events (e.g. Scientific Conference, Commercial Expo’s)**

This is based on the three typologies recognised in Portugal’s analysis of its 34 reported Major Events: international political events; international sporting events; national large scale events (festivals, concerts, carnivals, cultural events)<sup>82</sup>. Where these represented over two thirds of the events reported on, it would be prudent to reserve a fourth typology simply of ‘other’. One can think of many other *categories*, such as ‘commercial’, ‘scientific’, ‘educational’, ‘community’ and ‘religious’ but the research has identified these four basic typologies into which to place them accordingly. A ‘religious event’, for example, could ordinarily be placed as ‘cultural’ unless it is more an ambassadorial state visit (e.g. of the Pope), in which case it might be better placed as ‘political’.

Notably, ‘political’ and ‘sports’ events were the two types of Major Event that stood out significantly from the 2010 French roadmap survey as the main types consortium members were going to host during 2011 and 2012 (Roadmap p.4). Roughly they shared 73% of the anticipated Major Events between them, ‘political’ events being the marginally larger of the two at 38%. The typology clearly works, with the remaining 27% being ‘cultural’ or ‘other’.

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<sup>82</sup> (GCS/MAI, 2009, p. 61)

To the definition of a Major Event based on its international dynamic, for guiding recognition in the field one can further add to the above descriptive elements of event characteristics, security threat categories and event typologies the following *qualities* derived from reviewing Portugal's 2009 report in that:

1. For the host country, their extra security requirement may be domestic or international.
2. They tend to be urban in character (if not location) as an expression of global society.
3. They may be regular or non-regular in spatial and/or temporal occurrence.
4. They will tend to dominate other security planning concerns.
5. Their security demand will be extra-ordinary and in excess of routine capacity.
6. They may produce new security measures that redefine routine policing for the host.

Descriptive quality 3 refers to the report's observed fact that some events have infrequent repetition cycles (e.g. Olympics every four years at a different venue) during which security issues may have significantly changed for both the event and the venue, requiring a fresh appraisal each time. And others that although more frequent (e.g. annual championships) may use different host venues each time: again, requiring fresh appraisals of their security implications. These factors of regularity/non-regularity can also contribute to their categorisation as 'major' for the host country.<sup>83</sup>

Regarding qualities 4 to 6, perhaps if one had to define 'Major Event' in just one word that word might be 'dominating'. Indeed, the conventional use of the word 'major' as an adjective is to describe something as more important than other things, i.e. *dominating*. So, with regard to a national authority's responsibility for governing security at large scale or important public events, the extent to which concerns for one particular event comes to *dominate* that of all other events, would put it in the category of 'Major Event' as far as its security planning goes. Indeed, as has been repeatedly expressed in the IPO programme, it is the sheer extra-ordinariness of the security demand that will put it in excess of an authority's otherwise routinely available national capacity of resources, knowledge and technology. In this sense, if the event itself is one that comes to dominate it can subsequently *re-define* security provision at future events.

That in itself is a defining feature that makes it a 'major' event as opposed to just large or important. Because what it will have done is produce something *new*. Whether that is simply a new working practice or policy, or whole organisational structure or even occupational culture and consciousness, it will have introduced something that did not exist *before*. It will have fundamentally affected and permanently altered some aspect of the host authority's system of security organisation and provision.

An example might be the August 2005 International Association of Athletic Federation (IAAF) Games in Helsinki for Finland. It was widely recognised that the event represented the biggest security challenge to date for Finland and that the security planning for it by the Helsinki Police Department under the direction of its Deputy Commissioner, not only dominated the preceding year's security planning programme for the police but also substantially re-defined Finland's own security planning policies and practices. It brought them together into one document as the country's template for security planning procedures at future events of similar size and nature. To some other countries, the IAAF Games may have been just one other event requiring no greater security attention than normal. To Finland, though, it was the dominant security challenge of the time, and so a 'major' event.

Needless to say, other EU Member States will be able to point to their own 'defining' events that caused them to fundamentally revise, re-design and re-define anew the way they research, plan and provide security in recent times and times to come. That would be their 'Major Event' *par excellence* – the defining

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<sup>83</sup> (GCS/MAI, 2009, p. 65)

security operation for their national authorities. The pressure to so respond is most likely to have come from its international dynamic, none the least from its being under the scrutiny of world media and pressure to be seen to provide not only effective security, but to do so as a demonstrable expression of democratic European values. The coordination of the required international dynamic to this effect is where the services of the House are intended to assist EU Member States seeking access to them.

This chapter of the manual concludes with a diagrammatic summary of the House's common definition of 'Major Event' and its additional elements. It can be read in conjunction with the manual's glossary of other key terms.


There is a small postscript to this discussion of seven or so years, though. What the House now recognizes as 'Major Events' by virtue of their international dynamic, questions of supranational governance, implications for democratic policing standards and potential as sites of security transformation under the scrutiny of world media, the international academic literature on policing and society has tentatively started to recognize and name '**mega-events**'. This is particularly so in relation to contemporary sociological research on private security regulation, protest policing and counter-terrorist security in terms of legacy and the upgrading of security infrastructure<sup>84</sup>. The emerging academic term 'mega-event' should therefore be construed with the House's developed term 'major-event' accordingly.

This is not to add another term to the growing glossary of terms being used in the House, simply to acknowledge that the very phenomenon that the House is concerned with is itself becoming recognised by other spheres of influence, albeit by slightly different names and perhaps for different lines of analytical enquiry. It is useful to be aware of this.

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<sup>84</sup> See for reference (Boyle & Haggerty, 2009) (White, 2010, p. 3) (Martin, 2011, p. 30)

## THE HOUSE DEFINITION OF MAJOR EVENT & ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS





## **PART II - COMMON HOUSE POLICIES 1: PLANNING & EVALUATION STANDARDS**

Part I presented security planning as planning against the potential of security threats posed by an organized event of significant scale. Its two chapters have shown that it is the requirement for *international cooperation* in respect of that planning – planning that goes beyond the scope of the host's standard national security plan – that defines an event as 'major' for the purpose of the House. The next two parts of this manual offer guidance for the development of House services aimed at supporting the *coordination* of that international cooperation among national authorities in the planning processes for Major Events in Europe.

Dealt with on a chapter by chapter basis, the envisioned House services are the outcomes of the EU-SEC programme. They were progressed by the consortium under Work Packages 2 and 3 of EU-SEC II during 2009/2010. Anticipating the work of the third phase of the EU-SEC programme from late 2011 to early 2013, they are referred to as 'Coordination Tools/Methodologies' (CTMs 1-7). Each is 'owned' by a respective consortium partner for the purpose of their testing and evaluation under thematic task leadership within two parallel work packages (WP1 & WP2). This is to be implemented in the live context of specific Major Events likely to take place during 2012.



## CHAPTER 3 - THE HOUSE AND THE IPO SECURITY PLANNING MODEL (CTM 1)

### Anticipated CTM Work for the House

The below table lays out the seven foundational House CTMs and their owners against the thematic tasks and their leading partners and envisaged objectives of Work Packages 1 & 2:

WP1		TASK 1.1	TASK 1.2	TASK 1.3	TASK 1.4
18 months in parallel with WP2 below (2011-2013)	<b>THEMATIC AREAS</b> →	<b>Common Research &amp; Technology Taxonomy</b>	<b>Common Planning Standards</b>	<b>Common Evaluation Standards</b>	<b>Networking &amp; Training (CEPOL)</b>
Testing CTMs in live events (2012)	<b>LEADERS &amp; teams</b> →	<b>Portugal</b> 2/3 members	<b>UK</b> PPSP officer	<b>Denmark</b> 2/3 members	<b>France</b> 2/3 members
CTM	OWNER*	CTM Involved	CTM Involved	CTM Involved	CTM Involved
1 IPO Model	Denmark		•	•	
2 PPP Guide	UK		•	•	
3 Media Guide	Italy		•	•	
4 Security Products	Austria		•		
5 EMER	Portugal	•			
6 STEP	Estonia	•			
7 Net & Training	France				•
<b>Deliverable Reports due early 2013</b>	<b>TASK REPORTS</b> → D1.1,2,3,4 (Restricted)	<i>Use of a common taxonomy for ME security planning</i>	<i>Application of common planning standards to European MEs</i>	<i>Application of common evaluation standards to European MEs</i>	<i>Training activities on common security standards for MEs in EU</i>
WP 2		TASK 2.1	TASK 2.2	TASK 2.3	TASK 2.4
In parallel WP1	<b>THEMES:</b>	<b>as 1.1</b>	<b>as 1.2</b>	<b>as 1.3</b>	<b>Framework</b>
Stockholm Prog' impact analysis	<b>LEADERS &amp; teams:</b>	<b>Romania</b> 2/3 members	<b>Austria</b> 2/3 members	<b>Spain</b> 2/3 members	<b>UNICRI</b> 2/3 members

Table 2: Summary of parallel WP 1 & 2 task themes and leaders against CTMs and owners.

Source: Consolidated from UNICRI's Proposal for The House (UNICRI, 2010b, pp. 12-13, 16, 22-27) by J Hadley.

The two work packages shown in the table run in parallel during the first 18 months of the House project. The focus of WP1 is on the *testing* of the CTMs in live events. The main focus of WP2 is analysis of the *potential impact* the CTMs on related aspects of the Stockholm Programme (2010-2014)<sup>85</sup>. The first three thematic tasks are the same for both work packages but are selective as to the CTMs they engage. The fourth tasks differ thematically but remain related in respect of issues around structure and framework for House services.

Through the four thematic tasks of Work Package 1, all CTMs are expected to be **tested** in the context of two or three live Major Events on a member's territory. Major event hosts are expected to facilitate

\* The CTM owners may be subject to change.

<sup>85</sup> (CoEU, 2009)

**access** to the security planning and evaluation processes of the event. UNICRI is to **arrange** the tests of the respective CTMs with respective task leaders. Throughout, task leaders are expected to **update** each other with task developments and outputs. The deliverable reports (titled in the above table) in each task team's thematic area are restricted to programme participants only and will not be public documents.

Simultaneously, teams for the **first three** thematic tasks of Work Package 2 analyse the potential impact of respective CTMs on the implementation of the Stockholm Programme. The analysis is to be in respect of advancing adoption of a common policing approach across Europe. The one deliverable in respect of all three tasks *Report on the Contribution to the Implementation of the Stockholm Programme via the House* will be similarly restricted only to programme participants and not made public. Unlike that of WP 1, the **fourth** task of WP2 does not deal with a foundational CTM. Instead, led by UNICRI, it will draw upon EU-SEC programme reports on state-of-the-art surveys & obstacles to cooperation to identify appropriate legal/governance frameworks and structure for the future of the House. Its deliverable *Feasibility Study on the Best Structure for the House* will also be restricted.

The deliverable reports of WP1 & 2 will be converted into and inform an **end-user's** manual for the CTM based services of the House. This will be the objective of Work Package 3 during the last 6 months of the project for delivery in late 2013. This current manual, as the end product of EU-SEC II, is being written primarily as an **owner's** manual aimed at CTM owners and team participants tasked with the testing and evaluation of the House services.

The CTMs pertinent to developing common policies on security planning and evaluation in Work Package 1 will be dealt with in this chapter. Namely: the IPO Security Planning Model; good practice guidance in public-private partnerships (PPPs); media management guidance; and common ethical and operational standards in respect of security products.

The CTMs pertinent to developing common policies on security technology and networking will be the subject of the chapters 8 to 10 in Part II. Namely: STEP, EMER and the use of CEPOL. Chapter 12 of Part IV will relate to aspects of the Stockholm Programme in relation to all CTMs and the House as guidance for the focus of WP 2.

### **The IPO Security Planning Model (CTM 1)**

Launched in 2003 as a global security and counter-terrorism programme, the International Permanent Observatory (IPO) on Security during Major Events was built upon three core considerations relating to the phenomena of Major Events:

*Complexity*: that their security planning challenges should not be underestimated.

*Legacy*: that they present opportunities to expand and introduce lasting security capacities.

*Scarcity*: that knowledge and expertise on their planning is rare, diffuse and hard to access<sup>86</sup>.

Drawing on the collective experiences of security planners for Major Events in Europe, the 2007 *IPO Security Planning Model* (building on the 2005 *Security Planner's Toolkit*) fills a need subsequently identified by Member States for an internationally recognized security manual as a common standard covering the main elements of the planning process and guiding principles of security provision at Major Events.

As an evolving House resource based upon best practices and lessons learnt in that collective experience, the IPO Model therefore represents an international planning and evaluation standard: a common

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<sup>86</sup> i.e. spread between disparate authorities of different countries with various restrictions on access.

benchmark, or template, against which member states can review and evaluate their own standard national research programmes and planning processes for major event security<sup>87</sup>. That is, to see it as a *process* rather than a *plan*.

This reflects an important point raised in the UK team's Task 3.1 report: to be mindful of national initiatives among EU Member States to develop their own Major Event Security Manuals and current use by many of their own standard operating procedures for Major Event security and ensure compatibility between them and that of the House<sup>88</sup>. To this end, the idea is not to *replace* national models (e.g. the UK's SECCO Manual<sup>89</sup>) but to use the IPO Model as a common point of international comparison in respect of them and their development. These concerns are also reflected in the Task 3.4 *Draft Strategic Roadmap*, which points out the likelihood of structural resistance to paradigmatic changes of practice and doctrine amongst national authorities<sup>90</sup>.

### Basic Description of the Model

Unlike the 2005 planner's Toolkit, the 2007 planning Model is not a practitioner's technical manual but a policy maker's (or security manager's) checklist for managing the security planning process of a Major Event. Set against a description of **twelve main elements** of a security planning process (ranging from leadership and structural management to contingency planning and crisis management), the model consists of three main components of: a **system** (for organizing those involved in the planning); the **deliverables** (of security and contingency plans); and **risks** (of anything that may adversely challenge the plans)<sup>91</sup>.

This is not the place to detail the content of either the Toolkit or the Model. However, the Model can be summed up as: a system that produces deliverables to address existing and potential risks<sup>92</sup>. The system covers issues concerning *capacity*, *constraints* and *intelligence*.

The deliverables focus on plans for both *inside* and *outside* the security venue, along with *'if'* contingencies. The five 'risks' spoken of in the IPO Model (*terrorism, public disorder, crime, image embarrassment, emergencies*) as a combination of 'threats' and 'vulnerabilities' detailed in the Toolkit<sup>93</sup>, are echoed in the House's six 'threat' potentials to a Major Event.

### House Development of the Model

Among the EU-SEC Consortium, there is overwhelming support for the national incorporation of the IPO Security Planning Model and its common recognition among practitioners as a basic template for reviewing and developing local security plans. How best to achieve its national recognition and local acceptance among security planners throughout the EU was a consideration of Task 3.2 during 2009.

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<sup>87</sup> (UNICRI, 2010a, p. 9)

<sup>88</sup> See recommendation 2 and reference to UK development (MetPo, 2010a, p. v & 7).

<sup>89</sup> Used to risk assess and manage security at major events (MetPo, 2010a, pp. 2-3).

<sup>90</sup> (DGPN, 2011, p. 7)

<sup>91</sup> (UNICRI, 2007, pp. 9-23)

<sup>92</sup> (UNICRI, 2007, p. 17)

<sup>93</sup> (UNICRI, 2005, p. 42)

Under Austria's lead, the task team reported<sup>94</sup> on a phased approach involving the following sequential steps as the best way to achieve this aim:

- a presentation of the IPO Model to each Member State;
- a table top exercise in its use at national training level;
- a local field exercise in its operational use with a small routine event; and
- a feedback review and evaluation of its field-tested use.

To do this, the following basic actions would need to be carried out in preparation:

1. **Seek recognition of the IPO Model at an appropriate level within Member States**  
(i.e. the executive or senior management).
2. **Introduce it into national training programmes where appropriate**  
(i.e. as core training, promotion/specialist courses or as professional development programmes).
3. **Develop a 'train the trainer' programme**  
(to ensure continuity and consistency of delivery in each Member State).
4. **General dissemination within Member States**  
(i.e. ensure availability in all police libraries and personal issue to those working in security planning).

With regard to the *Networking and Training CTM 7* and its development within the House under the third phase of the EU-SEC programme, the Austrian task team determined that the potential of pursuing such a programme through CEPOL should be considered by respective task leaders (provisionally UK, Denmark, France) with the dissemination of resulting reports coordinated by UNICRI. The Romanian partners further endorsed its use in police training curricula as a significant tool<sup>95</sup>. To this end, the above approach is offered as a suggested guide for future House development.

### **Field Testing and Ownership**

The field testing of the IPO Model was one of the ideas accepted by the EU-SEC Consortium in December 2006 for future joint activity<sup>96</sup>. In June 2007 UNICRI presented the model to security planning specialists and other EU-SEC partners at the Police College of Finland. It was found to closely match domestic models and gained from constructive feedback. In standing up to scrutiny in this way, it is viewed as representing a robust standard that provides a checklist for existing plans and backbone for future evaluations.

Indeed, during 2009 and as part of Task 3.2, the 2007 IPO Model was successfully field tested by Denmark in relation to the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit (COP 2009) in December that year. From the COP 2009 field-test experience, and as provisional CTM Owners of the IPO Model for the House, the Centre for Police Studies in Denmark produced an 'IPO Security Planning & Evaluation Checklist' for use in conjunction with future joint activities in this area. For ease of reference, the checklist is reproduced at the end of this chapter.

With regard to two other CTMs that follow, guidelines on public-private partnerships (PPPs) and media management in respect of Major Event security planning, they should be seen as interfacing with related elements of the IPO Model: namely that of the first element 'Leadership' and fourth element 'Media &

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<sup>94</sup> (B.M.I, 2010, p. 17) gratefully assisted by team partners from Ireland and Italy.

<sup>95</sup> (B.M.I, 2010, p. 8)

<sup>96</sup> (UNICRI, 2008, p. 64)

PR Strategy' respectively. The work with regard to PPPs under UK's Task 3.1 lead will be looked at next before that of media management under Germany's Task 3.3 lead. In conjunction with Austria's Task 3.2 work on common ethical and operational standards for security products, all four CTMs are brought together in terms of a suggested annual CEPOL seminar as part of CTM 7 discussed in Chapter 10 *post*.

## **IPO SECURITY PLANNING & EVALUATION 'CHECK LIST'**

(Centre for Police Studies, Denmark. 2009)

### **I. Element 1: Leadership**

All involved properly understand the chain of command  
All involved properly understand their specific responsibilities

### **II. Element 2: Planning Structure and Management**

Planning team identifies main branches for planning  
Base planning on identifying best practices and evaluation of previous events

### **III. Element 3: Intelligence**

Threat assessment: "What is the likelihood?"  
Vulnerability assessment: "What are the consequences?"  
Risk assessment: Likelihood X Consequences = RISK

### **IV. Element 4: Media & PR Strategy**

Media monitoring  
Design of public information strategy  
Public reassurance - explanation of momentarily variations from "normal"

### **V. Element 5: Venue Security**

Harden secure area  
Search, seal, secure  
Maintain public safety  
Vetting/Accreditation/ticketing  
Access control

### **VI. Element 6: Border control**

Strengthen routine border control  
Intelligence-led strengthening ASAP  
Enhance information sharing and collection

### **VII. Element 7: Traffic Management**

Maintain and secure access routes  
Maintain and secure road network in and beyond secure area  
Design proportionate public transport  
Prepare for disruption and blockage of routes

### **VIII. Element 8: Non-Event and Event-Related Security**

Plan to protect people and property  
Plan for event-related sites  
Plan for critical infrastructure  
Plan for "soft" targets  
Promote stakeholder awareness  
Design early warning mechanisms



**IX. Element 9: Human Resources and Logistical Support**

Support strategy with adequate personnel  
Provide adequate logistical support  
Enhance human response with equipment and technological solutions  
Plan for withdrawal and return to normality

**X. Element 10: Information Technology (IT) and Communication**

Design effective and secure communication  
Design appropriate and comprehensive control centres  
Design comprehensive flow-charts showing lines of communication and management of data  
Design protection of core communication and plan for communication in emergencies

**XI. Element 11: Integration and Coordination**

Integrate, complement and coordinate all planning branches  
Test flexibility and effectiveness of plans  
Test competence of individuals and teams  
Test equipment in prevailing surroundings

**XII. Element 12: Contingency Planning and Crisis Management**

Design contingency plans  
Plans shall: Save and protect, prevent further development of emergency, maintain critical services, inform media and restore to normal ASAP while facilitating investigation

**XIII. Additional elements to be evaluated?**

**Event:**

**Date:**

**Evaluating Officer:**

**Comments:**

This "Check list" acts only as a manuscript and must be supported by written comments on each element and sub-element in the checklist.

## CHAPTER 4 - BEST PRACTICES IN PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS (CTM 2)

The aim of this coordination tool/methodology is common guidance on establishing best practices with public-private partnerships (PPPs) within national and international EU frameworks as part of the overall planning process<sup>97</sup>. It complements the Leadership element of the IPO Security Planning Model, particularly with regard to its guidance on establishing common standards for contractual agreements between parties to PPPs at Major Events.

The work led by the Metropolitan Police resulted in two key documents being produced with regard to this CTM: Task 3.1 Report on *Public-Private Partnerships in Major Event Security in the EU*<sup>98</sup>, and its end product, the *Practitioner's Guide to Public-Private Partnerships for Security at Major Events*<sup>99</sup>. Both are informed by the research and work done with the UK team on behalf of the EU-SEC programme during 2009 and 2010 by Professor Frank Gregory, professor of European Security and Jean Monnet Chair in European Political Integration at the School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.

Via seven thematic areas, the practitioner's guide provides for thirty recommended phases/elements for consideration as 'best practice' (or 'what works') in the security planning process. They were arrived at by a comprehensive review of EU Major Event Security Manuals and published studies of private security industry and police interactions in the EU and practitioner evaluation surveys among EU-SEC partners and UK Security Coordinators (SECCO's). They represent a practitioner's consensus on 'best practice'<sup>100</sup>. As a foundational service of the House, the overall intention is to test their application as common planning standards in respect of PPPs to help coordinate international cooperation in this area.

What is envisaged in the House's future testing of this CTM is the development of a database of best practice partnerships provided by Member States, including a list of companies already in similar partnerships and their fields of expertise. To help ensure that wider international standards are also taken into consideration, the House's UK partners (as the provisional CTM Owners and future task leaders in its field-testing) will be able to draw upon the technical assistance of UNICRI's Office on Public-Private Security Policies<sup>101</sup>.

### Assessing 'Good Practice'

In part answer to Portugal's recommendation to clarify the criteria for what constitutes 'good practice' with regard to sharable lessons (Chapter 1 *ante*), the UK report points to criteria for 'best practice' transferability offered by the European Crime Prevention Network's 2005 publication *A Methodology for Assessing Good practice Projects and Initiatives*. This suggests that the practice be: 1) appropriately formulated; 2) replicable; and 3) successful.

For the House, the UK report emphasizes the importance of the 'replicable' criterion in that adoption/adaptation of a practice should not depend too much on substantial resource inputs, unique legislative frameworks, involvement of individual personalities or other special circumstances: in short, easy application across all 27 EU Member States<sup>102</sup>. As a House CTM the PPP guidance document was developed by the UK on that basis. Its continued ownership and application could be similarly assessed.

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<sup>97</sup> (UNICRI, 2010a, p. 6)

<sup>98</sup> (MetPo, 2010a)

<sup>99</sup> (MetPo, 2010b)

<sup>100</sup> (MetPo, 2010a, p. 6): Research methodology section in original report.

<sup>101</sup> (UNICRI, 2010b, p. 24)

<sup>102</sup> (MetPo, 2010a, p. 7): Full EUCPN report accessible at <http://www.eucpn.org>

As with the IPO Security Planning Model, this is not the place to detail the content of the PPP guidance itself. A summary checklist of the thematically grouped elements appears at the end of this chapter. The task of developing the CTM within the House will, of course, require working with the PPP guidance and related documents in the original. What can be consolidated here are salient parts of the UK's background report to the guidance.

### **Core Principles – Responsibility and Regulation**

With regard to Major Event Security in the EU, public-private partnerships can be understood as being built upon some core principles concerning responsibility and regulation:

First, that the Major Event Organizer (MEO) is primarily responsible for security at the event. This is regardless of the public or private nature of the venue or event itself. Accordingly, the common expectation of police duties in relation to the event is their response to security threats that are *beyond the management capacity* of the organizer<sup>103</sup>: in other words, that which the Private Security Industry (PSI) cannot *presently* provide for.

The report observes that this core principle is explicitly stated in the EU Council's 2007 *Handbook for police and security authorities concerning cooperation at Major Events with an international dimension* (EU Doc. 10589/1/07, REV 1, ENFOPOL 119, Brussels, 4/7/07). And on this note recommends ensuring compatibility between what is this IPO Model as a House CTM and national initiatives now being undertaken to develop similar MES Manuals. For example, the UK SECCO Manual's approach to risk management in relation to MES based on principles of reduction to an acceptable level rather than absolutes of prevention.

A second core principle stressed in the UK report is that of only using regulated private security companies or companies that employ security personnel holding state recognized licenses<sup>104</sup>. The report found that (in 2009) there was still no consensus between EU countries regarding the nature of partnerships with the private security industry in MES. This is despite PPPs becoming an increasingly established feature of security in EU Member States. This is to the point of becoming 'institutionalised' in the eyes of the European Commission by virtue of their operation over very long periods of time to cover for the reduced role of the state in some areas of security provision in the last few decades<sup>105</sup>.

These principles apply even though House services are more concerned with *temporary* PPP arrangements in relation to MES. The report's further review of EU Major Event security policy and general commentary on public-private security sector relations is covered more substantially here in respect of these two areas of core understanding.

### **On Responsibilities – EU Major Event Security Policy**

The UK report points out that the Amsterdam Treaty (in force 1<sup>st</sup> May 1999) introduced the aim of making the EU a single 'area of freedom, security and justice'. Its implication is that wherever an individual is in the EU they should enjoy a *common standard* of policing and security. In contrast to hitherto international cooperation agreements over public order policing and intelligence sharing since the mid 1970s that left domestic and national policing largely *unchanged* (i.e. football hooliganism and related police

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<sup>103</sup> (MetPo, 2010a, p. 1)

<sup>104</sup> (MetPo, 2010a, pp. v, 13): Recommendation 3 and discussion public-private sector relations.

<sup>105</sup> (MetPo, 2010a, pp. 3-5): The report divides private security into four categories: 1) Private Security Industry (PSI) – standard provision of trained security personnel; 2) Private Military and Security Companies (PMSC) – exceptional provision of armed security; 3) Hired Police Services – provision of police services to MEO at cost; 4) Private Citizens – provision of volunteer/paid stewards for safety (not security) duties.

intelligence sharing since 1975 TREVI), the Amsterdam objective now creates both obligations and expectations of domestic change toward a *commonality* among national authorities in respect of the domestic and national delivery of policing as a public good in EU states.<sup>106</sup>

As the EU-SEC programme has long recognized, this has particular application to Major Events as globally configured and intensely visible expressions of European society and values. So public-private partnerships in relation to them become significant sites of interest and transformation in modes of policing and security provision in contemporary Europe.

Citing a number of EU policy developments during the 1990s on establishing key principles and issues in international public order and security cooperation, and echoing the question of balance theme alluded to in the introduction of this manual for the House, the UK report points to two such public order principles set out in the European Council's 2002 *'Security Handbook for the use of police authorities and services at international events such as meetings of the European Council'*:

1. that 'The enforcement of law and order should be guided by the principles of proportionality and moderation preferring the less intrusive approach. Where possible, a de-escalating **police** approach should be chosen'; and
2. that 'Dialogue and cooperation with demonstrators and activists should be actively pursued by the **police authorities**.'

The implementation requirement, the report continues, is for each Member State to have a 'national contact point' to collect, exchange, and disseminate information and risk analyses.<sup>107</sup>

Further signalling an important shift from the pre-Amsterdam Treaty thinking of 'no change in domestic policing' associated with football policing and international cooperation, the December 2006 EU Presidency Proposal for single *'Security handbook for the use of police authorities and services at international events'*, is noted in the UK report to have now left the 2006 *EU Football Policing Handbook* as a 'stand alone' document. Instead, the required post-Amsterdam thinking encapsulated in MES and its implications for domestic change toward commonality are echoed in the report's cited EU responsibility principle that:

*'Although the host Member State has primary responsibility for providing for the security at the event, given its international character, all other Member States and EU competent bodies have a responsibility to assist and support the provision of such security.'*

Where the EU's European Police Chief's Task Force (founded in 2000 for high level information exchange on European policing issues and practices) is said to have paid little direct attention to MES as a specific topic, the UK report also notes that from an EU security research perspective the 2009 European Security Research Innovation Forum's (ESRIF) Final Report recognizes Major Events precisely as 'valuable laboratories to implement and test specific security measures as well as elaborate best practices that are also transferable as routine protective measures for fixed targets.' In other words, significant test-sites for research based innovations and transformations in European policing and security.<sup>108</sup>

In this context, the House's testing and development of its practitioner's guidance to PPPs through MES takes place with a view to coordinating a common understanding as to the nature of the relationship

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<sup>106</sup> (MetPo, 2010a, pp. 8-11): adapted from the original text of the report.

<sup>107</sup> (MetPo, 2010a, p. 9) – see also Chapter 5 section on media, ethics and external police communication *post* with regard to the EU principle of 'de-escalation'.

<sup>108</sup> (MetPo, 2010a, p. 9)

between public and private partner responsibilities. In particular, based upon a 2007 UNICRI brainstorming meeting<sup>109</sup>, that:

- at the macro level, security strategies are designed to protect the wider community and not simply the interests of the partners involved;
- at the meso level, those with management responsibilities in the partnerships have authority to take decisions and commit resources on behalf of their organizations; and
- at the micro-level (i.e. the event itself) that all parties have an information sharing protocol in place.

The developing relationship between public and private sector security over areas of responsibility thus represents significant new ground in Europe and should be commented upon a little further.

### **On Regulation – Public-Private Security Sector Relations**

Traditionally the Private Security Industry (PSI) typically took the form of guarding services for corporate premises or escorted secure high value transportation services. Its personnel might be armed (depending on the laws of a particular state) but in serving primarily private rather than state security interests they did not commonly possess more police powers than an ordinary citizen of the state. Growth since the 1980s, however, and particularly since the post 9/11 counter-terrorism concerns of the millennium, has seen the industry enter into areas of state interest security provision in Europe, albeit as secondary sources of provision to that of the state itself. With specific regard to Major Event security though, the UK team's research indicates that the public sector tends to assume that it is actually the private sector that acts as the primary source of protection at an event's location, not the police<sup>110</sup>. One can refer here to the related glossary terms 'mass private property' and 'privatisation' being used in the academic police studies literature.

What the UK report usefully notes in debate over the relationship of private security industry to state security interests is that the EU had made a bureaucratic 'pillar location choice' around 2007 of moving the public-private security dossier from the 'Third Pillar' of DG Justice Freedom and Security to the 'First Pillar' of DG Enterprise and Industry. In other words, private security is currently seen within the EU more in terms of commerce than security as it previously was. A 2006-2008 EC funded study that this observation drew on also showed that (as within the eyes of European Police Chiefs) Major Event Security as a specific area of PPPs was not highly visible in comparison to other, more traditional, areas of private security provision<sup>111</sup>. The EU's pillar re-location further underscores the importance of House coordination in respect of common approaches to PPPs among EU Member States.

To this end the UK report suggests the House considers exploring links with the Confederation of European Security Services (CoESS). CoESS was founded in 1989 by national associations of private security companies in EU Member States to represent and ensure their interests through work aimed at the harmonization of national legislation concerning the industry and its activities<sup>112</sup>. Research cited in the UK's report notes that with one or two earlier exceptions there has been industry regulation in most EU and other democratic states since around the time of CoESS's foundation and that most (but not all) EU Member States tend to regulate the industry under an interior-type ministry. This suggests, according to

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<sup>109</sup> (MetPo, 2010a, p. 11) Citing UNICRI Report of the Second Brainstorming Meeting. 'Strengthening Public/Private Partnerships for the Protection of Vulnerable Targets against Terrorist Attacks', UNICRI HQ, Turin, March 17-18, 2007.

<sup>110</sup> (MetPo, 2010a, pp. 11-12) See page 12 for outline of public-private relations debate.

<sup>111</sup> (MetPo, 2010a, p. 13) citing EU funded works by Dorn & Levi published 2007 & 2009.

<sup>112</sup> <http://www.coess.org/objectives.htm> (accessed 11 April 2011)

the study, either recognition of the industry's semi-policing type role or a desire to distinguish between public and private sector security functions<sup>113</sup>.

What can be noted in relation to House interests in this area is the already multinational and increasingly global scale of Europe's major private security companies (such as Securitas AB and G4S) and that the provision of crowd control and event security was ranked the second most common PSI function after traditional activities among the EU-25 states in a 2007 industry wide study by leading industry figure, Jorma Hakala<sup>114</sup>. Furthermore, that in a 2004 CoESS study of 25 EU Member States modified inputs during 2009 from EU-SEC II partners, the powers of security personnel either equalled or, in 13 out of the 26 EU States listed in Table 1 of the UK report, now actually *exceeded* that of a citizen<sup>115</sup>.

With the exception of the UK (which regulates individuals rather than companies) compulsory regulation of PSI companies is the norm among EU Member States. The UK Report refers to studies presenting the Spanish regulatory regime as indicative of a security system most clearly exemplifying the integration of private security with public security. This is because there is no legal space within the Spanish constitution for private security provision, so regulatory measures have to be all encompassing and are claimed to be the widest in the Western world. In the UK, with comparatively far greater legal space for private security, integration is just as evident where government policy is reported to treat licensed and regulated private security industry services as part of what is referred to as 'the extended police family', despite variable support for this view among the UK police themselves<sup>116</sup>.

### **The politics of contemporary security provision**

The report notes from other studies that strong cultural and professional ties may well exist between private security specialists and public law enforcers. This is said to be due to occupational mobility between them and increasing convergence of common interests. This observation may be tempered, however, with the report's own survey findings of what it described as a 'lukewarm' attitude by responding House members to the essential need for PSI services in PPPs for Major Event security. This was attributed to sensitivity about needing to stress the police as the *primary* national security providers, along with variables as to (current) capabilities of the PSI in member states and variable experiences of the PSI in particular Major Events<sup>117</sup>.

The issues raised in the UK report's reviews further underscore Major Events as important sites of change in the politics of contemporary security provision in Europe. The UK guidance cites the 2005 Glastonbury Festival as an example of good practice in terms of a working PPP and notes the practice of private security managers patrolling the festival *with* police officers<sup>118</sup>. As a media spectacle, it could be said that such practice also serves to further legitimate the private sector by virtue of police association. Indeed, other researchers have noted that the public demonstration of state affiliation has been a long sought strategic objective of private security companies in the UK<sup>119</sup>.

In this respect, it might be important for the House to monitor changes over time in the lines of demarcation between public and private forms of security provision in areas that may have traditionally been thought of as 'public'. That is, not to consider these lines as *static* lines but *migratory* and thereby sites

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<sup>113</sup> (MetPo, 2010a, pp. 14-15) Drawing on CoESS related research by Jorma Hakala in 2008.

<sup>114</sup> (MetPo, 2010a, p. 16) – citing Hakala, J., 'Why we regulate private security' CoESS Report, p13, Helsinki, 1/2/08.

<sup>115</sup> (MetPo, 2010a, pp. 16-17)

<sup>116</sup> (MetPo, 2010a, pp. 17-19)

<sup>117</sup> (MetPo, 2010a, p. 31) Based on replies from 11 out of 27 EU Member States in 2010.

<sup>118</sup> UK's EU-SEC II Task 3.1 presentation, Final Meeting of WP3, Stockholm 26<sup>th</sup> January 2011 (author's notes)

<sup>119</sup> (White, 2010, p. 50)

of gradual change and observable growth and expansion of new modes of policing and security provision within contemporary Europe. Changes brought about, in no small part, by what we are generally recognizing as 'Major Events' and what other researchers now recognize as the state's 'showcasing of security' through them<sup>120</sup>.

As with the IPO Model, CEPOL lends itself as an appropriate European level senior police officer forum for further discussion and dissemination of knowledge on PPPs in the context of Major Events and questions of state regulation, legitimacy and supranational governance. France's Task 3.4 Report (*Draft Strategic Roadmap*) also comments on the use of monitoring the numerous legal problems that can occur in the case of Major Events even though daily contact and interaction between to private and public spheres of policing is now common<sup>121</sup>.

### ***Endpoint***

A summary of the PPP guidelines and recommendations concludes this chapter.

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<sup>120</sup> (Martin, 2011) an important scholarly article on the direction of policing through major event security.

<sup>121</sup> (DGPN, 2011, p. 9)

## **PPP Guidance: Summary of Recommendations**

### ***A. Roles, Responsibility and Accountability***

1. Define who is accountable for major event.
2. Define relationship between event owner (client)/event organiser/suppliers/ contractors/supporting agencies (police/private security/local councils)
3. Establish strategic lead.
4. Establish who the stakeholders are.
5. Establish Joint Command / Executive Planning Team.

### ***B. Setting the Baseline / Strategic Intention***

6. Intelligence requirement / threat assessment.
7. Define scope/footprint of event area.
8. Set initial strategic/executive meeting.
9. Set strategic intention.

### ***C. Agreeing the Parameters***

10. Define areas of responsibility and Agree Memorandum of Understanding.
11. Asset and resource assessment.
12. Budget setting agreement.
13. Agree information / intelligence / communication sharing protocol.
14. Form Security Committee/Security director/Security Integrator/ Police Security Coordinator.

### ***D. Consultation and Development of the Plan***

15. Stakeholder / Community Consultation / media engagement.
16. Media engagement.
17. Create security plan (Create tactical plans).
18. Review of security plan (by security committee).
19. All Plans (tactical and security) submitted to 'Gold' Commander or Senior Event Executive

### ***E. Preparedness***

20. Identify training needs.
21. Table top exercise / Dry run.
22. Identify contingencies.
23. Agree Joint Media Strategy.

### ***F. Review***

24. Review threat assessment and intelligence requirement.
25. Review of overarching plan (tactical and security plans) by Gold-feedback refine agree
26. Final Executive/Gold Planning meeting.

### ***G. Event Day and Organisational Learning***

27. Briefings
28. Live event - On-site Management
29. Hot de-brief.
30. Structured de-brief / lessons learnt / organisational learning



## CHAPTER 5 - MEDIA MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES FOR MAJOR EVENTS (CTM 3)

As with the IPO Model and PPP guidance, this is not the place to simply replicate the media management guidance developed by Germany during EU-SEC II. This section of the manual highlights its further testing and application as a House coordination tool/methodology (CTM) during the third phase of the EU-SEC programme in the planning and evaluation processes of specific Major Events. It is provisionally owned by Italy for this purpose, as partners who had previously tested the idea of it in their implementation of Task 2.3 to test the coordination of existing House services<sup>122</sup>.

The guidance document itself is the *EU-SEC II Task 3.3 Report: Media Management*. It was produced by the project's Task 3.3 working group led by the German Police University (DHPol) under the coordination of Professor Joachim Kersten during 2009/2010. Building on earlier project results<sup>123</sup>, its own literature review, expert workshop findings and field case studies, it was delivered to the EU-SEC II Consortium in October 2010 and is available for foundational use and further development as a House CTM through UNICRI. It should be referred to in the original.

For future implementation as a CTM, the aim of the guidance is to serve as a best practice template for both the effective management of the media itself and for the communication of security policy both to the public and security practitioners. It should also draw attention to the challenges of emerging technologies, such as 'citizen journalism'<sup>124</sup>, which can present themselves as both potential security threats as well as potential security tools. The topic of citizen journalism has also been central to critical analysis of police media strategies at the 2009 London G20 summit. This was concerning contested representations of protester violence and police violence in relation to the death of a by-stander caught up in the event's security operation and its controversial use of public order 'kettling' tactics<sup>125</sup>.

The EU-SEC II Consortium's guidance document itself provides a basic framework for an approach to assist Major Event security planners develop an appropriate media and PR strategy, one based on a cooperative and efficient relationship between the police and the media<sup>126</sup>. As with the PPP guidance, it complements the Media & PR Strategy element of the IPO Security Planner's Model discussed above and has been written with precisely that in mind<sup>127</sup>.

### International Consistency for World Media Relations

The House recognizes world media as a significant definer of an event as 'major' and thereby the requirement for international cooperation in respect of its security planning. Where the media acts as a bridge between suppliers and consumers of information, it can do so regardless of whom supplier or consumer may be. Consequently the presence of world media can attract potential security threats to an event such as publicity seekers, protestors or even terrorists. World media therefore needs to be managed by planners as both a potential conduit of threats *to* the event as well as a communications tool *for* event security. In this respect, the House's coordination of a common policy is intended to help ensure that world media receive a consistent, coherent and similar standard of management from all EU Member States.<sup>128</sup>

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<sup>122</sup> (UNICRI, 2010a, p. 7)

<sup>123</sup> (DHPol, 2010, p. 1) Finland's Task 2.1 ideas for future joint activities, Portugal's Task 1.2 survey.

<sup>124</sup> (UNICRI, 2010a, p. 8)

<sup>125</sup> (Greer & McLaughlin, 2010) With kind permission, this article was disseminated to EU-SEC II delegates at the 4<sup>th</sup> NSC Meeting held in Paris on 15<sup>th</sup> September 2010.

<sup>126</sup> (DHPol, 2010, p. 19)

<sup>127</sup> (DHPol, 2010, p. 5)

<sup>128</sup> (UNICRI, 2010a, p. 7)

It is the optimization of police-media relations at a Major Event that is being sought in security planning. In this, the guidance stresses that the building of a relationship of *trust* is key to police management of the media. It also warns that *unprofessional* media management following security incidents can be the cause of further damage to interested parties, including the government and that contemporary media management requires being fully conversant with the ever evolving online technology of the *new media*, such as Twitter.<sup>129</sup>

Those tasked with the future testing and application of the guidance as a CTM in the planning and evaluation of media management at specific Major Events should be mindful of its intended purpose and potential impediments to its reception within police management.

As a CTM the document is intended to provide guidance to security planners on how to foster *effective working relations* with the media. This relationship, the guidance notes, can be used as a tool through which the police can build relationships with the wider community affected by the Major Event's presence. Well managed media relations, it notes, can also take some pressure off security planners by using it to address anticipated public order problems.<sup>130</sup>

These arguments, elaborated in the document, can be used to convince police management that may not otherwise be convinced of the need for any or further guidelines. Potential obstructions to good working relations to be mindful of are the fact that police and media have different (and sometimes opposing) agendas and rationale. This is to be expected and is in fact healthy in a democracy as a means to public accountability<sup>131</sup>.

What has to be overcome is the occupational problem of antagonistic police-media relations of mistrust that may have been built up over the years on the basis of stereotypical and prejudiced attitudes on both sides. Professional working relations between the police and media are vital to Major Event security and need to be planned for. To this end, the document lays the foundations for building guidelines to assist Major Event security planners in considering how to manage the media within their security plans.<sup>132</sup>

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<sup>129</sup> (DHPol, 2010, pp. 1-2)

<sup>130</sup> (DHPol, 2010, p. 3)

<sup>131</sup> The article (Greer & McLaughlin, 2010) in particular can be used as case study material in this respect.

<sup>132</sup> (DHPol, 2010, p. 4)

Elements of a communications strategy<sup>133</sup>, for example, can be designed to:

- create a positive image for the event
- reassure the public about the extent of the operation and communicate critical information such as travel disruption, ticketing arrangement, etc.
- keep the media appropriately informed
- monitor international, national and local media
- develop strategies to ensure fair and accurate reporting
- develop policies/procedures for managing responses to media comments on security
- coordinate and facilitate press conference on security

### **Core Guidance and Next Steps for Development**

Based on the German team's Task 3.3 research, guidelines on media management were found to be an indispensable tool for good policing, particularly in cases where unexpected and dramatic incidents occur during an event. The Duisburg Love Parade tragedy of July 2010 where 21 young people lost their lives and over 500 were injured as a result of crowd crushing is taken as a full case study for reference within the document.<sup>134</sup>

The document's core guidance notes are that:

1. The police need to be the primary source of information to the media
2. The police need to continuously cultivate media contacts
3. The police need to be flexible in their approach to media relations (no set 'recipe')
4. There are minimum requirements for police information to be: timely; accurate, strategic, directed/channelled and for logistics to be supportive and professional.

How this relates, structurally and strategically, to any PPP based arrangements over lead responsibility for security (see Chapter 4) should also be thought through in the planning stages. Where the Major Event organiser (MEO) has primary responsibility for security provision, and that provision is primarily from the private sector, the police may still need media resources inside the venue.

In all these respects it is perhaps the requirement for a *professional* police press officer with direct access to the chain of security command that is the most important in avoiding the highly damaging appearance in public of amateurish efforts and behalf of the police and authorities.

As supporting further reference material from academic police studies literature (albeit in the UK context), this manual suggests the history and professionalization of police media management in *Policing Images* (Mawby, 2002) and/or 'Managing the Image' in *Practical Police Management* (1995) contributed to by the same author. An overview of the relationship between police and media in the broader cultural context can be found in the book chapter 'Policing and the Media' (Reiner, 2003) and a full examination of police self-image promotion through media management in *Policing and the Media: Facts, fictions and factions* (Leishman & Mason, 2003). These can be supplemented by the mentioned article on citizen journalism and new media environments in relation to the public order policing of the 2009 London G20 summit by Greer & McLaughlin (2010). See bibliography for full references.

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<sup>133</sup> (UNICRI, 2010a, p. 7)

<sup>134</sup> (DHPol, 2010, pp. 16-18)

What the Task document proposes, as next steps in the development of its guidance on media management as a CTM service of the House, is its utilization as a senior management police training tool in collaboration with CEPOL. This is in recognition of the House's interest in ensuring consistency in police approaches to international media at Major Events and the need for EU Member States to build a best practice based media management capacity.<sup>135</sup>

### **International Consistency and Simultaneous EU-Wide Events**

We could take a small example here of how the new media environment spoken of as citizen journalism combines with another phenomena made possible by the new media technology, that of short notice but simultaneous EU-wide protest events. On Saturday 4<sup>th</sup> September 2010 simultaneous demonstrations were staged, peacefully, in cities not only across France but also outside French embassies in Brussels, Rome, Barcelona, London and Vienna. As part of an organised protest, they were pre-cursors to further demonstrations outside French embassies and consulates across Romania in multiple cities and counties two days later on Monday 6<sup>th</sup> while France hosted a meeting of immigration ministers from across the EU and Canada.

The EU-wide demonstrations were coordinated by the European Network Against Racism (ENAR), a network of over 700 Non-Governmental Organisations across the EU. They were an international response to protest against what the ENAR Press Release dated 1<sup>st</sup> September calling for support at the demonstrations described as “the xenophobic policies put in place [that] summer by the French government” in relation to “targeting and stigmatizing migrants and especially the Roma population in the name of ‘security and public order’.”<sup>136</sup>

What is of note here is not the topic of the protest but the speed and reach of its international coordination in response to what had been only relatively recent media exposure of the issue. It had been only a month since amateur camera footage (citizen journalism) posted on the internet had caused public outrage in France by depicting ‘rough tactics’, as reported 2<sup>nd</sup> August by the Guardian online<sup>137</sup>, of forcible police evictions of African descent immigrants from their homes: a mother was seen dragged across the road with her baby in arms trapped and screaming underneath her. This had been followed up in world media on the 19<sup>th</sup> August with coverage of Roma deportations in Marseille reported as part of a ‘programme of exclusion’<sup>138</sup>. The coordinated mobilisation of peaceful demonstrators in simultaneous EU-wide protest came within a few days of a developing international news media story.

In circumstances like these, the policing of simultaneous public order protest across the EU can render the security tactics of Member State national authorities subject to comparative public scrutiny via world media coverage. Comparative differences and critical shortcomings may well risk exposure. The development of international consistency in media management as well as a commonality of policing and security standards in Europe would be a desirable product of such external pressure. In this sense, world media coverage itself can be seen as a common site and source of independent research on security during Major Events in Europe. For it raises awareness of the importance of what the German team on ethics in EU-SEC signalled in relation to the media as ‘external police communication’<sup>139</sup>.

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<sup>135</sup> (DHPol, 2010, p. 20)

<sup>136</sup> (ENAR, 2010)

<sup>137</sup> (Guardian, 2010)

<sup>138</sup> (Davies, 2010)

<sup>139</sup> (PFA, 2008, pp. 13-15) (UNICRI, 2008, pp. 89-91)

### **Media, Ethics and External Police Communication**

Germany's contribution to the original EU-SEC project in 2008 and subsequent 2008 manual section on ethics included matters concerning media-management. It would be appropriate to re-iterate them at the end of this media chapter as prelude to the next chapter, which develops the question of ethics as a planning and evaluation standard for the House.

In a free and democratic state governed by the rule of law, security is noted as a central point of reference for the police in general: they are regarded as the essential guarantor of the State's internal security. Consequently the police also represent the State's monopoly of the use of force over the citizen. The German report notes that the police thus have "a clearly exposed function with considerable accumulation of power and, consequently, a huge responsibility in handling this power."<sup>140</sup> What are understood as professional standards and codes of police ethics are the precautions required to ensure that police measures to guarantee security during Major Events or elsewhere remain justifiably appropriate and within the democratic rule of law. They are understood as 'behaviour binding regulations'.

The importance of security during a Major Event renders police behaviour and the extent of its containment by regulations and ethical standards subject to close media scrutiny. The quality of the security challenge itself can vary depending on the type, character or complexity of the event in question. As we have seen in Chapter 2 in terms of typologies, this would be as 'political', 'sporting' or 'cultural' categories. Germany's 2008 report notes that it is those with a political connotation, rather than sporting/cultural ones, that are likely to prove the most testing when it comes to upholding questions of police ethics.

For in political events the role of the police is to guarantee and protect the constitutional and legal rights of the involved groups, notwithstanding support or disapproval of the original cause for the event. Demonstrators will expect the police to protect them in exercising their rights and not to be prevented from carrying out activities in relation to them. This demands a highly sensitive strategy from the police, who must meet those expectations with a balance between the freedom of individual rights and the security of people at and around the event and the event itself. Being in accordance with the law for the situation, all operational security measures must also align to universally valid ethical commitments, both conceptually and in practice. Crucially in this regard, stresses the report, "the police must operate within the existing system of values and the legal framework to protect legal rights, *without imposing its own ideas of the relevance of an event and good or bad attitudes and behaviour of the citizens in the situation?*" (emphasis added)<sup>141</sup>.

In terms of media, communication becomes important in these heightened, exposed, and difficult situations. For the police have to communicate their security role in the specific event as public order maintainers not only to the event organisers and the involved groups of demonstrators, but also the public at large. Moreover, the EU's principle of 'de-escalation' (see Chapter 4 'on responsibilities' section *ante*) in respect of confrontation being one that the police would often be reminded of and ordered to follow in overall guidance to their regular documented policing operation for an event.

So the German report on ethics makes a number of points concerning external police communication through the media, primarily in the context of public order policing and the handling of protests at Major Events of the political type:

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<sup>140</sup> (UNICRI, 2009, p. 86)

<sup>141</sup> (UNICRI, 2009, p. 87)

Firstly that it is the relationship of the police and the media that needs to be the centre of attention. Within democracies, Germany point out, the media are a fundamental means of democratic control. Media reports have a deep impact on the general mood and attitudes of the public. The role, behaviour and manners of the police especially, as institutions with the monopoly on the use of force, are issues frequently reported on by the media (as the above French case perhaps exemplifies). The police-media relationship therefore requires thorough examination.<sup>142</sup> This understanding can be used as supplementary reference material for development of the House's Media-Management CTM being outlined here.

Secondly, the report characterises the relationship as generally one of mutual dependence – each needing the other but for different purposes. For the police, the most prominent issue at stake is its *legitimacy*. Depictions of the police in general and reportage of their handling of difficult operations in particular are important for establishing and maintaining police legitimacy. For the police, the media thus function as a means of promoting a (favourable) image of themselves among the public.

The dependence of the media, on the other hand, is based on the necessity of gathering serious and trustworthy information. Journalists depend on the police for first hand details but also have to maintain a certain image of themselves as trustworthy and credible reporters. And it is on their credibility that large circulation and dissemination of their media reports as serious journalism relies. So at a general level there is a mutual dependency at stake for both police and media: police legitimacy and large media circulation<sup>143</sup>.

Thirdly, and at a more routine and local level, Germany's EU-SEC work with police officers, media representatives and academics allows for the following observations to be made and considered: that on the surface, traditional police/media confrontation seems to have steadily given way to more collaboration and that police public relations management has seriously improved in the last decades.

However, underneath this general sense of satisfaction some old tensions were still found to prevail and revealed themselves during the workshops. The media can still feel and get the impression that the police are deliberately withholding necessary information. In response, the police maintain that this is not deliberate but due to their need (especially in relation to Major Events) to ensure that only thoroughly examined information is released. Former problems can therefore still have an impact on present relations and media management measures need to be taken to overcome them.

On the other hand, police and academics pointed out that the media can frequently present a distorted image of the police as either black or white with nothing in between. Public images of the police consequently fail to hold up to the realities of the police when confronted. Thus, the report continues, the behaviour and appearance of the police in the media contains a touch of glamour that is hardly compatible with everyday routine. The roots of this problem however, the report adds, go to more complex social phenomena and cannot be solved between the police and media in particular situations<sup>144</sup>. It is enough to say in conclusion to the original 2008 report that the relationship can be characterized as one of mutual dependency and cooperation but still requiring improvement in certain respects.<sup>145</sup>

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<sup>142</sup> (UNICRI, 2008, p. 89)

<sup>143</sup> (UNICRI, 2008, p. 90)

<sup>144</sup> See also various discussions in above mentioned police studies references.

<sup>145</sup> (UNICRI, 2008, pp. 90-91)

### ***Endpoint – Police Ethics in Media Management***

Returning to the continuation of this 2008 work on ethics and the media in the 2010 work on media management, Germany's Task 3.3 report importantly concludes by noting that police duties and scope of activities are determined by national legislation in respective EU countries, which need to be considered in the development of any media management tool<sup>146</sup>. The observations concerning 'replicability' made by the UK on 'assessing good practice' mentioned earlier in this chapter can be taken account of in this respect. That is, for best practices to avoid being dependant on unique legislative frameworks and other nationally specific resources in order to be adopted as common standards. However, the key common denominators for future work to consider in this respect, it concludes, are Human Rights based principles of proportionality in use of measures, rule governed use of force and *The European Code of Police Ethics*. The next chapter deals with this more directly.

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<sup>146</sup> (DHPol, 2010, p. 20)

## CHAPTER 6 - ETHICAL & OPERATIONAL STANDARDS FOR SECURITY PRODUCTS (CTM 4)

Key documents relating to this CTM are the Austrian Team's EU-SEC II Task 3.2 Report *Common Research Standards for Security during Major Events in Europe*<sup>147</sup> and the Council of Europe's *The European Code of Police Ethics*<sup>148</sup>. The latter is annexed in the former and to this manual as Annex C. The task report is the outcome of joint activity among consortium partners during 2009 led by B.M.I. and supported by Dr. Jonathan Hadley, a researcher in policing and security at the University of Helsinki's Social Research Department, as an independent advisor.

As a common methodology for end-users' field testing of 'security products', the CTM is centred on the promotion of minimum *ethical* and *operational* standards within the overall security planning process. Chapter 2 of this manual describes what the House means by 'security products', which is taken in the wider sense and not restricted to technical equipment alone. Accordingly, the acronym **STILT** provisionally classifies the range of security products to include:

- Strategic plans;
- Tactical measures;
- Informational tools;
- Legal instruments; and
- Technical equipment.

All of which can be regarded as 'security tools' produced and/or procured via research within the overall planning process for a Major Event.

So it is to the *planning process* that Austria's CTM is intended to be applied as a common European standard of ethical consideration and operational certification of 'security products'. It draws on two of the four themes dealt with in the Task 3.2 report as Theme 2 (*Ethical Standards and Accountability for Security Research*) and Theme 4 (*Quality Assurance Standards for Security Tools/Products*)<sup>149</sup>, the core elements of which are consolidated here with a view to their field testing and reporting on as an applied House CTM during 2012. A supporting article *Setting Standards: Major Events and the European Code of Police Ethics* (Hadley, 2010)<sup>150</sup> appears in the Austrian partner's police science and practice journal *.SLAK* and can be used in conjunction with this CTM.

### Background to the Question of Ethics in the EU-SEC Programme

As the previous chapter noted, the German partners<sup>151</sup> to the original EU-SEC project conducted work and reported on ethical issues and security during Major Events. Its findings were replicated in the 2008 EU-SEC manual of best practices for research coordination.

In terms of ethical principles and sources, the report adopted a particular sense of ethics for the purpose of the EU-SEC project and programme. It took ethics to mean those morally permissible 'standards of conduct' that govern members of a group simply because they *are* members of that group. That is, that

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<sup>147</sup> (B.M.I., 2010)

<sup>148</sup> (CoE, 2009)

<sup>149</sup> (B.M.I., 2010, pp. 14-16; 19-21) The other two themes referring to the use of CEPOL and the IPO Security Planning Model as utilized elsewhere in this manual.

<sup>150</sup> Later reproduced as *Setting International Standards* in the international edition of the same journal (Hadley, 2011).

<sup>151</sup> Deutsche Hochschule der Polizei (DHPol), formerly Polizei-Führungsakademie des Bundes und der Länder (PFA) in Münster.



the ethics of research is for researchers, the ethics of policing is for those doing policing or being concerned with police work, etc. In this sense, the topic of ethics is presented as being *relative*, even though morality (being another sense of ethics at a *universal* level) is not. It takes ethics as resembling law and custom, which can vary from group to group over time but be at least morally permissible (i.e. no thieves' or torturers' code of 'ethics' to be rendered 'relatively' valid). Taken as resembling laws and custom, the 2008 manual states, ethics set "standards to guide and evaluate conduct."<sup>152</sup>

### **Ethical Standards and Accountability – Gold and Platinum**

In terms of police ethics and public accountability<sup>153</sup>, the House seeks a common standard that reflects those already in place at a European level. Europe has been promoting Human Rights within policing since 1979. The period 1997-2000 marked the Council of Europe's first programme on Police and Human Rights<sup>154</sup>. As recommendations formally adopted by the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers on 19<sup>th</sup> September 2001, *The European Code of Police Ethics* is a set of international police standards to be promoted among Members. It was formally published in 2009 as a toolkit for the legislation of the security sector. It therefore has direct, legitimate and influential bearing in Major Event security provision in Europe.

Task 3.2 developed a set of statements reflecting articles of *The European Code of Police Ethics* salient to security planning for Major Events. The idea is for a national authority to actively consider the extent to which they could claim compliance to them. They are intended to represent a basic system of recognition by the EU-SEC Consortium as to a Major Event's self-certified attainment of common ethical standards expected of it at a European level.

A basic 'gold' and advanced 'platinum' standard is offered. The basic standard amounts to a passively assumed implicit statement of compliance with *The European Code of Police Ethics* in principle. The advanced standard, however, amounts to a more actively considered explicit statement of compliance to salient articles. As statements of compliance, the 'gold' and 'platinum' standards are reproduced at the end of this chapter. The platinum standard concerns common international policing standards that are expected in terms of:

1. Public Accountability
2. Personnel Identification
3. Public Complaints Systems
4. Human Rights Protection
5. Ethical Security Products
6. Independent Research

They are designed for use as discussion documents to reflect upon at any stage in a specific Major Event's planning. They can also be used as basic templates against which to independently assess the exceptionality of policing and security at an international event in contrast to routine local standards expected of democratic policing domestically.

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<sup>152</sup> (UNICRI, 2008, p. 84)

<sup>153</sup> (UNICRI, 2008, pp. 83-91, Ch 7): within the EU-SEC programme. security standards for major events and associated research has been seen in terms of police ethics and public accountability.

<sup>154</sup> (CoE, 2000) Available at <http://www.cmr-net.ch/publications/kms/details.cfm?lng=en&id=95671&nav1=5>

### Testing the Platinum Standard among Consortium Partners

The six basic statements making up the platinum standard were provisionally tested among consortium partners as part of Task 3.2's development in September 2010. Delegates representing 18 consortium partner countries attending the 4<sup>th</sup> Network Steering Committee Meeting of the EU-SEC II project in Paris were given a copy of the six basic statements.

With regard to how Major Event security actually *is* in their respective countries (i.e. not how they think it *should* be but *actually* is) they were asked to ascribe to each statement a pre-given value ranging from 1-6 concerning the level of compliance as they understood it<sup>155</sup>.

Replies were received from 16 of the 19 delegates of the consortium's 24 Member States either on the day or shortly after. Fourteen were police officers with expert knowledge in the field the other two being senior specialists within their country's policing organisation (Germany & Bulgaria). The value of 6 ('not known'), confirmed the reliability of respondents' replies by appearing only twice out of a total of 96 entries (i.e. 6 statements x 14 respondents). The separate values given to each statement by each responding country accompanies their reproduction at the end of this chapter.

The below table of results combines the separate figures to indicate the general range of current compliance to the six statements among House members collectively:

Value → Statement ↓	1 Yes (Full)	2 Yes (Part)	3 No (but should)	4 No (and shouldn't)	5 No (can't say if)	6 Not Known	YES (vals 1&2) & as % of 16 respondents
1 Public Accountability	6	6	-	1	3	-	12 (75%)
2 Personnel Identification	6	7	1	-	2	-	13 (81%)
3 Public Complaints	2	5	3	2	4	-	7 (44%)
4 Rights Protection	8	6	-	-	2	-	14 (88%)
5 Ethical Products	14	1	-	-	1	-	15 (94%)
6 Independent Research	2	3	6	-	3	2	5 (31%)
As % of possible 96	40%	29%	10%	3%	16%	2%	100%

Table 3: House's ethical standard statements against compliance value range among 16 EU Member States.

Source: Short Survey distributed 15 Sep 2010 to 19 Consortium partners at 4<sup>th</sup> NSC Meeting, Paris, by J Hadley.

Basic analysis found that there was a general will among partners toward compliance in all respects. However, where values 1 & 2 are combined to indicate compliance to a statement either in full or part, consortium members were found to have a significantly low level of compliance in respect of setting up dedicated public complaints systems for Major Events (44%) and commissioning independent external research in respect of the event (31%) in terms of statements 3 & 6, respectively (shown in grey). This is in contrast to far higher scores attained (75% to 94%) for the other statements. This might be because they tend not to risk critical exposure to external public scrutiny, but that is an area for further exploration.

Disparities between countries, however, could be detected from responses to statements concerning public accountability and the use of personal identification numbers. A pertinent example in the context of the House CTM on PPPs would be the apparent disparity between Member States over requirements

<sup>155</sup> Values: 1 = YES (in all respects of the statement); 2 = YES (in some respects only); 3 = NO (but in some respects should be); 4 = NO (and some respects should not be); 5 NO (but cannot say if it should or should not be); 6 = NOT KNOWN (unable to say either way/not in a position to say).

for private security personnel to wear clear identification numbers while on patrol at Major Events. This can also be expanded to police officers in public order situations in some countries<sup>156</sup>.

In some cases there was explicit opposition to aspects of public accountability as well as the suggestion of a dedicated complaints system for a Major Event. This was in contrast to explicit support for the statement on dedicated public complaints systems, as well as that on personnel identification numbers and independent research. Such disparities validate the statements as tools for coordinating security planning for Major Events toward a commonality of international policing standards based upon the *European Code of Police Ethics* and its promotion among Member States.

The highest levels of compliance were on the statements concerning the ethical nature of requesting security products and verification of lawfulness (as human rights protection) in security plans (94% and 88% for statements 5 and 4 respectively). However, an inability to say either way as to whether a country's Major Event security plans should comply to the statements or not (value 5) was found in respect of all statements and represented a significant 16% of all possible answers in total (shown in grey).

Compared to only 40% for answers indicating compliance in full and 29% for those indicating compliance in part, this level of uncertainty represented the third largest proportion of answers. If added to the 10% indicating non compliance in practice but a recognition that there *should* be compliance in principle (value 3) it further validates the need for use of the statements as Major Event security planning discussion points aimed not only at coordinating commonality among Member States but promoting the *European Code of Police Ethics* more generally.

### **How to use these Statements in Training and Planning Phases**

The work of Germany on ethics contained in the 2008 EU-SEC Manual discusses its place in police training under the heading 'internal police communication'<sup>157</sup>. This is in conjunction with its discussion of ethics in terms of 'the role of the police' at Major Events (particularly as maintainers of public order at political events) and 'external police communication' in terms of media relations and management (particularly as public image promotion). These later two areas were covered in the previous chapter on the Media Management CTM. This section will draw on the area of 'internal police communication' to contextualise the use of this ethical standards CTM in the training and planning phases of Major Event security.

Internal police communication is seen as an important method of promoting the relevance of ethical issues and standards among both individual police officers and police organisations as a whole. Measures are required to promote them in both attitude and behaviour of officers and organisations alike. This relates to both daily police work in general and in the policing of Major Events in particular. For the ethical standards now developed in this CTM, the 2008 work by Germany breaks internal police communication into four spheres of possible application and influence:

1. education and training
2. organisational socialisation
3. internal public relations
4. operational debriefing

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<sup>156</sup> Replies from France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Estonia, Cyprus, Sweden, among others, all indicated disparities over the wearing of personnel identity numbers in certain situations, for example.

<sup>157</sup> (UNICRI, 2008, p. 88)

### ***Education and Training***

The German contribution reminds us that a fundamental and compulsory part of police training of all police officers in a democratic society concerns that of police ethics, human rights, the rule of law and its binding obligation for the police as a whole and each officer individually. This covers the roles of the police in a free and democratic State, the basic principle of the monopoly over the use of force (its consequences and commitments), the relationship between the police and society, and systems and institutions of control over the police (public accountability). Topics such as everyday contact with the public, interpersonal skills, behaviour toward victims and offenders, use of force, conflict resolution are generally taught at operational level. At a managerial level, responsibility for the implementation, advancement and compliance to the above by the organisation and its members tends to shape the curriculum. These can be taken as the fundamental occupational ethics, learnt during systemic police education and training processes.<sup>158</sup>

There is therefore an important and expected place in any internationally coordinated specialist and/or senior officer police training and education programme centred on Major Event Security Planning among EU Member States. This manual's CTM on a set of ethical standards, or statements aimed at provoking thought and reflection among security planners in relation to compliance with standards set by the *European Code of Police Ethics*, can be used to assist precisely that. This is whether it is CEPOL organised, House organised or domestically organised at the national or local level.

### ***Organisational Socialisation***

Ethical competencies are also gained from field experience as 'organisational socialisation'. Germany's report notes that police officers 'live' in their organisation, gradually growing within it and its culture. Though informal, this is a normal and generally functional process. However, problematic sub-cultural developments occur when internal marginal groups with particular professional paradigms and deviant beliefs and values arise. The result can be patterns of behaviour that go against the institution's ethical standards. Whilst there can be specific structural and/or personal factors facilitating it, we are reminded that it is the responsibility of police management to address problems of police sub-culture.<sup>159</sup>

A media report<sup>160</sup> at the time of writing (April 2011) concerning the French *Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité* (CRS) may help exemplify some of the difficulties faced by police management in this respect. According to the UK's Guardian online, an official decree stating that the French riot police, the CRS, could no longer drink wine or beer with their meals had been reacted to 'furiously' by the police unions. Management concerns over damaging internet images of uniformed CRS officers openly drinking from beer cans on the sidelines of a street protest that they were policing in October 2010 were being resisted by proponents of the force's traditional permission to drink wine or beer (not spirits) with their lunch while on duty – this included packed lunches with can of beer/glass of wine from the back of riot vans while patrolling demonstrations. The case shows how organisational socialisation can shape occupational cultures. Also how professional paradigms within it can be problematic when required to adapt to new professional standards. For the House and its CTMs, it also indicates that nationally specific cultural differences are something that may need to be addressed in preparation for international cooperation over Major Event security planning based on management of media imagery and development of common professional standards for policing in Europe.

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<sup>158</sup> (UNICRI, 2008, p. 88)

<sup>159</sup> (UNICRI, 2008, p. 88)

<sup>160</sup> (Chrisafis, 2011)

### ***Internal Public Relations***

'Internal PR' is part of the preparatory phase of Major Events, the German report notes. This is the stage where all previously mentioned aspects of police ethics and professional standards become concrete and practical for the specific situation. It is about introducing the officers involved to the background of the event and the expected circumstances and problematic areas of the event. It is about familiarising officers with the aim of the security operation in relation to it, its guidelines, strategic concept and corresponding tactical measures.<sup>161</sup> In this regard, relevant aspects of this House CTM's six ethical compliance statements can be introduced or brought to bear. For example, explanation as to the requirement for personal identification number display, or existence of a dedicated public complaints system in relation to the event.

### ***Operational Debriefing***

This fourth sphere of influence can be applied both to this CTM 4 on ethics as well as CTM 3 on media management. It is simply the post-event debriefing. Germany's EU-SEC workshops with police managers and journalists identified numerous factors that can actively improve awareness of ethical issues in police actions. Primarily they amount to some level of critical reflection on the operation: what has happened and by what cause; what strengths and weaknesses can be identified? The detection of errors or problematic incidents and the evaluation of performance, all serve the function of control. Of similar importance is analysis of public reactions: media coverage in particular as well as complaints about the police in the context of the event. Systematic coverage of these factors in an operational debriefing can lead to them being taken more seriously and thus reducing mistakes in future deployments.<sup>162</sup>

In the context of international cooperation over Major Event security planning, this CTM's six statements of ethical compliance, along with its quality assurance operational standard for security products that follows, can be used to critically reflect upon planning and delivery during the post-event evaluation phases, or at any preceding stage of the planning process.

### **Common Operational Standards – Quality Assurances for Security Products**

Task 3.2 developed an easily replicable operational standard for common use within the House as a CTM in relation security products. A simple requirement that:

*“All ‘new’ security products introduced for a specific major event meet national standards of approval before further international adoption among partners or further domestic use by its host nation as routine<sup>163</sup>.”*

There are links here to the transferability of technology and technical resources dealt with in the next chapter under STEP as Part 2 of the manual's guidance on common policies for the House. This section will confine itself to the basic quality assurance principle arrived at as a common operational standard for the House's CTM on security products.

Table 1 in Chapter 1 (p. 16) of this manual lists some of the security topic areas that Major Event security planners felt were currently under researched and in need of development. Crude but valid as the list is, some research topics belong to preparation phases, others to implementation phases and others to evaluation phases of a security planning programme. In keeping with the House's STILT classification

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<sup>161</sup> (UNICRI, 2008, p. 89)

<sup>162</sup> (UNICRI, 2008, p. 89)

<sup>163</sup> (B.M.I, 2010, p. 3)

system, some related to strategic, tactical, technical, and legal research topics, as well as to managerial and informational topics.

The Task team discussed what common quality assurance standards could be asked for in respect of any new security product produced or procured on the basis of operationally desired research topics such as those listed. It concluded that the only minimum standard the EU-SEC consortium could insist on was that the subsequent *routine* application of the new product (intended to meet the security demands of what are recognized as otherwise *exceptional* circumstances) meet the governing national and professional standards of the EU Member State producing or procuring it.

A case study of controversial public order policing tactics used at the 2009 London G20 Summit and public complaints of excessive force is reproduced in Annex C of the original Task 3.2 report. Based on the UK's Independent Police Complaints Commission report<sup>164</sup> it notes how new tactics (i.e. 'security products') especially introduced at one Major Event (Gleneagles G8, 2005) had gone on to become locally established practices at the 2009 London G20 without having been nationally approved or assessed against nationally agreed standards. This point, echoed in the UK government's own report<sup>165</sup>, forms the nub of this common operational standard for national approval as the *minimum* of quality assurances for routine use of any new security product born of the extra-ordinary security requirements of a Major Event<sup>166</sup>.

Space prohibits further elaboration on this aspect of common standards for security products as a House CTM. Detailed discussion based on contributions from the Danish partners and UNICRI can be found on pages 20 and 21 of Austria's original Task 3.2 report. The conclusion to which was that until a national approval process was completed in respect of it there should be restricted use of any new *ad hoc* security products (as recognized under the report's STILT classification system). This should be applied both domestically and in terms of transfer under the auspices of international cooperation.

Further use should be limited until national approval on the basis of medical (and where necessary, psychological), and ethical assessment. This latter aspect ties the common operational quality assurance standard to the common ethical standards discussed above.

An internationally recognised body that came to light since the writing of the Task 3.2 Report but can perhaps assist with the development of the CTM in this respect is the UK based *Omega Research Foundation*<sup>167</sup>. Their work consists of identifying and having listed as banned or as controlled items at the national and international level, the commercial manufacture, trading in and inappropriate use of certain specialist security equipment (products) that are now proliferating the market but contravene international protocols to prevent torture and ill-treatment (OPCAT) either by virtue of their technical design or intended operational use. Certain classes of new 'stun' and 'gas' technology premised upon the infliction of pain as a means to compliance fall within this area of contemporary concern over the market in specialist technical equipment, which takes the manual to Part III as *Common Policies 2* for the House.

### ***Endpoint***

For ease of reference and use, the gold and platinum statements of ethical compliance spoken of in this CTM chapter are reproduced here in conclusion. This is along with an overview of the data from a short

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<sup>164</sup> (IPCC, 2009)

<sup>165</sup> (HMIC, 2009)

<sup>166</sup> (BMLI, 2010, p. 19 & 39)

<sup>167</sup> Omega Research Foundation, Manchester, UK. Research Associate Neil Corney omega@mcr1.poptel.org

survey among Consortium members regarding their respective country's ability to claim full compliance to them.

## ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR THE HOUSE (CTM 4)

### Gold

Preparation and implementation of security for this Major Event respects *The European Code of Police Ethics* as adopted by the Council of Europe 19 September 2001 with regard to:

- a) Articles 1 & 3 on the objectives and legal basis of the police
- b) Articles 13, 15, 17 & 19 on the organisation and structure of the police
- c) Articles 36, 37, 38, 43 & 45 on police action and intervention
- d) Articles 59 & 61 on accountability and control of police
- e) Article 64 on research and international cooperation

### Platinum

Our preparation and implementation of security for this Major Event respects *The European Code of Police Ethics* as adopted by the Council of Europe 19 September 2001 in that:

**1. Public Accountability** (regarding Articles 13, 15, 17 and 59 collectively):

The planning, provision and evaluation of security for this major event is the responsibility of an operationally independent and dedicated police command position, accountable to a specified civil authority.

**2. Personnel Identification** (regarding Article 45):

All security personnel during this major event wear openly displayed and easily readable personal identity *numbers* (rather than names) at all times. This includes, in particular, police officers in public order situations as well as private security guards and stewards engaged with duties under the security plan.

**3. Public Complaints** (regarding Articles 19 and 61):

A dedicated public complaints system is set up in respect of this major event's security operation and evaluative research includes ready analysis and publication of the nature and number of complaints made regarding the management of its security and conduct of individual security personnel during it.

**4. Human Rights Protection** (regarding Articles 1, 3, 38, 36, 37 and 43 collectively):

Security plans for this event contain a statement verifying the lawfulness of all intended actions within them and their overall compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights, in particular those concerning life, use of force, and right to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly.

**5. Ethical Security Products** (regarding Article 36):

In requesting threat assessments and developing new security tools for this major event, intelligence or other knowledge obtained through unethical means (in particular torture, inhumane or degrading treatment) is neither sought nor knowingly accepted and planners actively seek assurances from agencies providing such services that their products have not been so obtained (or are intended for such use).

**6. Independent Research** (regarding Articles 19 and 64):

Recognising that security for this major event can set new policing precedents as well as test ethical boundaries in response to new security threats, independent scientific research on the policing of the event is commissioned from external institutions from the outset of the planning process.



**Data from Short Survey on Compliance to Ethical Standards Statements:**

Responding Country	Value Range	Public Accountability	Personnel Identification	Public Complaints	Human Rights	Security Products	Independent Research
Ireland	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Portugal	1-2	1	2	2	1	1	1
UK	1-2	2	1	2	1	1	2
Bulgaria	1-3	1	1	1	1	1	3
Estonia	1-3	1	2	2	2	1	3
Germany	1-3	1	2	3	1	1	2
Slovenia	1-3	1	2	2	1	1	3
Sweden	2-3	2	2	3	2	2	3
Romania	1-4	2	1	4	1	1	3
Austria	1-5	4	5	5	2	1	6
Cyprus	1-5	2	3	<i>5</i>	5	1	<i>6</i>
Hungary	1-5	5	1	3	2	1	2
Italy	1-5	2	2	5	2	1	5
Malta	1-5	2	2	4	1	1	5
Spain	1-5	5	1	2	2	1	3
France	5	5	5	5	5	5	5

Table 4: Values for compliance to six ethical standard statements reflecting international policing standards.

Source: Short survey distributed by J Hadley 15<sup>th</sup> Sept 2010 to consortium delegates at 4<sup>th</sup> NSC Meeting, Paris.

P = Police respondent, C = Civilian (senior specialist) respondent

Non-response: Latvia, Slovakia, Denmark.

Not surveyed: Finland, Netherlands, Greece, Poland (not at meeting)

Values:

1 = YES (in all respects of the statement);

2 = YES (in some respects of the statement only);

3 = NO (but in some respects should be);

4 = NO (and some respects should not be);

5 NO (but cannot say if it should or should not be);

6 = NOT KNOWN (unable to say either way/not in a position to say).

(Values in italics = researcher interpretation).

Countries ranked by overall value range as indicated of general compliance: those ranging only 1-3 representing a general claim to compliance or a will to achieve compliance, those with values ranging into 4 and 5 representing potential for developmental debate.



### **PART III - COMMON HOUSE POLICIES 2: COOPERATION, RESEARCH & NETWORKS**

As common policies for the House, the previous four chapters of Part II dealt with planning and practice based CTMs. The next four chapters of Part III deal with CTMs based on cooperation, technology research and networking. They draw on the results of Work Package 2 and remaining parts of Work Package 3 from EU-SEC II in terms of obstacles to coordination, the development and testing of the House's Specialist Technical Equipment Pool (STEP) and European Major Events Register (EMER) as CTMs and the role of the European Police College (CEPOL) within the broader House theme and specific CTM of networking and training.

Essentially, the idea of STEP is a database aiming to provide information on availability and effectiveness of security technologies used by partner countries during Major Events. That of EMER is a repository of information about Major Events at a European level hosted by partner countries<sup>168</sup>. The use of CEPOL is as a European level training and networking instrument for senior officers and specialists in the field of major event security planning<sup>169</sup>.

Both STEP and EMER are the envisaged subjects of further testing and development as House CTMs within Task 1.1 *Common Research Technology and Taxonomy* to be led, provisionally, by Portugal during 2011/2012. It is anticipated that matters concerning CEPOL will be led by France under Task 1.4 *Networking & Training* during the same 18 month period<sup>170</sup>. As introductory and supporting background to material concerning STEP, EMER and CEPOL, the key results of the Netherland's Task 2.2 report on obstacles affecting coordination in relation to Major Events in Europe<sup>171</sup> are reviewed first.

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<sup>168</sup> (UNICRI, 2009, p. 3)

<sup>169</sup> (DGNP, 2011, p. 24)

<sup>170</sup> (UNICRI, 2010b, pp. 23-24)

<sup>171</sup> (MinJus, 2009)



## CHAPTER 7 - OBSTACLES AND SOLUTIONS TO COOPERATION

From the outset, the positive spirit in which the Netherlands' task was undertaken was with a view to not simply identifying obstacles to coordination but also ways in which they can be dealt with. On behalf of their Ministry of Justice, the report *Obstacles affecting the Coordination of Research in relation to Major Events*<sup>172</sup> was jointly researched and compiled by two senior advisors to the Police Academy of the Netherlands, Ries Ouwerkerk and Cyril Poppelaars, both of whom have police backgrounds in fields of law, training, management and specialist large-scale international operations such as Major Events.

Choosing to focus on legal and cultural obstacles, their three-step approach was: to review existing reference material related to the issue, particularly that from EU-SEC in relation to obstacles to the transfer of expertise<sup>173</sup>; to consult with and survey consortium members during EU-SEC II workshops; and finally, to validate their results via presentation to the EU-SEC II Network Steering Committee. This was successfully done in Bucharest, 3 June 2009.

### **Avoiding Obstacles to Coordination – The *Prüm Decision***

A key conclusion was that, based on the evidence of EU-SEC there is a clear will among House partners to transnational cooperation with no objections in principle. Objections are largely confined to privacy issues around the sharing of personal details. The sharing of lessons learned in a properly developed police networking system would be supported<sup>174</sup>.

Most importantly, the report observes that a will to share information is backed up by the Council of the European Union's 2008 *Prüm Decision*<sup>175</sup> to adopt key elements of the 2005 Prüm Convention into EU law and that the consequences of this should be identified and monitored<sup>176</sup>. For these purposes and reference in this House manual, an over view and details of the *Prüm Decision* can be found at EU's *Europa* website cited and footnoted *post*.

The *Prüm Decision* is described as a set of provisions concerning the automated exchange of information regarding (specifically) *Major Events* and for the purposes of combating terrorism and other forms of cross-border police cooperation. Chapter 3, Articles 13 to 15 (see Annex D) deal with provisions concerning Major Events with, in the Decision's terms, 'a cross-border dimension'. There is close resonance here with the House's definition of 'Major Events' as events requiring 'international cooperation' in respect of its security planning.

With regard to the supply of data in relation to Major Events that have a cross-border dimension, Articles 13-15 of the *Prüm Decision* are summarized by the EU's website in the following terms:

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<sup>172</sup> (MinJus, 2009, p. 7)

<sup>173</sup> (UNICRI, 2008) (MetPo, 2006)

<sup>174</sup> (MinJus, 2009, p. 8)

<sup>175</sup> (CoEU, 2008)

<sup>176</sup> (MinJus, 2009, p. 8)

*EU countries must provide each other non-personal data via their national contact points, as required for the purpose of preventing criminal offences and maintaining public order and security. Personal data may be supplied only if the data subjects are considered a threat to public order and security or if it is believed that they will commit criminal offences at the events. However, this data may only be used in relation to the event it was provided for and must be deleted once it has served its purpose, but no later than a year after it was supplied.*<sup>177</sup>

The 2008 *Prüm Decision* is therefore a significant point of international legal guidance and support for the House with regards to the sharing of both non-personal and personal information in the security planning process of Major Events for member states. Having made this point, though, it should be remembered that neither STEP nor EMER envisage the sharing of *personal* data. Nevertheless, the workshop results of Netherlands' Task 2.2 report indicated strong recognition within the House of the Prüm treaty and decision as a positive development for the sharing of information and cooperation<sup>178</sup>. It is therefore a significant instrument for the subject of dissemination, training and discussion within the House.

Critics of Prüm, however, point to the unusual speed and relative secrecy in which it passed through the EU legislative negotiation process. In particular its by-passing of national and European parliamentary involvement as a manipulation of European legislative standards in order to secure its support and democratic legitimacy. There are concerns, too, that because it was developed by a minority of Member States outside of the EU's institutional framework it either marks the beginning of the EU fragmentation process or serves, in its flexibility, as an asset to the widening and deepening composition of the European Union:

*Because the [Schengen III and Prüm] treaties' negotiation process and enactment into European law were largely guarded from the peering eyes of public watchdogs, many European citizens suspect an encroachment into their basic human rights and liberties, as well as a deterioration of the EU's democratic legitimacy.*<sup>179</sup>

Of pertinence to the House and its interests in the international coordination of major event security planning at a European level, is the observation made by critics of Prüm that protesters at the 2007 G8 Summit in Heiligendamm, Germany, feared that their personal information would be unknowingly spread throughout police stations in Europe on the basis of its cross-border data sharing protocols through national police contact points<sup>180</sup>. However, criticism of Prüm seems largely levelled at the manner of its negotiation (expeditious, behind closed-doors and lacking democratic legitimacy) than the nature of its substance. What is said to be at stake in this respect is the fragmentation of the European Union on the basis of its implementation of “imperfect communitarisation rules, regulations and practices.”<sup>181</sup>

In terms of obstacles, EU-SEC II Consortium members reported to the Netherlands of a need to change attitudes at the higher institutional and political level of police leadership concerning organised international cooperation. Also, that within an institutional and occupational context there is still little teaching of research based security planning for Major Events in some police academies. A significant problem identified in the report as being that of learning on an isolated 'case by case' basis rather than as

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<sup>177</sup>[http://europa.eu/legislation\\_summaries/justice\\_freedom\\_security/police\\_customs\\_cooperation/jl0005\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/police_customs_cooperation/jl0005_en.htm)

<sup>178</sup> (MinJus, 2009, p. 8 & 10)

<sup>179</sup> (Walsch, 2008, p. 83) Christopher Walsch is an associate professor at the Department of Political Science, Eszterházy Károly College, Hungary.

<sup>180</sup> (Walsch, 2008, p. 86)

<sup>181</sup> (Walsch, 2008, pp. 88, 90)

a 'continual learning programme' that builds on a succession of cases. In this regard, better use of existing EU level networks and training initiatives as a means to knowledge management was recommended<sup>182</sup>.

Drawing on Prof. Frank Gregory's 2006 research for EU-SEC I and findings of its own task based research, the Netherlands' summarised its conclusions as follows:

- That there is no need for new networks: CEPOL training and European Security Research Programme (ESRP) frameworks already have sufficient overlap.
- That a focus on 'major event security' (which fits the European research agenda) could considerably improve information exchanges within existing networks.
- That national legislation is experienced as a significant barrier to information exchange potential only for matters directly related to 'national security'.
- Much information can be shared in the field of 'good practice'.

Given the observable will and international treaty based ability to exchange information and engage international cooperation over research coordination, the Netherlands concluded that the only thing that need now be done is 'to find the optimal way to make this happen'<sup>183</sup>. Their report recommended a 'knowledge management wheel' (Fig.2 below) as a means of overcoming or reducing any discernable obstacles to research coordination.




Fig 2: *Knowledge Management Wheel* (MinJus, 2009, pp. 14, adapted)

A continual learning programme that develops knowledge via a succession of case evaluations would allow for the networked transfer of new knowledge to potential users. A network's subsequent use of it and reviewed development of it would then feed into a virtuous circle of improvement.

The opposite of this, one imagines, is a vicious circle of decline where knowledge from isolated case reviews is *not* used to build upon existing knowledge, is *not* transferred to other potential users, does *not* get used or further developed with a view to improved cooperation and security planning for future Major Events.

Whilst this pedagogical principle is in all likelihood well understood and accepted among the Consortium, the problem the Netherlands' report identified is how to actually initiate the movement of the wheel – how to get it turning.

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<sup>182</sup> (MinJus, 2009, pp. 4, 10 & 18)

<sup>183</sup> (MinJus, 2009, p. 14)

*The proposed shift in emphasis is, in fact, based on the assumption, and the experience, that if this movement actually occurs, previously identified obstacles will decrease in number and importance. In the event of sufficient participation by those involved, the process will gradually change 'automatically' and the knowledge development phase will be characterized more and more by coordination.*<sup>184</sup>

To do this, the report describes four relevant factors, or conditions, that have to be first fulfilled<sup>185</sup>. In short, they are:

1. **Perception:** Acknowledging the importance of the activity to be carried out. This includes (as most but not all those surveyed did) realizing the importance of coordinated research and planning activities at a *European*, not just national, level.
2. **Motivation:** Participants with the required perception have to be motivated to make a contribution *themselves* (as was born out by the workshop and survey results).
3. **Opportunity:** An opportunity has to be created for simplifying the sharing of information more comprehensively. A central database would be beneficial. The currently available opportunities of bilateral information exchange and European level conferences are insufficient.
4. **Skill:** Once the above three conditions have been fulfilled, skills in the efficient and effective use of special database tools have to be acquired.

Virtuous movement of the *knowledge management wheel* requires the proper implementation of the last two conditions - 'opportunity' and 'skill'. It is with respect to the central database(s) called for in the opportunity factor that House CTMs of STEP and EMER primarily relate. Skill acquisition of these and other CTMs fall within future CEPOL based activity of the House.

### **Initiating Movement to Overcome Obstacles**

The Netherlands' recommendations on obstacles to coordination help conclude this chapter.

The Netherlands' Task 2.2 report's focus was on initiating 'movement' within the *knowledge management wheel* as the primary means to reduce what are seen mainly as cultural rather than legal obstacles to cooperation and knowledge sharing<sup>186</sup>.

The **first step** in achieving this is simply that of **sharing information on Major Events**. This is reached when the majority of House partners actually make information available to each other on behalf of the group. The willingness to do this, and thereby its feasibility, has been already demonstrated within EU-SEC II.

The **second step** is to share information on **current research**. This is reached when the majority of partners provide such information in their own countries. Again, the will to do this is apparent within the project. All that is required is an effective way to do it.

The **third step** is sharing that of **expected research**. This is achieved when countries are prepared to provide insight into their research plans for major event security over a coming period of about 2 years

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<sup>184</sup> (MinJus, 2009, p. 14)

<sup>185</sup> (MinJus, 2009, p. 15)

<sup>186</sup> (MinJus, 2009, pp. 16-18)



(so in the case of THE HOUSE proposal 2012 and 2013). Sensitivity over the live nature of the planning process may still present a barrier in this respect.

The **fourth step** is **national coordination with foreign research**. This is reached once it can be claimed that, with regard to their own research plans, countries take account of planned research abroad. More in terms of security planning processes than broader research programmes, the consideration given by Italy to other country's plans for the 2009 UEFA Champions League Finals in Rome may constitute an example of this.

The **fifth step** is the **joint choice of issues**. This is when plans from abroad are not simply taken into account of but directly coordinated as common themes. One might consider the common standards discussed as House CTMs earlier in Part II in this respect.

The **sixth step** is the intended goal of **central coordination**. That is, coordination between countries on the basis of central coordination at a European level. House CTMs of STEP, EMER and CEPOL based networking and training discussed in this Part III of the manual along with those of Part II are all designed to contribute to that same end goal.

An unstated **seventh step** is the potential emergent condition of **'automatic' control** of coordination from within the process itself, rather than being centrally driven.

This last step is not elaborated on in the report but allows for a sense of self-determination of major event security and policing at a collective European level to be recognized. This may need to be carefully monitored for, to ensure that the balance of common standards of European principles and values of democratic policing are not at risk of being diverged from in the localized pragmatics of security provision.

The clear structuring of information exchange from the outset is therefore an important recommendation of the Netherland's report. Following this is the importance of working to fixed formats. What has to be prevented, the report warns, is a situation arising in which exchange is simply limited to entering whole reports onto data bases. This is because while the availability of such whole reports is useful (via police college libraries, for example), summarized parallel information in a standardized format is also important for ease of use and comparability as House services. The following two chapters' outlined formats for STEP and EMER are intended to help as guidance in this respect.

So too is the engagement with CEPOL. This is in keeping with the Netherlands' final recommendation – to avoid setting up new networks and platforms but to find ways to link with existing initiatives at the EU level. In navigating the road ahead, CEPOL has been positively approached and already embraced by the House in this light.

## CHAPTER 8 - TESTING THE STEP IDEA (CTM 5)

The idea of the *Specialist Technical Equipment Pool* (STEP) was one of eight proposals<sup>187</sup> first made in June 2006. Along with the *European Major Events Register* (EMER) and three other ideas not detailed here, it was unanimously accepted and prioritized for development by the then EU-SEC Consortium at its Network Steering Committee Meeting held at UN Headquarters in New York, December 2006. STEP was prioritized for development and elaborated on in a further report<sup>188</sup> to the Consortium in February 2007. All five ideas were comprehensively reproduced from these reports in the final EU-SEC manual of results *Toward a European House of Security at Major Events* published by UNICRI<sup>189</sup> and presented to Consortium members at the launch of EU-SEC II in July 2008.

The key points of STEP and its further testing during EU-SEC II by Italy under Task 2.3 are replicated here. This is for the guidance and reference of Estonian House members as envisaged CTM Owners and future developers of STEP within the third phase of the EU-SEC programme during 2012. In consequence of Task 3.4, the French partner's Draft Strategic Roadmap further points out that among security planning specialists it is the technological dimension that takes on the greatest importance. For the practitioner there is a strong belief that advanced technologies can improve surveillance capacity. But questions to be mindful of, the Roadmap reminds us, is that each country has its own doctrine for the adoption and use of certain technologies. Furthermore, that the reaction of local populations to these technologies during Major Events must also be born in mind<sup>190</sup>. Such matters could usefully be incorporated into STEP.

### Background to the Basic Idea

STEP aims to support decision making in both planning and procurement processes. Simply described, the idea is a common pool of specialist technological equipment that could be made available by cooperating partners for assistance to countries hosting Major Events<sup>191</sup>.

As a secure, selective and searchable electronic database it is also intended to contain evaluative information on specialist security technologies and equipment that have been tried and field tested by Member States at Major Events. Independent of commercial interests, it would provide independent peer-reviews of such security technologies by authorities and security planners. Such reviews would outline both the benefits and shortcomings of a tested security product for future reference of other House members and possible improvement<sup>192</sup>.

So there are two basic elements to STEP: One as a pool of potentially sharable specialist equipment between House members (subject to availability and logistics); the other as a source of independent field operative review of specialist security equipment that is either commercially available or has been produced by an authority's own research and planning. The STILT classification system of security products can help structure the database.

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<sup>187</sup> (SMPO, 2006, pp. 38-49)

<sup>188</sup> (SMPO, 2007)

<sup>189</sup> For full details of all five accepted ideas, see EU-SEC I Manual of results (UNICRI, 2008, pp. 60-64).

<sup>190</sup> (DGPN, 2011, p. 8)

<sup>191</sup> (SMPO, 2006, p. 46) (SMPO, 2007, p. 2) (UNICRI, 2008, p. 60)

<sup>192</sup> (UNICRI, 2010a, p. 6)

### **Planning, Procurement and Commercial Pressure**

The original idea came from the difficulties one partner experienced in searching worldwide for anyone who could lend them a bullet-proof bus for a political summit. The internet has undoubtedly made such searches easier today in terms of any market availability of specialist security products. Yet the other element of the idea was born of the difficulty some partners had in obtaining reliable field test based peer-reviews that were independent of the product's own marketing sales pitch. So these two elements are at the heart of the STEP idea.

The UK's EU-SEC report in 2006 had noted commercial pressure on national authorities from the growing post 9/11 security industry. It cited an American market research company as (then) estimating the value of the European homeland security market to be nearly €874m by 2014 (assuming no further attacks). Whilst small in comparison to rapid growth in US government spending on homeland security (\$130 billion/€100 billion since 2000, expected to reach \$170 billion/€130 billion by 2015), it indicated significant and increasing market pressure on EU governments to spend on specialist technological security equipment<sup>193</sup>.

The market has undoubtedly grown in the way predicted. At the time of writing (January-June 2011) the now well established annual international and industry led *Counter Terror Expo* held in London for two days in April, for example, exhibited over 400 private companies and hundreds of specialist security products and technologies now on the market<sup>194</sup>. The expo had much major event contingency planning application in the broader European procurement context for national authorities. The same expo will be held again at the same London venue 25-26 April 2012 and is expected to continue. There has also been the development of professional journals that review security related products. One of particular note being *Jane's Police Product Review* aimed specifically at international procurement for police and state security. It comes available to practitioners and professionals as an independent bi-monthly supplement to the UK's weekly *Police Review* magazine.

The House needs to be aware of such market developments and consider its potential for influence over them. Shared and ready access to professional peer group opinion on such specialist security technology and equipment would be of value to EU Member State national authorities when considering procurement of new equipment as well as knowing its availability when planning for Major Events.

Crucially though, it also provides an opportunity for end-user feedback to help inform commercial market research and development as to what is required in the field. This is in preference to pure market availability determining use.

As a CTM, STEP has the potential to help allow Member States identify new needs and emerging threats so that the private sector can respond by developing new technologies that meet those identified new needs. In this way, the tools available to Member States between themselves will also improve over time<sup>195</sup>.

So development of the STEP idea should aim to meet two basic security research functions:

1. planning - access what equipment is available from which EU Member States for loan; and
2. procurement - access end user comment/review as to operational use and limitations.

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<sup>193</sup> (MetPo, 2006, pp. 41-47) summarised in (SMPO, 2007, p. 3)

<sup>194</sup> (CTX, 2011) <http://www.counterterrorexp.com/page.cfm/Link=79/t=m/goSection=1> Accessed 5 May 2011

<sup>195</sup> (UNICRI, 2010a, p. 6)

Some basic specifications may assist the future CTM Owner in shaping the development of STEP. The following is taken from the 2007 elaboration report and 2008 manual:

#### **Basic Specifications - Secure, Selective and Searchable within the EU**

STEP would have to be **secure**. Data detailing the operational limits of a national authority's technology, in terms of security provision at Major Events or otherwise, is understandably sensitive. Such data could not only be exploited by people of bad intent, it could also be commercially exploited against a strategic interest in national, or at least European level, industrial supply<sup>196</sup>.

It would be **selective**. The idea is not to create an inventory of *all* specialist technical equipment owned by a national authority - just that which is used for security during planned Major Events. To serve the planning function, core items to include are those the contributing national authority has available for loan (in the name of international cooperation/assistance) to other national authorities within the EU. To serve the procurement function, items not available for loan to others but used in security planning/provision internally could also be listed. Both would have field operation reviews.

To be **easily searchable**, STEP would have to be electronic and web-based. It would have to be accessible to authorised users acting for EU Member States' national authorities responsible for major event security planning. Also to be searchable by equipment category, type, make and model (at least). It would also have to be operated and contributed to in English as a common working language.

#### **Ownership, Setting Up and Maintenance of STEP**

The CTM Owner would be responsible for setting up and servicing STEP. This would include promoting its use, ensuring contribution from national authorities and developing it as necessary.

As suggested guidance based on that given in 2007, setting it up would require the identification and installation of a suitable and secure programme, as well as structuring and encouraging the initial data inputting from contributing partners and launching it. The technology with which to do this is by now common place.

For maintenance, contributing partners should have control over their own data. They should be able to input, amend and remove their own data as they see fit. Maintenance of up to date information would be the responsibility of the individual contributing authority. Again, this kind of technology is now well established.

The CTM Owner would also initiate updates in conjunction with the European Major Event Register idea, EMER, in respect of recording specialist technical equipment inherited as a legacy of the event registered. Cooperation between CTM Owners of STEP and EMER would be an essential part of their mutual testing and development during the third phase of the EU-SEC programme.

It is important to be reminded that the STEP idea is essentially an operational planning tool rather than a developmental research tool. It is simply a pool of what national authorities *already have* and use. It is not a pool of what they are developing or would like to develop for the future.

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<sup>196</sup> Citing (MetPo, 2006, p. 43): Some EU countries stress national industrial protection over transatlantic security industry cooperation.

To compliment the procurement function of STEP as a secure website though, it could have hyperlinks to other open source websites on specialist security equipment being developed or on the market and forums for their development, such as the mentioned *Counter Terror Expo*, as well as international regulatory and monitoring bodies such as the afore mentioned Omega Research Foundation.

The basic data entry fields for STEP envisaged early on in the EU-SEC programme include (and would be searchable and accessible by) those given in the below Table 5.

Country (drop down file of EU member states): National Authority (for major event security): National Contact Point (for liaison over international police cooperation on MES – as per Prüm, Article 15):
Contributing organisation/department (owner of the item of equipment in question): Name of liaison officer/officer in charge (for equipment in question): Category of equipment (use common ‘catalogue’ categories from the market?):
Name, make and model of item (separate fields): Photograph/image of the item (optional but desirable): Year first purchased and cost per item (separate fields - optional): Number of items owned and departmental locations (optional):
Main operational use (drop file of STILT classification/categories + ‘other’ free text): Major event recently used at (drop file EU-SEC categories, plus name, date and venue): Field portability (e.g. hand held, desk operated, driven, fixed, restricted locations): Maintenance level (high/low):
Operational Review (Free text to cover strengths and weaknesses):

Table 5: Basic data entry fields envisaged for STEP as a CTM owned by Estonian House Partners.

Source: Modified from STEP Elaboration Report (SMPO, 2007) and EU-SEC Manual (UNICRI, 2008) to include reference to 2008 *Prüm Decision* and STILT classification system developed during 2009 in Task 3.2

### Testing STEP in EU-SEC II

The cooperative experiences of both EU-SEC and EU-SEC II have firmly established the practical will and ability for project partners to share information on specialist technological equipment and some of its operational merits and limitations.

For example, a simple e-mail survey in spring 2006 among security planning practitioners within the ten Member State EU-SEC Partners resulted in the following replies from five of them concerning chemical detection, identification and monitoring devices (DIMs):

<b>Partner</b>	<b>Chemical detection device</b>	<b>Operational Use</b>	<b>Portability</b>
<b>France</b>	The Saber 2000, Smiths Detection Ltd	Explosives searches at venues/suspect packages	Handheld
<b>Portugal</b>	None available	-	-
<b>Finland</b>	Dräger, ChemPro 100	VIP security check & drug factories	Portable
<b>Austria</b>	Ionscan 400b, Swab sampler Detector	Explosives trace detection (not air born chemical)	Table top, 22kg
<b>UK</b>	Yes (no detail)	CBRN searches at event venues/suspect premises	-

Table 6: Test results for willingness to share information on specialist equipment for STEP.

Sources: STEP Elaboration Report (SMPO, 2007, p. 6).

Though the further exploratory detail was scant, it indicated that different partners at least had different types of equipment for effectively the same purpose. Furthermore, that not all partners actually had access to such equipment and might therefore want to purchase or borrow it. This further supported the idea that a common pool of specialist equipment that could be made available when not in use, together with comment as to its operational use would be a useful asset to future House members.

## CHAPTER 9 - TESTING THE EMER IDEA (CTM 6)

The *European Major Events Register* (EMER) was the other Consortium agreed idea from EU-SEC to be tested and pursued during EU-SEC II. As a House CTM it is intended to be owned and developed by Portugal under the third phase of the EU-SEC programme within the thematic frames of parallel Tasks 1.1 and 2.1 (common research and technology taxonomy) during 2012<sup>197</sup>.

The simple idea of EMER is as a common database of Major Events hosted in Europe that are formally registered as such by Member States. In principle, common registration provides House recognition of the event as ‘major’ at an EU level and access to its services (CTMs) as a means to improved cooperation and assistance from other Member States. It is anticipated that the register would also form a researchable repository of key facts and figures for the evidence based planning purposes of future events in host European countries<sup>198</sup>.

As with STEP, the elaborated upon key points of EMER are replicated here from the original 2006 *Joint Activities*<sup>199</sup> report and its summary in the 2008 EU-SEC manual of results<sup>200</sup>. They are intended simply as guidance for any future CTM Owner and developer of EMER. The positive monitoring experiences of Italy under Task 2.3 during 2009 in terms of testing the will to share the kind of data input EMER would require are also drawn upon here. There are also clear links to networking and training services of the House, as discussed in the next chapter.

### Common use of the House Definition of Major Event

For the purposes of EMER, the common House definition of ‘major event’ can be applied. The original 2006 report made use of a suggested alternative ‘short’ definition of ‘major event’ (see Chapter 2 *ante*). Its subjective requirement of ‘international cooperation and assistance’ is closely in line with this 2011 manual’s House definition of a major event as ‘an event that requires international cooperation in respect of its security planning’. The House definition can therefore be substituted for and operationally applied to the 2006 EMER idea.

The key purpose of using a subjective definition is to have a host country’s event recognized as ‘major’ at a common EU level via its registration as such. This is because some smaller EU countries had mentioned problems in having their event recognized as ‘major’ at EU level for the purposes of obtaining co-operative assistance in comparison to competing priorities of other larger countries and their comparatively larger events. Again, the 2008 *Prüm Decision*’s recognition of Major Events with a ‘cross-border dimension’ further complements the House definition and its use with EMER in this subjective respect.

If properly developed, in time it is envisaged that the register could act as a central administration system through which international cooperation and assistance could be requested, coordinated, supported and monitored. As mentioned, the register could also record and hold basic monitoring and evaluation details in respect of selected aspects of ‘security’ during the event for future reference and further research and development purposes. An organising research question in this respect is simply to ask ‘how secure was the event?’ when tested by *real* threats (whether foreseen in threat assessments or not) in the field.

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<sup>197</sup> This is subject to final approval of the EC.

<sup>198</sup> (UNICRI, 2010a, p. 5)

<sup>199</sup> (SMPO, 2006, pp. 40-41)

<sup>200</sup> (UNICRI, 2008, pp. 62 - 63)

**Elaboration on the Idea:**

The idea is that at any stage in the security planning for an event, a host country could simply register the event with the central administration body (i.e. the House).

The register would be maintained in two ways: one is that the administrative body would automatically accept any national authority's registration request on the basis that it fits the subjective element of the House definition (i.e. requires international cooperation in respect of its security planning). Similarly, the second is that where the administrative body becomes aware of a Member State's hosting of an event requiring international cooperation in respect of its security planning, it simply offers the hosting authority the opportunity to have it registered as such. This two-way process helps maintain the central database.

One point for consideration is that as an administrative mechanism, registration may amount to formal recognition of the event as 'major' within the EU and thereby bring with it international legal obligations and possibly liabilities in the event of security failure through lack of requested cooperation. The implications of this may require further investigation by its owners on behalf of the House. In particular articles within Chapter 5 of the above mentioned 2008 *Prüm Decision* concerning joint cooperation and liability of member states should be reviewed, monitored and considered in accordance with the suggestions of the Netherlands' Task 2.2 report (discussed in Chapter 7 ante)<sup>201</sup>.

**Registration Details and Administration:**

For operational, administrative and future research purposes, each event could be given its own unique reference number made up of the year, host country, and consecutive registration number as a major event. For example, if the first registered event in Europe for 2007 was an EU summit hosted by Germany its reference number would be ME/1/DE/2007. If the next were hosted by France it would be ME/2/FR/2007 etc.

Registration details should be simple and very basic: The country, date, venue and duration of the event. The event type (using the four typologies of 'political, sporting, cultural and other' developed in the EU-SEC project and discussed in Chapter 2 *ante*), its formal name, and the event organiser's name and contact details.

It should also contain the name of the national authority responsible for security during the event, the senior officer in command & control of security during the event and the key officer responsible for planning security during the event.

Where known (or for later update prior to commencement date) the host authority could register the basic nature of potential threats (in terms of the six predefined categories of 'threats to public safety', 'threats to public order', 'terrorism', 'criminality', 'threats of public disorder', 'other events potentially embarrassing to the authorities' + 'other' as described in Chapter 2 *ante*) and names of organisations & authorities from who international cooperation is expected.

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<sup>201</sup> (MinJus, 2009, p. 8)



***Monitoring details (obtained/submitted daily during event):***

On a daily basis throughout the duration of the registered event, the administrative body could request (or arrange for the event's security control centre to automatically supply) a return of the following simple data:

- Any major security incident: Yes/No. Likely/confirmed fatalities: Yes/No
- Number of other security incidents. Number of arrests. Number of dead (due to security incident).
- Any major safety incident Yes/No. Likely/confirmed fatalities Yes/No
- Number of other safety incidents. Number of injuries. Number of dead (due to safety incident).

Although in the majority of cases this would be a simple 'nil' return, it would make the identification of registered Major Events that *did* suffer significant security/safety breaches (as well as those that did not) and other critical incidents easily identifiable and researchable by year, host authority, organiser and event type. Further detail can then be accessed via any reports on file or other sources (e.g. media reports). This is important data, because it identifies Major Events in which security actually *failed* and thereby the most valuable lessons that can be learnt and shared with a view to avoiding them in the future.

***Reports (obtained/submitted as and when completed):***

At appropriate times immediately before the start of the event and in its follow up period, the administrative body could request copies of key summary documents to be uploaded and kept on file for future reference and research purposes (arranging for English translations in due course if need be, but English in the first instance would make for a more readily usable database). These could be simply noted on the register as follows:

- Copy of Threat Assessment forwarded for future reference: Yes/No (with source details)
- Copy of Security Plan forwarded for future reference: Yes/No (with source details)
- Copy of Evaluation Report forwarded for future reference: Yes/No (with source details)
- Legal action pending re security/safety breach: Yes/No

Where available, the reports can inform further research or be requested from the host authority for the purpose of research if not on file. A note as to any legal action pending may assist with identifying events relevant to research based on legal questions.

There are many database software packages on the market that can handle this kind of simple data processing, storage and retrieval. Some time should be given to reviewing them and selecting one for trial purposes of developing EMER.

***Evaluation details:***

As a central research resource the register could also act as a database to help with evaluation in some specific areas concerning cost and the researching of specialist equipment that might be available to other authorities for future events.

The below figures and data should be readily available and could be requested/submitted within a month or so of the event (together with the evaluation report if possible):

- Total cost of Security provision for whole event €:
- Total cost of Security provision to National Authority €:
- Main items of specialist equipment left to authority after hosting event (brief list):

This would complete the file for any registered Major Event and, in time, prove a valuable coordination resource for both operational security planning and developmental research of security during Major Events in Europe. The last item on the evaluation data list has obvious connections to the STEP database and can be used to further inform it.

Keeping the future in mind, room should also be made within the EMER database to develop it later by adding some of the other ideas suggested in the original 2006 report and accepted by the Consortium at the time. In brief they were<sup>202</sup>:

- threat Assessment Research and Evaluation (TARE) – a simple automated post-event survey to evaluate the reliability of threat assessments used for a registered event.
- rolling Integrity Testing and Evaluation Survey (RITES) – simple real-time feedback from vetted event staff on security strengths and weaknesses; and
- European Register of Vetted Events Staff (EVES) – perhaps more complex than the other two but in essence a register of cross-border event staff that have already been vetted for earlier events in other countries. Simply aimed at expediting the process.

### **Task 2.3 Experiences of EMER Potential**

As was the case with STEP, the willingness to share the kind of information required to support EMER and more was repeatedly demonstrated during the course of EU-SEC II. Monitored by Italy as part of Task 2.3 during 2009, basic security plan outlines and other relevant details of current Major Events were presented at meetings by host authorities.

Of note was the security planning by the Italian Authorities for hosting the UEFA Champions League Final at the *Olimpico* Stadium in Rome, 27 May 2009. The EU-SEC consortium partners were invited to a pre-event meeting held by the security coordinator of the Italian Ministry of Interior's Department of Public Order (C.N.I.M.S.) in Rome on 20/21 April. Details of the planning and organization were shared, along with details of new security innovation projects within it. These included hi-tech solutions to ticketing and accreditation systems, as well as stewarding management, airport reception and traffic mobility systems<sup>203</sup>.

The security operation for the Rome 2009 Champions League was reported on after the event by way of presentation to the EU-SEC II Consortium at its meeting in Bucharest (3-5 June) and later in Lucca (5-6 November) by way of conclusion. It was more than evident from this level of cooperation and detail of information sharing that sufficient data for the EMER database could be provided by House members for use in both assisting with the coordination of planning for specific events as well as use in a 'continual learning programme' as recommended by the Netherlands in their Task 2.2 report discussed earlier.

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<sup>202</sup> (SMPO, 2006, pp. 42-45)

<sup>203</sup> Slides of the 2009 Champions League presentations can be found on the EU-SECII portal under Task 2.3

There is only space to list just some of the recent Major Events that partners have been able to share details and experiences of among consortium members over the life of EU-SEC II:

***April 2009, Rome:***

- FIFA World Cup. Dortmund, June/July 2006. Police Dept. Dortmund, Germany
- UEFA EURO Final. 8 Cities, 7-29 June 2008. BMI, Austria
- UEFA Champions League Final. Rome, 27 May 2009. CNIMS, Italy
- UEFA Champions League Final. Madrid, 22 May 2010. National Police Corps, Spain

***November 2009, Lucca:***

- COP Climate Change Conference. Copenhagen, December 2009. Nat. Pol. Dept., Denmark

***Sept 2010, Lognes:***

- Visit of Pope Benedict XVI to Cyprus, 4-6 June 2010. Cyprus Police, Cyprus

***January 2011, Stockholm:***

- Hungarian Presidency of the EU, Jan-Jun 2011. Hungarian National Police, Hungary

Each presentation contains within it comparative examples of problems solved, lessons learnt and good practices shared among House partners. Such material, along with that of a more general nature for use alongside other CTMs provide solid content and substance for a House based system of EU wide police networking and training in the field of major event security planning. In this regard, EMER could be regarded as much as it could a central training resource as a central coordination register, particularly in conjunction with the *European Police College* (CEPOL).

## CHAPTER 10 - NETWORKING AND TRAINING THROUGH CEPOL (CTM 7)

According to the House Proposal document for the third phase of the EU-SEC programme, Task 1.4 *Networking and Training* will be led by France with the assistance of two or three other consortium members who have experience in training<sup>204</sup>.

The task will involve “the planning and implementation of training modules and training curriculum on Major Event security standards in collaboration with CEPOL to raise awareness and promote the use of the coordination tools/methodologies (CTMs) of the House by relevant policy makers and practitioners.”<sup>205</sup> In other words, those CTMs outlined and discussed in this and the previous chapter as common policies of the House – Networking and Training itself being a CTM expected to be owned by the French national authorities as partners.

The end product will be a report on the training activities on common security standards that have taken place during the task’s 18 month period (expected to be late 2011 to early 2013). Of general note here is that the enhancement of EU-SEC’s existing network of major event security providers and targeted training as a means to ensure cohesive benchmark standards is what lies at the heart of the House’s longer term aim of commonality and cooperation across the EU. Joint training, E-learning programmes and pre-event preparation exercises are all thought to be able to assist in reaching this objective<sup>206</sup>.

The potential of CEPOL has been long recognized within EU-SEC since early discussions in 2005. The basic idea of a CEPOL based networking and training programme (then referred to as ‘research programme’) dedicated to the subject of major event security was first accepted by the consortium for future development in December 2006<sup>207</sup>. Within EU-SEC II, the Austrian led team for Task 3.2 further considered the use of CEPOL and continued to support its training potential and use as a dissemination tool for related research findings. Crucially, and in keeping with findings from the Netherlands’ Task 2.2 report (Chapter 7 *ante*) it was seen as a “ready network of institutional contacts that, if used well, could act as a valuable source of inspiration for command level practitioners.”<sup>208</sup>

As with CTMs of the IPO Security Planning Model and Standards for Security Products discussed in Part II (alongside those of Public-Private Partnerships and Media Management), the use of CEPOL for research dissemination and training was further elaborated upon in the Austrian partner’s Task 3.2 report *Common Research Standards for Security During Major Events in Europe*<sup>209</sup>. It has been centrally taken up by France in the development of their Strategic Roadmap for the future coordination and development of the House.<sup>210</sup> The document, *Pilot Security Research Strategic Roadmap*, was written under the leadership of the *Direction des Ressources et des Compétences de la Police Nationale* (formerly *Direction Générale de la Police Nationale* as D.G.P.N. within EU-SEC II) and circulated in draft form in March 2011. It provides further progressive commentary on the above CTMs as well as CEPOL in general that should be replicated here in summary.

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<sup>204</sup> Subject to the final approval of the EC.

<sup>205</sup> (UNICRI, 2010b, p. 24)

<sup>206</sup> (UNICRI, 2010a, p. 10)

<sup>207</sup> (SMPO, 2006, p. 48) (UNICRI, 2008, p. 60)

<sup>208</sup> (B.M.I, 2010, pp. 12, para 5.4)

<sup>209</sup> (B.M.I, 2010, pp. 12-13)

<sup>210</sup> (DGPN, 2011)

## **An Assessment of Needs**

A 2010 survey based assessment of needs among 22 consortium partners based on replies from 18 of them further confirmed the following points<sup>211</sup>:

- Political and sporting events are expected to be the main types of Major Events hosted by partner countries during the next two years (2011 and 2012)
- While international cooperation is common, sharing resources is usually limited to intelligence, databases and equipment but rarely finances. There remain concerns over legal constraints for external public (i.e. police) interventions in host countries
- Most see the House as a good opportunity to share best practices, facilitate common standards and make efficient use of resources. The House is unique in this respect
- Most feel they have sufficiently well-trained human resources to undertake major event security planning and delivery but this may be more perception than reality
- The training of police in major event security planning remains a specialism that is not commonly integrated into police training other than on an *ad hoc* basis for some senior officers. There is a clearly formulated demand for training from senior officers
- At least 10 of the 18 responding countries have a dedicated Major Event planning department and related staff but most countries face financial constraint – one of their biggest weaknesses – despite being well organized
- Reflected in the seven House CTMs, countries ranked their research priorities as: a common security planning model (the IPO Model); common training tools (e.g. CEPOL); a common taxonomy (definitions in relation to EMER); a peer-review of tools (STEP); PPP best practices; ethical standards; media management strategies
- Unanimous support for the designation of national contact points as a suitable way to coordinate activities of the House at a national level (and in this respect one should be mindful of the aforementioned 2008 *Prüm Decision's* Article 15 on National Contact Points concerning Major Events with a cross border dynamic – see Annex D)

The House, France's report reminds us, is not a research centre itself but a key player in the field of major event security planning. This is by virtue of its ability to both collect knowledge of security plans and disseminate the pedagogically translated sense that is made of those plans. To this end, development of the EMER database is of vital significance to any networking and training activities.

## **Recognition of House CTMs**

With regard to European wide networking and training, the *Draft Strategic Roadmap* recognizes a general need to identify 'lowest common denominators' with regard to public and private sphere policing interactions and to be careful of over reliance on the British context of best practices for Public-Private Partnerships (CTM 2). It also recognizes the Austrian team's consideration of CEPOL's centrality in sustainable and profitable cooperation over development of a common training and dissemination frame for Security Standards (CTM 4). So too the House as a vehicle for the German team's work on media management (CTM 3) aimed at ensuring consistency of approach to international media<sup>212</sup>.

But it is the IPO Model, STEP and EMER (CTMs 1, 5 and 6) that the French report observes as satisfying the majority of the members of the EU-SECII consortium. There is little more that can be said in these respects that has not already been covered in the previous chapters of Part II and Part III to this

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<sup>211</sup> (DGPN, 2011, pp. 6-8)

<sup>212</sup> (DGPN, 2011, p. 10)

manual. The only additional points come from the pedagogical perspective of this particular coordination tool/methodology, CTM 7:

- With regard to the IPO Model, that for it to be a common reference point it must not be a rigid document but one that can take into account long term contingencies
- That the IPO Model must be accessible in terms of content and presentation – electronic medium being of practical communications benefit
- That in time it should be translated into different languages, taking great care to ensure that its concepts and their common meaning are globally maintained – ‘planning’ for example as relating to the idea of ‘anticipation’ (against which ‘research’ might more properly relate to the idea of ‘looking back’)
- With regard to STEP and EMER, in remaining developmental, that the potential benefits for national authorities and Europe must continue to be assessed
- That the form of cooperation over STEP and EMER – as formal or informal – should be established as part of the ongoing research into developing them
- Recognising the value of EMER to accumulate state-of-the-art data on Major Events for use within the House, conditions of access for *which* researchers and for *which* purposes need to be further determined

Citing the Pope’s 2010 visit to Cyprus as a good example of how EU-SECII tools have already provided the basis of an integrated approach to the sharing of best practices, the Roadmap notes France’s hosting of the G20 in November 2011 as a further opportunity to allow House experts to observe parts of the security planning phase, implementation of the plan and post-event evaluation/assessment.

It notes, however, that any access to observe the security operation *in situ* will need to be obtained from the French authorities via UNICRI<sup>213</sup>.

This opportunity could be made use of in respect of testing and developing both STEP and EMER. However, the emphasis should be on developing the framework of the databases that would accommodate data content obtained from this kind of major event as a single case. To be clear, neither STEP nor EMER currently exist as actual databases. They need to be built.

### **Using Common Terminology**

Use of common terminology is clearly a best practice for the management of security planning for Major Events with a cross-border and multi-agency dynamic. This manual’s chapter reviewing the House definition of ‘major event’ and defining terms of ‘security’, ‘security planning’, ‘security product’ and others contained within its glossary of key terms for use in the House, are an intended to contribute to this point.

The acceptance of a common (technical) language, the French report notes, enables clear and consistent definitions of key elements in the field of major event security. In this, it found that the role of the word ‘terminology’ itself should be stressed over that of ‘taxonomy’ as found and used within the EU-SECII programme<sup>214</sup>.

To explain why, the word ‘terminology’ is broader in scope than ‘taxonomy’ for the purposes of the House. As can be found in this manual’s glossary, ‘taxonomy’ refers to ‘a common classification system’.

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<sup>213</sup> (DGPN, 2011, p. 14)

<sup>214</sup> (DGPN, 2011, p. 14)

This is a workable term to the extent that the House has been able to classify different typologies of major event (political, sporting, cultural, etc) and categories of 'security products' (e.g. Strategic, Tactical, Informational, Legal and Technical – STILT) and even 'research' (as a specific event planning process in anticipation of threats, or retrospective study of and continual learning from them collectively).

In contrast, 'terminology' refers to 'a common technical language' with which to speak of major event security. This would *include* not only related taxonomies (as above) but also the various definitions and understanding of terms used (e.g. 'major event', 'security', 'security planning', 'security product', 'research programme', etc.). So 'terminology' is a broader and more inclusive word for the purpose of the House than the narrower and more specific word 'taxonomy' that it also accommodates.

As the French report remarked on this issue, the concept of 'terminology' is more dynamic and more adequately grasps the complexity of a major event with regard to its broader security issues. On the contrary, 'taxonomy' is too static and does not easily reflect the societal dimension of major event security provision – particularly in respect of its impact on the host venue site's local population<sup>215</sup>.

### **Synergies with Different International Experiences**

France's *Draft Strategic Roadmap* for the House rightly observes that major event security is the object of many ongoing projects at different levels: national, European and international. Within the scope of the House's *Networking and Training* CTM, each could benefit from contact with and sharing with each other<sup>216</sup>.

Examples given in the report are:

- Comparisons of the IPO Security Planning Model with the US's Homeland Security model for Major Special Events<sup>217</sup>.
- Exchanges with INTERPOL's Major Event Support Team (IMEST) and their experience in assisting member states with major event security preparation, coordination and provision and real-time access to INTERPOL's databases.
- Exchanges with the EU funded Integrated Mobil Security (IMSK) project intended to combine operational field technologies at major event venues.
- Exchanges with Sweden's 2010 GODIAC project aimed at determining good strategic communications practices at the policing of political events.

As mentioned toward the end of Chapter 6 on CTM 4 (Ethical Standards), one could add to this the work of the Omega Research Foundation in London and its work on international market control of unethical security based products – such as 'stun' technology based weapons and instruments that either remain insufficiently safety tested, contain too greater risk of abuse, or can only conceivably be intended for or used for torture or the unjustifiable infliction of pain as a means of securing compliance. Such exchanges may well benefit the CTM developers of STEP as well as Standards for Security Products.

What is perhaps important to remember in consideration of these suggested synergies with different international experiences, is the need for the House to ultimately serve as a practical advancement of the Stockholm Programme's vision of a commonality of policing in Europe. This would be through the House's support with the international cooperation required primarily during the *planning* stages rather than delivery stage. Essentially though, it needs to be grounded in the assertion of European based values

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<sup>215</sup> (DGPN, 2011, p. 15)

<sup>216</sup> (DGPN, 2011, pp. 15-17)

<sup>217</sup> Refers to Connors (2007)

and principles and associated democratic standards of policing and security that are expected. This should not be lost sight of amid the practicalities of operational security provision and its rapid 21<sup>st</sup> century expansion on a more global as well as commercial scale.

### House CTM Training via CEPOL

Centrally, the French report recognizes CEPOL in the role of training. In particular CEPOL's potential to provide, at the European level, training functions required by House members and its use as a vehicle to promote and disseminate the learning tools (CTMs) offered by the House<sup>218</sup>.

The report notes the exponential increase in major event security budgets over the last three decades. Having increased ten-fold in the last 10 years from around the 100 millions (USD) in the 80s and 90s to 1-10 billions (USD) in the millennium decade in the case of the Olympics. Where the cost of police agents is a major part of the overall security budget, the report points out that it is not rare to offset the lack of skills in major event security provision simply by multiplying the number of police officers and other private security agents at it: hence the fundamental importance of optimal training to cut the wage bill.<sup>219</sup>

Examples of different types of skills needed are given as: information technology; administrative support; dispatchers; specialized patrol; enforcement/investigative units; co-ordination units, etc. More pre-event training was a commonly identified need among many agencies involved in Major Events. Best practices for training approaches listed in the French report include:

- Tabletop exercises – typically involving officials from fire, health, law enforcement and other governmental services
- Live training events – staging various types of attack, disaster and contingencies
- Special theory classes in preparation for a specific event (e.g. rights, use of force)
- Specialized tactical training (e.g. crowd control, use of equipment)
- Training exercises during the event itself (to focus attention to detail)

However, whilst these themes and approaches would make up training at a domestic level as part of a host country's security preparations for a specific major event, they are not the proper focus of CEPOL based training for the coordination services of House CTMs.

As the French report identifies<sup>220</sup>, House CTM training via CEPOL should focus on covering some of the key services being developed and offered within the EU-SEC programme. As covered in this and the previous chapter, they are: the IPO Security Planning Model; STEP; EMER; PPP best practices; Ethical Security Standards and; Media Management.

A common grounding in all such training, the report singles out, is the need to respect and actively promote the *European Code of Police Ethics*. With its 66 articles adopted by the Council of Europe in 2001, the code is recognized as being quite complete and representative of real progress in contemporary civil policing. The need is for its *active* promotion in various policing contexts following its 2001 adoption by the CoE. As detailed in the Ethical Security Standards (CTM 4) section of Chapter 6 previously, major event security planning affords just such opportunity.

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<sup>218</sup> (DGPN, 2011, p. 23)

<sup>219</sup> (DGPN, 2011, p. 22)

<sup>220</sup> (DGPN, 2011, p. 24)



A suggested CEPOL course involving House CTMs structured along these lines could look something like this, for example:

	<b>Day 1</b>	<b>Day 2</b>	<b>Day 3</b>	<b>Day 4</b>
<b>Morning:</b>	<i>Travel</i>	IPO Model (basics of planning) Denmark	Media Management (social impacts) Italy/Germany	<i>Departures</i>
<b>Afternoon:</b>	<i>Arrivals</i>	P-P Partnerships (state regulation) UK	Ethical Standards (common policing) Austria	<i>Travel</i>
	CEPOL (House Intro) France/Host	EMER/STEP – QA (Technology Expo) Portugal/Estonia	Course Closure (Stockholm Programme), UNICRI	

Table 7: Suggested CEPOL course structure for House CTM development and training.

Four daytime seminars led by respective CTM owners over two days as workshops could be used to present, actively explore and deploy the IPO Model, PPP practices, Media Management and Ethical Security Standards with senior police officers in the field. The evening programmes could be used to first introduce the European House of Major Events Security, then present the STEP & EMER ideas in the context of a small market based ‘security technology expo’, and a final closure evening could centre on the relationship of the House to the wider European aspirations of the Stockholm Programme (as discussed in the next Chapter). Such a course or similar could go a long way in helping to test and develop the discussed CTMs as common security coordination policies and standards for major event security planning.

**A First Step on the Road Ahead – Belgium late 2011**

France has already gone some way in laying the ground for such a course. Within the *Draft Strategic Roadmap* it is envisaged that the EU-SEC programme (coordinated by UNICRI) and CEPOL will collaborate over specialized training aimed at increasing expertise and knowledge on security during Major Events. Course participants are expected to improve knowledge on operational techniques by sharing them with each other, facilitated by specialists from different areas as course trainers.

The course is intended to take place in Belgium in December 2011. This may prove too early for the full course outline as suggested above but would certainly serve as a provisional step along the way to developing something like it more fully the following year. The Roadmap itself suggests an annual European seminar dealing with Major Event Security organised by CEPOL in collaboration with the EU-SEC Programme Consortium.<sup>221</sup>

Indeed, the proposed subjects to be covered at the CEPOL course to be held in Belgium in December 2011 similarly centre on an introduction to the House and its key services such as the IPO Model, EMER, STEP and some information on the PPP work, common security standards and media management. The course could readily draw upon the content of this manual in all these respects.

Parts II and III of the manual have dealt with the content of the House and its CTM as common policies. Part IV will now turn to the structure of the House together with its further relationship to CEPOL and the EU's Stockholm Programme as the subject of the next two chapters.

<sup>221</sup> (DGPN, 2011, p. 26)



## **PART IV - THE ROAD AHEAD: FRAMEWORK AND GOVERNANCE OF THE HOUSE**

On 27 January 2011, hosted by the Swedish National Police Board in Stockholm, the EU-SEC II *Draft Strategic Roadmap* for the creation of the European House of Major Events Security (The House) was presented to representatives of 22 EU Member States and UNICRI by French partners, the *Direction des Ressources et des Compétences de la Police Nationale* (formerly D.G.P.N.). The Roadmap was the 30 month milestone in the 40 month project, the House itself (based on this October 2011 manual) being the main outcome of EU-SEC II.

The Roadmap connects the House to EU Institutions that provide policy recommendations in the field of security planning at a European level: ones (such as CEPOL) aimed at ensuring a common *policing* approach to security across Europe. Through them, the House seeks serious consideration of training in the field of security at Major Events in order to adopt a common *security* approach across Europe. It calls for national authorities to commit to the House.<sup>222</sup>

Beyond the European level coordination of major event security planning for national authorities as end-users, the press release from UNICRI accompanying the Roadmap acknowledged its recognition of the House's potential for implementing parts of the 2010-2014 Stockholm Programme. That is, the European Commission's defining strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning within the European Union's 'area of freedom, security and justice'. This is the broader picture to which the House speaks.

The first chapter of this final part of the EU-SEC II Manual will cover those aspects of the Roadmap and ensuing proposal that deal with the structure of the House in terms of its management and coordination, as well as its relationship to CEPOL in terms of its training and networking activities. The next chapter will then progress to more explicit discussion of the House's potential impact on the Stockholm Programme. House contribution toward a commonality of democratic policing in contemporary Europe is returned to in the concluding chapter.

In this respect it is worth referring back to the media image used in this manual's introduction. For where the Stockholm Programme is about making the visions and values of the European Union a reality for its citizens, including their participation in peaceful protest, the disciplined display of a coordinated Major Event security across Europe can serve as an expression of just that.

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<sup>222</sup> (UNICRI, 2011)



## CHAPTER 11 - STRUCTURING THE FUTURE OF THE HOUSE AND RELATIONS TO CEPOL

### **The Roadmap and Future Security Research Programmes on Major Events**

Sections I – III of the Roadmap have been absorbed into the previous chapter's coverage of CTM 7 *Networking and Training*. Section IV looks to proposals for supporting broader research programmes on the topic of security planning for Major Events in general rather than the narrower security planning process for a specific event in particular. In this respect it considers both the future coordination and funding of European research in the field of Major Event security<sup>223</sup>.

In terms of the coordination of research the Roadmap suggests structures based upon a scientific committee and a coordination unit. In terms of research funding it points to EU and national level sources and proposes the creation of a local public interest group. To take coordination first:

### **Coordination of Security Research on Major Events**

The coordination of (broader) research is needed for a number of reasons:

- To stimulate cross and multi-disciplinary research.
- To ensure research outcomes are translated into tangible benefits.
- To achieve economies of scale and enable partnership consolidation in security acquisitions.
- To direct investments toward encouraging international cooperation and improving collaboration.
- To support research services and networks that link researchers, data, facilities and technical expertise.

These would include, among other things, innovative methods and technologies for managing Major Event security, as well as the enhancing of end-user capabilities in the field of collecting Major Event data for analysis, such as the EMER and STEP coordination tools and methodologies (CTMs) described and discussed in previous Chapters 8 and 9.

The Roadmap suggests the creation of two bodies to support the EU-SEC II Consortium in doing this: *The Scientific Committee* and the *Coordination Unit*. These seem to have been provisionally adopted by the House and added to its management structure as *Advisory Board* and *Coordinator* respectively within the third EU-SEC programme funding proposal to the EC's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7) for funding on its theme of Security<sup>224</sup>. As structure, they can be outlined here in terms of the Roadmap's proposal for future reference.

### ***The Scientific Committee***

- Responsible for the (research) programme's overall guidance. Approves yearly work plans and decides upon unallocated funds.
- Ensures that research programmes and (their) projects are consistent and that their purposes are in keeping with the goals pursued under the Stockholm Programme.
- Examines, discusses and approves (project) progress reports.

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<sup>223</sup> (DGPN, 2011, pp. 17-21)

<sup>224</sup> (UNICRI, 2010b, p. 30)

- Includes a representative from the scientific community of each EU Member State.
- Is joined by the *Coordination Unit* as both observer and secretariat (both the *Scientific Committee* and the *Coordination Unit* being part of the House).

The Roadmap also suggests a **restricted** *Scientific Advisory Group* responsible for the appraisal of research projects (for specific Major Events), such as the (preparation and production of) Security Plans. This *Advisory Group* would regularly review, assess and evaluate the Plan's implementation and outputs, making recommendations when appropriate.

The group would report to the EU and the *Coordination Unit* and be made up of eminent scientists in the field of policing, media, technology and urban matters<sup>225</sup>. In other words, a group that could (sensitively) offer independent 'review' of a national authority's security planning process for Major Events at an international EU level in terms of issues of concern to the House and discussed elsewhere throughout this Manual.

Within the proposal for the House, the suggestion of an *Advisory Group* for reviewing specific security plans has been translated as an *Advisory Board* made up of representatives from EUROPOL, CEPOL, Frontex, and UNICRI to offer technical advice on the work of the House. It would also act as a forum through which the Consortium of EU Member States can monitor and feed into their work the activities of other relevant institutions in the field of Major Event security<sup>226</sup>.

The difference in translation seems to have been a shift from broader scientific to narrower specialist representation on the *Advisory Group/Board* and a reorientation from reviewing specific security plans of national authorities to offering technical advice to the House on its wider activities aimed at the coordination of national authorities through its CTM services. What seems feasible in this respect is development of the *Group/Board's* role to include reviewing a national authority's security planning *process* rather than security *plans* for Major Events *per se*. The IPO Security Planning Model (CTM 1) lends itself to that function.

In much a similar way, it is possible to read the Roadmap's *Scientific Committee*, made up of representatives from the scientific communities of EU Member States, as the House's already established *Network Steering Committee* (NSC), made up of specialist representatives from EU-SEC Consortium Members – some of whom are already of the scientific community. The NSC could fulfil all the duties of the Roadmap's *Scientific Committee* in terms of the House Proposal and its EU funded work plan as a specific 'research programme' of task based work packages. If that is what was envisaged for the long-term, it is echoed in the interim structure.

With this in mind, the third EU-SEC programme proposal, 'Task 2.4 of Work Package 2, led by UNICRI, is to be a 'feasibility study on the best structure for the House' in terms of legal and governance frameworks<sup>227</sup>. This is noted simply as 'framework' in Table 2, Chapter 3 *ante* but indicates scope to develop the long-term structure of the House in the terms outlined in the Roadmap based upon the experience of the House's proposed structure and management for the interim EU-SEC Programme period of late 2011 to late 2013.

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<sup>225</sup> (DGPN, 2011, p. 18)

<sup>226</sup> (UNICRI, 2010b, p. 30)

<sup>227</sup> (UNICRI, 2010b, p. 26)

### ***The Coordination Unit***

Already mentioned as a participant of the suggested *Scientific Committee* and part of the House along with it, the Roadmap's envisaged *Coordination Unit* would ensure that:

- all research projects are effectively implemented, with a result oriented focus to achieve the goals of improving security among Member States;
- research outputs lead to information widely shared and disseminated among these States and among research organizations and industry (thereby fostering greater collaboration); and
- a search for securing additional funding mechanisms promotes support for new research opportunities.

The role of the *Coordination Unit*, adds the Roadmap, could also include leading and supporting the administration of research programmes<sup>228</sup>.

Again, allowing for the collapsing of 'research programme' writ large as scientific research on Major Event security in general, into that of the House's specific 'research programme' as the third EU-SEC programme project for supporting the international coordination of security planning for specific Major Events, and further still into that of a 'research programme' as part of the overall security planning process for a specific major event, the Roadmap's suggestion of a *Coordination Unit* translates into the proposed House management structure as *Coordinator*.

Within the proposed House structure, the *Coordinator* is a role entrusted to UNICRI made up of three staff: Project Coordinator, Project Officer and Project Assistant. This unit of three also doubles up as the House Secretariat, responsible for administering and managing the Consortium and its NSC. As *Coordinator* though, its role is twofold: one with responsibilities to the European Commission in relation to the House project, the other with responsibilities to the EU-SEC Consortium in relation to its NSC and coordination of Task Leader's and their work plans within the third project's Work Packages<sup>229</sup>.

Again, the structure here can be seen as echoing and perhaps piloting that of larger and wider structure for the future of the House. A structure envisaged by the Roadmap for the future once the services of the House and its CTMs have been tested and evaluated in terms of the third EU-SEC project proposal during 2012 and 2013. Hence the importance of presenting this EU-SEC II Manual as *CTM Owner's* manual. Its guidance as to the development, testing and evaluation of the CTMs as the seven foundational services of the House is aimed at giving national authorities (as nominated owners) the fullest description possible of each CTM (along with references to source documents) as material to work with.

### **Funding Security Research on Major Events**

There is perhaps less to say here as relates to the direct purpose of this manual as guidance for CTM Owners among EU Member States. Suffice to note that in highlighting the significance of Major Events to the European Commission's Security Research agenda and in writing the *Draft Strategic Roadmap* itself, the French partners have gone as far as to request that the Commission should place the Roadmap document on CIRCA<sup>230</sup> for viewing by the EC's Programme Committee members and have a copy passed to the Security Advisory Group. This is in furtherance of the Roadmap's aims, *inter alia*, of giving

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<sup>228</sup> (DGP, 2011, p. 18)

<sup>229</sup> (UNICRI, 2010b, pp. 30-31)

<sup>230</sup> Communications & Information Resource Centre Administrator (CIRCA): an extranet document/information sharing tool developed by the EC for given private communities/committees/groups etc.

the European Commission and its Programme Committee further input and ideas when formulating future EU funding programmes in the European Research Area of Security (i.e. FP8-SEC)<sup>231</sup>.

Commenting that a further reason to set up the *European House of Major Events Security* is to help ensure that research activity is complementary with other on-going research activity, the Roadmap makes some future research funding suggestion. In short, they are that at the European level other Directorates than those of Home Affairs and Justice and Enterprise with direct interest in Security Programmes may be considered approachable. This is because Major Event Security cuts across more than just security planning and provision but also its impact on cities as venues. In this respect other European Directorates such as those of Tourism and Sport could be considered.

When looked at more broadly in these terms, there may also be funding bodies at the national level in respective countries that could also be approached. These may be both public and private funding bodies, since much major event security concerns big sporting events and the commercial interests attached to them. There are public-private partnership issues to explore here, too, but space prevents elaboration. One simply needs to be thinking beyond 2013.

A third proposal within the Roadmap is the creation of a Public Interest Group. This, the Roadmap suggests, could be made up of members representing the EU Member States, academia and the private sector. Stakeholders to consider would include international security industry groups such as CoESS (Confederation of European Security Services), International sports, football, Olympics associations such as FIFA, UEFA, and IOC, and international security organizations such as NATO. Hosted and perpetuated by the House, the Roadmap lists their potential benefits and advantages for future consideration, not as a replacement for public research spending but as enhancement of private expenditure on it<sup>232</sup>.

These are all avenues for consideration and exploration by UNICRI within the remit of their Task 2.4 of Work Package 2 on ‘frameworks’ for the long-term existence of the House in the interests of coordinating security planning toward a common policing approach in Europe.

### **House Training and Structural Relations to CEPOL**

Section V of the Roadmap deals with training and relations to CEPOL, as well as the importance of costing the exchange of experts between EU Member States and securing the overall commitment of National Authorities to the House.

#### ***Annual CEPOL Course – Networking Consideration***

The use of CEPOL for House training on CTMs (particularly ethics) is covered in the previous chapter under *CTM 7 Networking and Training*. The Roadmap’s emphasis throughout is that specialized training for senior police officers is possible under the auspices of the Home Affairs Directorate through cooperation between CEPOL and the House via UNICRI<sup>233</sup>.

Building upon its proposed CEPOL course in Belgium for late 2011 the Roadmap suggests an annual European seminar dealing specifically with Major Event Security, where the House can be promoted. This would be organized by CEPOL with the help of UNICRI. Course content is yet to be determined (though see Table 7 and surrounding CTM 7 discussion *ante*) but the main idea would be for the seminar

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<sup>231</sup> (DGPN, 2011, p. 19)

<sup>232</sup> (DGPN, 2011, p. 21)

<sup>233</sup> (DGPN, 2011, p. 24)



to grow into being the regular tool for network building and the dissemination of expert knowledge and experience at a European policing level<sup>234</sup>.

### ***National Contact Points – Prüm Consideration***

To do this, the Roadmap explains, CEPOL would need to be provided with, and have regularly updated, a list of House National Contact Points so that CEPOL could promote and disseminate information about the House to them.

On this point it would be important to think through and consider the relationship of those nominated as ‘National Contact Points’ for Major Event data supply under the *Prüm Decision* (see Article 15 in Annex D and related discussion on ‘obstacles to co-ordination’ in Chapter 7 *ante*), and those being spoken of as ‘House National Contact Points’ for Major Events. Logic suggests that if not one of the same then there should be some clearly coordinated or structural relationship between them in terms of communication if nothing else.

A National Contact Point for Major Events could help with the coordination of experts and dissemination of information on related security planning matters beyond just that envisaged by the *Prüm Decision*. *Prüm*, however, gives a basis in international law and policy for it. The structural relations of the House with CEPOL in this respect could be built upon the seed of National Contact Point for international data supply sewn by *Prüm* rather than set up something new and separate from it. As the Netherlands’ Task 2.2 report noted from the EU-SEC research in 2006: ‘there is no need for new networks’<sup>235</sup>.

### ***Commitment of National Authorities – Sovereignty Consideration***

What is critical in all this is EU Member State commitment of its National Authorities to the House. Where many major Member States demonstrably support the idea of the House, the Roadmap reminds us that the principle of sovereignty endures among them and remains a constant challenge to cooperation. However, by its focus on the planning phases and tools to support coordination of a common approach (i.e. CTMs), security planners (as national experts) remain able to judge for themselves the merits and utility of House services in their own national context without compromise<sup>236</sup>.

The continued existence of the House would be dependent upon EU Member States commitment to supporting and promoting National Contact Points (NCPs) for it. To this end, the Roadmap continues to note, the House will in part coordinate a network of NCPs set up in the participating EU Member-States and the European Commission. Together, these information collection and dissemination points form a network of Member States initially coordinated by UNICRI by virtue of its *super-partes* status. It would act as a practical instrument for the collection and exchange of data and information<sup>237</sup>.

As an example of an NCP for the House, the French partners (DGPN) as authors of the Roadmap suggest a point inside their own Cabinet with responsibility for the coordination of major state projects (*Unité de Coordination de l’État Major Projectable* – UCEMP). Whilst a Major Event of either national or international scale would be an example of one such project within the remit of such a unit, it should be remembered that both *Prüm* and the House are concerned with events made ‘major’ primarily by their requirement for *international cooperation* in respect of their security planning (or ‘cross-border’ dimension in

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<sup>234</sup> (DGPN, 2011, p. 26)

<sup>235</sup> (MinJus, 2009, p. 14) summarised in ‘obstacles to coordination’ page 58, Chapter 4 *ante*.

<sup>236</sup> (DGPN, 2011, p. 26)

<sup>237</sup> (DGPN, 2011, p. 27)

*Prüm's terms*)<sup>238</sup> and that these are not necessarily confined to state run planned events such as political summits, but commercially and communally run planned events such as sports championships and cultural festivals.

Furthermore, as this manual has already pointed out above, it would be prudent for the nomination of a NCP for the *European House of Major Events Security* to be reconciled with that being nominated for any Prüm based NCP for data supply in respect of cross-border cooperation in major event security planning in the EU. There is much potential synergy here.

As the Roadmap concludes on this point: beyond a technical and organizational approach it is important to promote among public decision makers the fact that the House will generate substantial dividend for its stakeholders (i.e. national authorities), as well as lay the foundations for convergence toward a common approach to security planning for Major Events in Europe<sup>239</sup>.

### **Structural Relationship – Stockholm Consideration**

Supported by the Stockholm Programme, the Roadmap sees CEPOL (via the House) as able to provide training based on knowledge developed in the field of Major Event Security. Both the House and CEPOL can facilitate the sharing of best practices among EU experts.

The input of Member State's security planning practices to the House and the application of House tools and coordination methodologies (CTMs) to them could result in information dissemination back to Member States via CEPOL as well as policy recommendations and guidelines fed back to Member States directly from the House<sup>240</sup>.

Outlined further in Austria's Task 3.2 report<sup>241</sup>, the use of CEPOL for research dissemination and training can also include dissemination of information *on* the House and its CTM services itself via the CEPOL website's Learning Management Systems – LMS. These are the Roadmap's foreseen structural relationships between the House and CEPOL.

Where this, and the House in general, supports the Stockholm Programme is the subject of the next section. Suffice only to say here that the Roadmap points to the European Council's invitation to the Commission within the Programme to do two things:

1. propose an Action Plan for substantially raising the level of European training and systematically expand exchange schemes in the Union; and
2. examine what could be defined as a European Training Scheme and give it a European dimension.

The first point is explicit in stating that the Plan should propose how to ensure that one third of all police involved in European police cooperation and half of the judges, prosecutors and judicial staff involved in judicial cooperation, as well as half of other professionals involved in European cooperation could be offered European Training Schemes<sup>242</sup>.

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<sup>238</sup> See Chapter 2 on 'defining a major event for the purpose of the House' and Chapter 4's section on 'obstacle to coordination'.

<sup>239</sup> (DGPN, 2011, p. 27)

<sup>240</sup> This process as to how the House would work appears in diagrammatic form as *Diagram 2* in the Roadmap itself.

<sup>241</sup> (B.M.I, 2010, pp. 12-13)

<sup>242</sup> (DGPN, 2011, pp. 25-26)

Broadly seen, an annual CEPOL course facilitated by UNICRI on promoting the House and its services centred on European level cooperation over Major Event Security Planning, encompassing its policing (IPO Model) and judicial implications (Ethical/Operational Standards) as well as relations with other professionals (Private Security, Media) could go a substantial way in answering that call and making its vision concrete.

## CHAPTER 12 - THE HOUSE'S POTENTIAL STOCKHOLM PROGRAMME IMPACT

The Council of Europe's 2009 Stockholm Programme for the period 2010 to 2014 re-affirms the priority it attaches to, and sets a new agenda for, the continued development of the EU as an area of freedom, security and justice. The enhancement of security via intensified law enforcement cooperation among Member States within the area of the EU is central to it.

First and foremost is its political priority to focus on the interests and needs of citizens. In this it sees the challenge as being to ensure respect for fundamental freedoms and integrity while guaranteeing security in Europe. The mutual reinforcement of law enforcement measures and measures to safeguard individual rights are of paramount importance. And in this, the programme states explicitly that all future actions should be centred on the citizen and other persons for whom the EU has a responsibility<sup>243</sup>.

Of its six main priorities to work toward in this respect, three resonate closely with issues concerning the House and developments in its field of Major Event security planning:

1. **The promotion of citizenship and fundamental rights** – European citizenship must become a tangible reality... The Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights are core values... European citizens must be allowed to exercise their rights to the full. (Resonance with ethical standards CTM 4).
2. **A Europe of law and justice** – The European area of justice must be consolidated so as to move beyond the current fragmentation. Priority should be given to mechanisms that facilitate access to justice, so that people can enforce their rights throughout the Union. Cooperation between public officials and their training should also be improved. (Resonance with Networking and Training CTM 7)
3. **A Europe that protects** – An internal security strategy should... protect the lives and safety of European citizens and tackle organized crime, terrorism and other threats. (It) should be aimed at strengthening cooperation in law enforcement, border management, civil protection, disaster management as well as criminal judicial cooperation in order to make Europe more secure. (Resonance with the House).

It should not be difficult to see ways in which the EU-SEC/EU-SECII projects and the creation of the House for 2011 as its ambition engage and promote these priorities in concrete terms.

Look again at the picture used in the introduction of this manual (Fig.1, p.2). Is not the right to peacefully demonstrate, even to the point of testing (but not crossing) the resolve of police lines to remain disciplined and impartial in its facilitation of protest not a tangible expression and thereby reality of European citizenship freely exercising core values to the full? Is it not possible to see protest as a *test* and *display* of democracy rather than as a threat and danger to it?

Are not recent domestic court judgments regarding the unlawful use of certain public order tactics (such as 'kettling' at the 2009 London G20<sup>244</sup>) in certain cases not part of the mechanisms that allow people to enforce their rights? Would not the House's common ethical standard (CTM 4) of encouraging a

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<sup>243</sup> (CoEU, 2009, p. 3 para 1.1)

<sup>244</sup> (Dodd, 2011)

dedicated complaints procedure for each major event help facilitate this? Would not House training of security planners across the EU on common ethical standards help move the area toward consolidation rather than fragmentation?

Are Major Events themselves not vehicles *par excellence* through which the development and demand for advances in security products, technologies and cooperative working practices aimed precisely at protecting Europe in the terms given can be strengthened? Would not the services of the House as the CTMs already described in earlier chapters not all serve towards these ends (in their legacies) of making Europe more secure?

### **Tools for the job**

Of the various tools the Stockholm Programme sees as important for implementing itself, **mutual trust** between Member State authorities, services and decision makers within the area is seen as the first and the basis of efficient cooperation. Ensuring it, though, is regarded as one of the main challenges for the future<sup>245</sup>. From the outset in 2004, the EU-SEC programme has gone some way in helping establish mutual trust between its Consortium partners within its field. The House, as its outcome for 2011, will serve to further such trust.

Among its other tools, that of **training** is also as central to the generalities of Stockholm as it is to the particularities of the House: the latter promoting the former in concrete terms. The Programme seeks to foster a ‘genuine judicial and law enforcement culture’. To do this it requires the use of existing institutions in training and exchanges on EU related issues. It specifically names CEPOL with regard to Europe’s police. In this regard, where enhanced cooperation over Major Event security planning lies at the heart of the House, it can include consideration of ‘Erasmus’-style exchange programmes as advocated by Stockholm<sup>246</sup>.

A **mid-term review** of the Programme’s implementation is expected by the Council of the European Union from the European Commission before June 2012<sup>247</sup>. Task leaders of Work Package 2 within the third phase of the EU-SEC Programme during 2012 may wish to be mindful of this in their analysis and reporting upon the potential impact each House CTM is having on related aspects of the Stockholm Programme (see table 2 Chapter.3 *ante* for overview of Work Packages and Tasks).

### **A Europe of Rights**

The Stockholm Programme sees a Europe built on **fundamental rights**. The rapid accession of the European Convention of Human Rights is now of key importance since entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1<sup>st</sup> December 2009. This obliges all institutions of the Union to ensure that such rights are *actively* promoted<sup>248</sup>. The House CTM on ethical security standards goes some way to encourage the active consideration of rights in the security planning process. It is not enough to assume such matters are self-evident. Their promotion needs to be actively asserted and critically engaged to constructive effect via strong police leadership.

In this regard, it is worth re-iterating observations made in Austria’s report of Task 3.2 carried out during 2009 with regard to promoting democratic accountability and the *European Code of Police Ethics* in line with their corresponding CTM<sup>249</sup>. Independent studies of policing in Europe have previously warned of

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<sup>245</sup> (CoEU, 2009, p. 5 para 1.2.1)

<sup>246</sup> (CoEU, 2009, pp. 8-9 para 1.2.6)

<sup>247</sup> (CoEU, 2009, p. 11 para 1.2.11)

<sup>248</sup> (CoEU, 2009, p. 11 para 2.1)

<sup>249</sup> (B.M.I, 2010, pp. 35-36)

ambivalence within a general police culture toward supranational levels of governance in Europe. They noted that police officers, administrators and politicians sometimes regard questions of accountability mechanisms as ‘a tiresome and marginal matter’. While accountability lies at the very core of co-operative police development as a pre-requisite rather than impediment, independent researchers have been sceptical as to whether any extension of a European policing capacity would be matched by an enhancement of accountability arrangements<sup>250</sup>.

For such researchers in the 1990s, there were two possible visions of Europe in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century and concomitant direction of its policing effort: federalised, with policing as an affirmation of democratic values; or fragmented, with policing tipping towards repression and authoritarianism<sup>251</sup>. The Stockholm Programme itself speaks of ‘the current fragmentation’ and urgently requires the consolidation of law and justice in order to move beyond it. Indeed, a decade on from the 1990s assessment, the latter vision remains at risk of materialising as some leading criminologists have commented:

*Discussion of police accountability in the twenty-first century must also attempt to comprehend the implications of policing that are connected to an emergent global security field. Particular concern has been expressed about the consequences of a dominant central government perspective that defines democratic scrutiny as a hindrance to effective policing and law enforcement as well as the interests of the post 9/11 and post 7/7 security state.*<sup>252</sup>

The UK government’s review of policing mass protest<sup>253</sup> follows severe criticism of security during the London G20 Summit in April 2009. Anticipating the 2012 London Olympics, its Human Rights centred recommendations would endorse the ethical principles aspired to in the application of the House CTM on common standards that put Human Rights and democratic accountability at the centre of policing. This is in line with Stockholm.

Other fundamental rights characterizing the Stockholm agenda for Europe include those of **free movement** around the EU area; **respect for diversity** and the vigorous pursuit of measures to tackle discrimination, racism, anti-Semitism, xenophobia and homophobia; the **rights of the child and vulnerable groups** against exploitation and discrimination; **support for the victims** of crime and terrorism, as well as protection of the rights of suspects during criminal proceedings; enhanced regulation of **personal data protection** principles in terms of public authority interference for law enforcement purposes; **transparency of decision-making** and access to documents in support of citizens’ participation in democratic life and; default **mutual protection** of EU Member State citizens by other Member State diplomatic and consular authorities in Non-Member States<sup>254</sup>.

While not appearing to apply *directly* to Major Event security planning and the services of the House, all have an *indirect* bearing on matters affecting Major Events: free movement impacts upon planning for mass international attendance across borders; respect for diversity impacts upon the policing of far-right and neo-nationalist demonstrations; rights of the child and vulnerable groups impact upon human trafficking for manual and/or sexual exploitation at mass events; the protection of suspects’ rights impact upon criminal investigations following public order incidents; data protection principles impact upon intelligence gathering and threat assessment provision; transparency of decision-making impacts upon public accountability over security planning processes; default mutual protection of EU citizens abroad

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<sup>250</sup> (Anderson, den Boer, Cullen, Gilmore, Raab, & Walker, 1995, pp. 277-8, 287)

<sup>251</sup> (Anderson, den Boer, Cullen, Gilmore, Raab, & Walker, 1995, p. 289)

<sup>252</sup> (McLaughlin, 2007, p. 173) whose external contributions to EU-SEC are acknowledged.

<sup>253</sup> (HMIC, 2009)

<sup>254</sup> (CoEU, 2009, pp. 13-20 paras 2.2 - 2.7)

impacts upon cooperation with security planning for Major Events outside the EU attended *en mass* by citizens from EU Member States.

To put some flesh to this. During the period of writing this manual (January to June 2011), a number of ongoing developments concerning its topic were reported in various ways. Most recently, the Metropolitan Police's purchase of the *Geotime* software at April's *Counter Terrorism Expo* in London was the subject of UK media attention in its reported ability to collate and map the digital movements of suspects and their associates from social networking sites, satellite navigation systems, mobiles and financial transactions. Some campaigners and lawyers, the news report mentions, have already expressed concern as to how the software could be used to monitor innocent parties, such as protesters in breach of data protection legislation<sup>255</sup>.

A month earlier, the UK's high court had ruled that police use of the 'kettling' public order tactic against peaceful protesters at the London 2009 G20 summit was illegal. The judgement was not against the tactic itself but in the unlawful use of it against innocent (non-violent) protesters on the specific occasion in question. The landmark judgement, made on 14 April 2011, now limits the police use of 'kettling' (containment) as a last resort for 'situations about to descend into violence'<sup>256</sup>. At the European level, the Met's wider use of kettling is currently being challenged in a separate case (Oxford Circus, May 2001 – the first time it was widely used as a new tactic) in the European Court of Human Rights.

It is as unfortunate as it is unintentional that both these cases happen to centre on a Consortium partner to the House. But in terms of 'security products' (i.e. as Technological and Tactical measures respectively) they would sit within the auspices of the House's STEP CTM and its STILT classification system. Both can be considered here in terms of commentary from the Danish partners in the Austrian team's Task 3.2 report on the limitations on routine use of new security products and the international sharing of them with others:

**Limitations on routine use:** The duplication of other officer's initiatives is deeply embedded in 'police culture': word of one officer's novel method of dealing with a particular situation or task, travels fast. The 'new thing' spreads quickly in practice and is fast adopted as the new standard: nobody knows where 'it' came from but suddenly it is in use everywhere. It may be new equipment that someone considers being useful for other purposes than those originally intended. Or, it may be alternative tactics approved for use in one specific situation. Suddenly it gains momentum and becomes "a new standard" in multiple different situations within a wider group of officers.

Whether the topic has undergone research or just suddenly appeared *ad hoc*, such initiatives are often communicated through informal channels and thus adopted without formal screening processes prior to the implementation. Being issues often improvised in the field, they are not subject to research, analysis or ethical discussion etc. As such, they circumvent formal approval by the relevant authorities. Conceding that the above happens both nationally and internationally, it is important to ask ourselves: "How do we make sure that, for example, equipment is only used in the appropriate situation, and to what extent have we seen slips and misuse in techniques and equipment?"

Whether we discuss hardware, or issues of strategic, tactical or operational standards, everybody must recognize the fact that the use of a method being approved for one specific occasion,

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<sup>255</sup> (Gallagher & Syal, 2011)

<sup>256</sup> (Dodd, 2011)

allows the use in that particular situation *only*. Before the topic can become a new standard, both equipment and techniques require further approval since there may be significant differences between one situation and another. In this respect, we must prevent any extraordinary measure, approved for one unusual situation, from turning into normal and everyday practice. Whether a possible solution is a short-list of guidelines, or a “One-off OK” for the use of something exceptional, we must look further and try to find an agreement on items that are considered to be indispensable minimum common standards. This list must be applied in general while at the same time not becoming too restrictive.<sup>257</sup>

More broadly, the Stockholm Programme’s vision of free movement has become further challenged by European interior ministers’ recent agreement in May to ‘radically revise’ the Schengen system that allows pass-port free travel within its 26 participating countries, 22 of which are EU Member States. This is in response to ‘fears of a flood of immigrants fleeing upheaval in North Africa’. Notably, the move to curb freedom of travel has come as the nationalist right is reported to be increasingly influencing policy across Europe<sup>258</sup>. House impact upon the European values and vision of Stockholm may face similar challenge.

### **A Europe of Law and Justice**

There are aspects of the Stockholm programme that the services of the House have potential to impact upon more directly. Section three of the programme speaks of strengthening the well established principle of **mutual recognition** of judicial decisions and judgements between Member State authorities. One might think here of the mentioned High Court ruling concerning the tactical use of the ‘kettling’, for example. First declared in the 1999 Tampere Agenda, the principle of mutual recognition is now expressed in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. It has increasing implications for international cooperation in Major Event Security Planning and an overall move towards a commonality of policing in Europe in general. Whilst recognising a diversity of legal systems domestically, the services of the House would aim to assist in developing a unity of European law through mutual recognition and trust.

Specifically, Stockholm’s **development of a core of minimum rules**<sup>259</sup> is supported directly by House CTM 4 on Standards for Security Products. Where the CTM is based on promoting the Council of Europe’s *European Code of Police Ethics* among EU Members in the field of Major Event Security Planning, the Stockholm Programme seeks EU adoption of common minimum rules on the basis of mutual recognition of domestic court judgements, judicial decisions and police/judicial cooperation in criminal matters. The common ethical and operational quality standards promoted by this House CTM will help develop best practices and appropriate new technologies in contribution to this wider end goal.

In addition to this, CTM 2 on Public-Private Partnership (PPP) best practices will contribute directly to the Stockholm Programme’s objective of **supporting economic activity**<sup>260</sup>. The EU recognises its need to create a clear regulatory environment so that small and medium sized private enterprises can grow and operate in cross boarder markets. Being international in nature, Major Events (for the purpose of the House) represent such international markets for the engagement of businesses within the private security sector at European level. The House CTM on best practices in PPPs helps develop appropriate new technologies in this respect and thereby the resources available to Member States. The regulatory

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<sup>257</sup> (B.M.I, 2010, p. 20) reproduced in edited form from contribution by Danish partners and representatives of their National Police Department – National Police College (POSD).

<sup>258</sup> (Traynor, 2011)

<sup>259</sup> (CoEU, 2009, pp. 28, para 3.3)

<sup>260</sup> (CoEU, 2009, pp. 32, para 3.4.2)



environment, though, is the key issue at stake here from both an EU and House perspective regarding the increasingly privatised nature of security provision (see section ‘on regulation’ in Chapter 4).

### **A Europe that Protects**

Section four of the Programme speaks of ‘a Europe that Protects’ and deals with Europe’s internal security strategy more head on. In this it requires an **upgrading of the tools for the job**<sup>261</sup>. Security in the EU, it recognises, requires an integrated approach whereby security professionals “share a common culture, pool information as effectively as possible and have the right technological infrastructure to support them.” Again, CTM 4 in terms of standards for security products, along with CTMs 5 (STEP) and 6 (EMER) and further assisted by CTM 2 on public/private cooperation can significantly contribute to this objective.

As UNICRI has previously stated, the House is to serve as a long-lasting tool at the disposal of EU Member States to help facilitate the effective design of security plans for Major Events. Beyond this, it foresees contribution to the improvement of security in the EU more generally for European citizens in terms of their safety and protection. This is by virtue of its services as helping to strengthen cooperation in police matters and law enforcement. Following Stockholm, what UNICRI sees as required for this kind of security in the EU is for field operatives to share a common professional culture, pool information effectively and have the right technological infrastructure to support them. For UNICRI, the House is intended to assist with this<sup>262</sup>.

**Forging a common culture** is an explicit objective of the Stockholm Programme<sup>263</sup>. It stresses the need to enhance mutual trust between all professionals at national and EU level. It seeks a genuine law enforcement culture that is to be developed through the exchange of experiences and good practices as well as the organization of joint training and joint exercises. The House’s IPO Security Planning Model (CTM 1) offers just that. As a common benchmark it articulates the main components of the planning process and guiding principles underpinning Major Event security to EU Members. In addition, CTM 7 on networking and training, especially via its CEPOL links, further drives development toward a common culture among security providers of EU Member States. It also further promotes the principle of **mutual recognition** between consortium partners via such joint activity<sup>264</sup>.

It should be added here that the overall IPO Programme itself met formal international recognition in 2006 under ECOSOC Resolution 2006/28 of the UN’s Economic and Social Council (Annex B). As noted in the Task 3.2 report, the resolution acknowledges the increasing importance of Major Events as targets of security threats as well as opportunities for host countries to strengthen their security management capacities and the increased importance of the principle of freedom of assembly that accompanies it. Its emphasis on *freedom of assembly* chimes with the notion of common ethical standards explored by the Austrian team and to be pursued by the House as CTM 4 in respect of security products. It also chimes precisely with the question of balance between liberty and security referred to in the introduction of this manual. These ideas sit well with the objective of a common culture.

With regard to the Programme’s objective of **mobilising the necessary technological tools**<sup>265</sup>, the development of both CTM 4 on standards for security products and CTM 5 on the Specialist Technical Equipment Pool (STEP), have impact potential. The former, in providing minimum ethical and

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<sup>261</sup> (CoEU, 2009, pp. 37, para 4.2)

<sup>262</sup> (UNICRI, 2010a, p. 2)

<sup>263</sup> (CoEU, 2009, pp. 37, para 4.2.1)

<sup>264</sup> (UNICRI, 2010a, p. 9)

<sup>265</sup> (CoEU, 2009, pp. 39, para 4.2.3)

operational standards, enables a degree of confidence between Member States in choosing products for procurement or planning. The detailed information provision foreseen in the potential of the latter enhances mutual trust and strengthens cooperation on the basis of it<sup>266</sup>.

A 'Europe that protects' requires **effective policies**: the Stockholm Programme and its focus on an *open and secure Europe serving the citizen* is seen as having many synergies with EU-SECII and the House. In running from 2010 to 2014, one of its key recommendations for the European Commission is to consider establishing *ad hoc* law enforcement cooperation at sporting events or larger public gatherings. These are events that the House would recognize as 'Major Events' – the Stockholm Programme itself citing the London 2012 Olympics as an example under its objective of **more effective European law enforcement cooperation**<sup>267</sup>.

In this respect, enhanced cooperation is at the very heart of the House, including the consideration of 'Erasmus'-style exchange programmes as suggested within the Programme's afore mentioned **training** objective and reflected in the respective House CTM 7 of Networking and Training<sup>268</sup>.

CTM 6, the European Major Events Register (EMER), sits well with the Stockholm objective of being able to make available adequate, reliable and comparable **statistics**<sup>269</sup>. For such statistics that are both over time and between Member States and European regions are necessary for evidence based decision making. This is so for informing common policy on major event security planning in general as well as informing security planning decisions for specific Major Events in host countries. The detailed information sharing expected with the development of CTM 6 on EMER would provide such basic but comparable statistics, assist with policy and planning decision on best practices and strengthen mutual trust at EU level<sup>270</sup>.

It is the EMER database that represents the centre piece of House services. However, it is yet to be built in any shape or form resembling the 2006 report that first described it as a future idea for the EU-SEC programme. From it, though, comes contribution to and access to STEP, another simple enough and well specified database which is likewise yet to be built for the House. The principles and practicalities of data sharing for both these CTMs have been well tested and proven within the life of EU-SEC II. There is therefore no reason why work on their realisation by their prospective owners within the House cannot now be started. They are elaborated on further in Chapters 8 and 9 of this manual to assist in just such a programme of work. Within the envisaged structures of the House and its anticipated *Advisory Board* respective CTM Owners may feasibly look to EUROPOL for technical assistance on the creation of secure, cross-border police databases.

Finally, some level of contribution can conceivably be made by CTM 2 on PPP best practices to the Stockholm Programme's objective on **disaster management in the EU**<sup>271</sup>. Put simply, the use of public-private partnerships for operational delivery of crisis and emergency management within various major event security plans should, in natural consequence, contribute to the overall objective of developing effective policies based upon an integrated approaches for the capacity to prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover from disasters in Europe more widely.

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<sup>266</sup> (UNICRI, 2010a, p. 6)

<sup>267</sup> (CoEU, 2009, pp. 42, para 4.3.1)

<sup>268</sup> (UNICRI, 2010a, p. 10)

<sup>269</sup> (CoEU, 2009, pp. 43, para 4.3.3)

<sup>270</sup> (UNICRI, 2010a, p. 5)

<sup>271</sup> (CoEU, 2009, pp. 53, para 4.6)

### **In Summary – The Challenge to International Police Cooperation**

The Stockholm Programme points out one of the major challenges facing the development of international police cooperation in Europe, though. Discussed in the introduction to this manual in terms of ‘balance’, it is the need to *ensure respect for fundamental freedoms and integrity while guaranteeing security in Europe*. Striking the right balance between law enforcement measures and measures to safeguard individual rights, the rule of law and international protection rules, is of paramount importance. The House sees itself as being well placed to facilitate and promote such a common approach.<sup>272</sup>

The specific services of the House detailed in Chapters 3 to 10 as CTMs are not provided by any other existing organization. If developed, they will fulfil key objectives for Consortium Partners of the EU-SEC programme in relation to major event security planning. Including:

- The promotion of the standardization of major event security across the EU, ensuring that citizens face similar experiences (e.g. Security Standards, Media Management)
- The facilitation of effective design of best-practice security plans for Major Events (e.g. the IPO Model)
- The facilitation of enhanced cooperation between Consortium Partners over the sharing of knowledge, resources and experiences (e.g. STEP & EMER)
- The provision of a forum to develop unique solutions to emerging major event security issues (e.g. Networking & Training/CEPOL)
- The building of stronger relationships and enhanced innovation between the public and private sectors (e.g. PPPs)

These goals of the House have been specifically acknowledged by the Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr. Ban Ki-Moon in his 2008 report on activities in implementing the UN’s Global Counter-terrorism Strategy<sup>273</sup>.

In as far as they contribute to and have the potential to impact upon general and specific objectives of the EU’s Stockholm Programme, the above outlines can be summarized for reference in Table 8 at the end of this chapter.

What is expected of respective Task Leaders during 2012 and by early 2013 under Work Package 2 (running in parallel with and under the same Task themes as Work Package 1 and its reports on the use, application and activities concerning the seven CTMs) is an impact analysis based study as to how the CTMs can and have contributed to the Stockholm Programme and other relevant EU policies. The summary made here is offered as a starting point for that analysis.

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<sup>272</sup> (UNICRI, 2010a, p. 3)

<sup>273</sup> (UNICRI, 2010a, p. 4)

STOCKHOLM PROGRAMME	HOUSE CONTRIBUTION
<b>On a Citizen's Europe</b>	
<i>1.2.1 Mutual Trust</i> Between MS authorities, services and decision makers as an important tool for implementing the programme	<i>EU-SEC Programme from Outset</i> Has helped to establish this in its field as basis of efficient cooperation in EU
<i>1.2.6 Training</i> Use of existing institutions (such as CEPOL for police) for training/exchanges on EU related issues in order to foster a genuine judicial and law enforcement culture	<i>CTM 7: Networking and Training/CEPOL</i> Enhanced cooperation at heart of the House, including the consideration of 'Erasmus'-style exchange programmes.
<i>1.2.11 Review of Stockholm Programme</i> A mid-term review of its implementation to be submitted by EC to CoEU before June 2012	<i>Work Package 2 (EU-SEC III)</i> Analysis of potential impact of CTMs on the Stockholm programme
<b>On a Europe of Rights</b>	
<i>2.1 A Europe built on Fundamental Rights</i> Obliges EU institutions to actively promote the European Convention on Human Rights (since Treaty)	<i>CTM 4: Standards for Security Products</i> Encourages active consideration of rights in the security planning process
<i>2.2 – 2.7 Assertion of other rights for the citizen</i>	<i>Indirect impact on ME security planning</i>
<b>On a Europe of Laws and Justice:</b>	
<i>3.3 Developing a core of common minimum rules</i> For adoption by the EU on the basis of mutual recognition of judgments, judicial decisions and police/judicial cooperation in criminal matters.	<i>CTM 4: Standards for Security Products</i> Common ethical and operational quality standards will develop best practices and appropriate new technologies.
<i>3.4.2 Supporting economic activity</i> Includes need to create a clear regulatory environment so small/medium enterprises can grow and operate in cross boarder markets.	<i>CTM 2: PPP Best Practices</i> Helps develop appropriate new technologies and thereby the resources available to Member States.
<b>On a Europe that Protects:</b>	
<i>4.2 Upgrading the tools for the job</i> Security in EU requires security professionals to share a common culture, pool information effectively and have the right supporting technological infrastructure.	<i>CTM 4: Standards for Security Products</i> As at 3.3 above, further assisted by greater public/private cooperation. (Also <i>CTM 5: STEP</i> & <i>CTM 6: EMER</i> )
<i>4.2.1 Forging a common culture</i> Stresses the need to enhance mutual trust between all professionals at national and EU level. A genuine law enforcement culture to be developed through the exchange of experiences and good practices as well as the organization of joint training & exercises.	<i>CTM 1 IPO Security Planning Model</i> Articulates the main components of the planning process and guiding principles underpinning ME security to members. <i>CTM 7 Networking &amp; Training/CEPOL</i> Common culture among security providers
<i>4.2.3 Mobilising the necessary technological tools</i> Stresses need for new technologies to keep pace with and promote current trends toward mobility, while ensuring people are safe, secure and free. Requires security to be tailored to real needs of users and field research supported by Public-Private Partnerships.	<i>CTM 4 Standards for Security Products</i> Minimum ethical and technical standards enable confidence in choosing products. <i>CTM 5 STEP (Equipment Pool)</i> Detailed information provision enhances mutual trust and strengthens cooperation.
<i>4.3.1 Effective policies</i> Development of <i>ad hoc</i> law enforcement cooperation at sporting events or large scale public gatherings (e.g. 2012 Olympics) should be implemented.	<i>CTM 7 Networking &amp; Training/CEPOL</i> Enhanced cooperation at heart of the House, including the consideration of 'Erasmus'-style exchange programmes.
<i>4.3.3 Statistics</i> Adequate, reliable and comparable statistics (both over time and between Member States/regions) are necessary for evidence based decision making.	<i>CTM 6 EMER (European ME Register)</i> Detailed information sharing provides comparable statistics, decisions on best practices and strengthens mutual trust.
<i>4.6 EU Disaster management</i> Based on integrated approach for capacity to prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover from disasters.	<i>CTM 2 PPP Best Practices</i> Use of PPPs for operational delivery of crisis and emergency management.

Table 8: Comparable summary of House synergy with and promotion of Stockholm Programme.

Sources: (CoEU, 2009) & (UNICRI, 2010a, pp. 5-10).

## CONCLUSION - TOWARD A COMMONALITY OF POLICING IN EUROPE

It is perhaps fitting that this final chapter of the manual concludes with that of the *Draft Strategic Roadmap* and its comments on the added value of the House to a commonality of policing in Europe.

I recall chairing my first EU-SEC meeting in early 2005 with a handful of senior Finnish Police officers, all experienced specialists in security planning for Major Events in Helsinki and Finland nationally. I had to introduce the EU-SEC project to them, explain what it was about and what their role was to be as a group of specialist advisors to me from the field. By way of introduction the first thing I said was 'It's about building Europe'.

This was simply to help paint the broader picture. But six or seven years on it remains the case that the policing of and security planning for what we are calling 'Major Events' can be seen as a primary vehicle through which the building of Europe in many respects is being done. The importance of the symbolic work of both Major Events themselves and a Member State's security capacity that they invariably showcase as an integral part of the spectacle is not to be underestimated. They reflect contemporary European values of freedom and democracy.

They also set new policing and security standards operationally. This in itself necessitates the need for their security planning and provision to reflect the active maintenance of a common set of ethical policing standards in Europe. This has been at the centre of much of my own personal concern and involvement with the EU-SEC programme. It is also the detailed subject of a recent article published in the Austrian partner's first International Edition of their *SLAK Journal for Police Science and Practice*<sup>274</sup> from the Federal Ministry of the Interior's Institute of Science and Research. The journal's covering letter, dated May 2011, is explicit in acknowledging the ever stronger need for European networking and cooperation as expressed through the objectives of the Stockholm Programme.

### The Manual's Commonality Theme

'A commonality of policing in Europe' is a theme that has run through the various chapters of this manual from beginning to end. It has found expression in the manual's review of Portugal's work on assessing the state of the art of major event security planning among Member States. It finds resonance with discussion as to the House definition of 'major event' and glossary of common terms in respect of it. The common policies and standards as CTMs on planning, partnerships, media management and security products are about precisely that.

So too are the common policies outlined as CTMs centred on cooperation, technologies and networking. This chapter has itself, perhaps more explicitly so, detailed the potential impact of the House on the implementation of the EU's Stockholm Programme. All of which points the EU-SEC Programme in the direction of a commonality of policing as part of the building of Europe through a security focus on Major Events.

For within the vision of Europe, one of the key things any European citizen is supposed to be able to expect from any Member State is a similarity of service and standards, regardless of which EU country they are in or from or why they are there. In terms of security provision, the police are always going to be found as the front line public expression of such services and standards: hence the importance of a

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<sup>274</sup> (Hadley, 2011) Article centres on CTM 4 standards derived from European Code of Police Ethics.

commonality of policing in order to meet the democratic expectations and rights of an increasingly mixed international citizenry at a European level.

This is so whether they are attending Major Events in one capacity or another or not. Planned Major Events are simply the window of opportunity through which the extent that commonality has been reached or not can be publicly observed and cooperatively aspired to.

### **The Added Value of the House**

In terms of the House's added value for the long-term, France's Roadmap makes five concluding points<sup>275</sup>:

1. That the House will implement parts of the Stockholm Programme, which calls for an increased commitment in harmonization, alignment and management support for results with measurable actions and indicators. The idea of using evidence to inform policy will be crucial in this respect.
2. That the House will first help to develop a common approach to planning security during Major Events and then will identify savings where possible, thus strengthening and modernizing financial governance and evaluation of the necessary resources.
3. That the House will help improve the level of Member States' actions through a further rationalization of spending (economies of scale). The challenge here is to avoid being too responsive to industrial policy considerations at the expense of European and collective needs.
4. That limited resources are spread across too many events as each (major) country wants to support its own tools (new security products, video-systems, drones, etc) resulting in excessive duplication and inefficiency in the European security industry.
5. That the EU-SEC II Consortium will propose to reduce the duplication of security investment across the House by promoting further and improving cooperation between European Member States, and between themselves and the EU institutions.

The Roadmap sees the way forward as including continued engagement of the House with live Major Events hosted in participant countries during 2011 and beyond, as well as further developed approaches to and engagement with CEPOL in respect of House service based seminars and continued experimental participation of EU-SEC II experts as observers on the implementation of security plans in order to collect data for further study<sup>276</sup>.

### **Commonality and Policy Convergence**

With further regard to the broader theme of commonality, though, the Roadmap concludes with the question of assessing 'policy convergence' between European Member States.

It sees the planning of Major Events as undoubtedly a predictable example of strengthening a common European approach. Noting that what is often referred to as 'policy convergence' is often studied from the perspective of just one particular state and explained in terms of *internal* policy transfers, the Roadmap rightly points out that policy convergence also takes place *between* countries.

Policy transfer and convergence needs to be studied and considered from the point of view of the local actors involved, the Roadmap argues citing a number of sources within the sociological literature in this field<sup>277</sup>. Yet it also observes that major event security planning reveals how local public policy is *deeply*

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<sup>275</sup> (DGPN, 2011, p. 28)

<sup>276</sup> (DGPN, 2011, p. 27)

<sup>277</sup> (Bennett, 1991) (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996) (Knill, 2005)

*embedded* and thus tends to limit (and be an obstacle to) policy convergence. Nevertheless, the observation adds, there is a growing awareness among senior officers of the need for policy transfer and exchange of good practices; thus implying the conditions required for convergence<sup>278</sup>.

The House could well be the best way to further facilitate this convergence – or to put it another way, convergence toward a commonality of policing standards in Europe.

A question for continual pursuit however, as raised earlier in this EU-SEC II manual, would be to ask ‘what constitutes ‘good’ practice as opposed to ‘bad’ practice? In answer to this question, the line of both this manual and the Roadmap’s end point is given as three-fold in terms of likely cornerstones of governing criteria:

1. consistency with the guiding principles of the *European Code of Police Ethics*;
2. the extent to which the end goal of security against potential threats is achieved and maintained when tested in the field; and
3. ease of operational implementation against cost effectiveness.

To this one could add a fourth: common terminology and a common planning process for EU member States to collectively speak through and to each other.

These matters have received closer attention and discussion in the preceding chapters and sections of this manual as guidance for owners of House CTMs. The task ahead is now for Consortium Partners to take ownership of their respective CTMs and build the House upon them as foundational tools for coordination, cooperation and commonality in Europe.

Good luck in your endeavours!

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<sup>278</sup> (DGPN, 2011, p. 29)





## POSTSCRIPT

Cyprus will hold the EU Presidency from July to December 2012. At the very start of their security preparations for this complex form of Major Event – multiple high profile summits of visiting high level political leaders in multiple venues over a protracted period – the Cyprus Police, as partners to the EU-SEC II project, requested what amounts to some of the foundational services of the House outlined in this manual.

A two day meeting was hosted by Cyprus over the 5<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> July 2011. Cyprus had requested for a specific focus on three areas: The IPO Planning Model; Public-Private Partnership Guidelines and; Media Management. They are recognised here as House CTM's 1, 2 & 3 respectively. As coordination tools/methodologies for the coordination of international cooperation over security planning for the event, the request provides an opportunity to further test House services and develop them.

Starting with the UEFA Champions League Final hosted by Italy in Rome, May 2009, EU-SEC II had been able to run a series of tests with live events for the provision of its future CTMs. As have already been commented and drawn upon in earlier parts of this manual (see Chapter 9), these included post-event evaluation of the December 2009 Climate Change Summit hosted by Denmark in Copenhagen and report on the Pope's Visit to Cyprus in June 2010. Involving observation during pre-event planning and delivery stages, they also included the UEFA Champions League Final in London, May 2011 and a high level summit held in Hungary (June 2011) during the Hungarian EU Presidency (January to June 2011).

Test Team reports from these latter two events at observation meetings held in London (New Scotland Yard, 25<sup>th</sup> and 26<sup>th</sup> May) and Budapest (Hungarian National Police HQ, 5<sup>th</sup> to 8<sup>th</sup> June) demonstrate that the use of the IPO Security Planning Model's 12 elements (see Chapter 3) as an evaluation checklist (CTM 1) is proving useful as a common standard among Consortium Partners<sup>279</sup>. Furthermore, that the emerging method of 'peer review' between international professionals (the Test Team) as constructive commentary *to* the host and responded to reflexively *by* the host, is showing itself to be of practical value in the coordination of international cooperation over the development of national research programmes toward a common standard of security planning in Europe. This method could be taken up and applied to the other planning and evaluation based CTMs.

So the opportunity that the requested House participation in the Cyprus EU Presidency for 2012 affords is to test and develop CTM 2 (on Public-Private Partnerships) and CTM 3 (on Media Management) in ways similar to those now established for CTM 1 (on the IPO Model). As the first three of the four CTM complement of Common Planning and Evaluation Standards dealt with in Part II of this Manual, the Cyprus request did not cover that of CTM 4 (on Ethical & Operational Standards for Security Products). It was, however, introduced and mentioned at the July meeting hosted by Cyprus. The meeting itself took the form of three workshops centred on the three requested themes, each led by a Consortium Partner with respective CTM familiarity: PPP (UK substituted by Netherlands); Common Standards (IPO lead by Austria, with further reference to Ethics) and: Media Management (lead by Germany).

As the host tasked with Major Event security planning preparations for one year hence, Cyprus saw the main objectives as awareness through facilitated discussions. It was not about defining the right or wrong

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<sup>279</sup> See in particular the evaluation reports to UNICRI dated 17 June 2011 (on Champions League) and 24 June 2011 (on Hungary EU Presidency) by the National Danish Police's Department of Police Studies and associated response reports by host organisations (UK, Hungary). Also Test Team reports by Spanish and French partners.

ways to do things, or the seeking of agreements or disagreements. Indeed, the international make-up of the meeting and each of its working groups was found to be a good forum for the face-to-face peer exchange of practical information, experiences and views in relation to the given security topics.

Perhaps what was taken as the central learning point for the House and its delivery of CTM services was the importance of this manual and its consolidated content as pre-meeting guidance on the nature and use of the respective CTM topics. Where use of the IPO Model as CTM 1 is now well established and can be used to 'test' Major Events against, this manual's CTMs 2 and 3 are still in the process of being themselves 'tested' and developed *by* Major Event planning processes. The same can be said for CTM 4 on Ethics. This, however, is a more abstract and contemplative theme and one that manifestly continues to find itself passed over in the face of demand for more easily implemented and concrete security topics.

So on this point one might be again minded that Europeans appear to be living in ever-darkening times characterised by the political language of 'austerity', economic instability and populist rhetoric on 'Euro-scepticism' verging on a virulent nationalism in some quarters. Public protests and demonstrations seen in Greece and elsewhere during 2011 are not without understandable causes and will undoubtedly continue into the years ahead – Major Events of a political nature such as the EU Presidency being ever-likely theatres of such international focus and attention. At the time of writing, the opportunity to dramatically curtail the freedom of the media is also being globally seized upon by governments in response to the bad practices of a few journalists. These are all threats to the hard fought freedoms of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century.

Freedom is the first victim precisely because it is the most fragile. In 21<sup>st</sup> Century Europe, will one be able to look to the police – instruments of democratic governance as the ancient Greek/Latin origin of the name implies – to protect centrally valued ideas of freedom first and foremost and to do so through continual reflection on policing activity as a public expression and defence of freedom based rights and responsibilities? In the end, it is freedom and liberty that is to be secured.

## ANNEX A

### MAJOR EVENT SECURITY PLANNING DEPARTMENTS AND COMMANDERS IN CHARGE OF SPECIFIC MAJOR EVENTS<sup>280</sup>

Country	Name of Event (as 'major event' under survey definition)	Department (for security planning for the event)	Commander (during the event)
<b>Austria</b>	EURO 2008 Auto News 'Wörther See' 2007 President of the USA (George.W.Bush) official visit to Austria	Federal Ministry of the Interior Provincial Police Dept of Carinthia Police headquarters of Vienna	Günther Marek  Wolfgang Gabrutsch  Bgdr SEMPER, Franz.
<b>Bulgaria</b>	Football game between sports clubs 'Levski' and 'CSKA'	Unit for Sports Events Protection and Sports Hoologanisms Prevention, in cooperation with Public Order Police Department	<i>No Data</i>
<b>Cyprus</b>	Airport Receipt and Transportation of the Euro to Banks Civilization of Peace: Faith and Culture in Dialogue Conference UEFA Cup Football Match Cyprus-v-Israel	Cyprus Police Cyprus Police – Emergency Response Unit <i>same</i>	Asst. Chief of Police Operations <i>same</i> <i>same</i>
<b>Denmark</b>	Forcible Eviction of Squatters in Copenhagen 'Youth House'	Copenhagen Pol. Operational Planning/Analysis Centre	Ch. Supt. Mogens Lauridsen
<b>Estonia</b>	Visit of the President of the USA to Estonia	Personal Protection and Law Enforcement Police	Ivar Pritis, Director
<b>Finland</b>	Organisation of Security & Co-operation in Europe Meeting 2008 The IAAF World Championships 2005 Eurovision Song Contest EU Presidency 2006	Helsinki Police Department <i>same</i> <i>same</i> <i>same</i>	Dep. Pol. Commissioner Liukka <i>same</i> <i>same</i> <i>same</i>
<b>France</b>	<i>No Data</i>	<i>No Data</i>	<i>No Data</i>
<b>Germany</b>	<i>No Data</i>	<i>No Data</i>	<i>No Data</i>
<b>Greece</b>	<i>No Data</i>	<i>No Data</i>	<i>No Data</i>
<b>Hungary</b>	<i>No Data</i>	<i>No Data</i>	<i>No Data</i>
<b>Ireland</b>	Ireland v England sporting event (80,000 spectators)	An Garda Síochána (no specific department named)	Ch. Supt. Store Street
<b>Italy</b>	Football Champions League 2009 Final	Ministry of Interior, Dept. of Public Security, N.F.I.P.	Supt. Roberto Massucci
<b>Latvia</b>	The Men's Ice Hockey Championships	State Police's Main Order Department.	Colonel Valdis Voins
<b>Malta</b>	Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting and Queen's Visit	<i>No Data</i>	<i>No Data</i>
<b>Netherlands</b>	Informal Meeting of NATO Defence Ministers	Ministry of Defence	<i>No Data</i>

<sup>280</sup> Compiled from answers to questions 2 (name of event), 5 (department responsible for the security planning) and 6 (name/rank of officer in operational charge of security during the event) of Part B to the EU-SEC II survey. Source: Final Report of Task 1.2, 2009: Annex A, pages 142-160.

<b>Poland</b>	<i>No Data</i>	<i>No Data</i>	<i>No Data</i>
<b>Portugal</b>	Under 21 European Football Championship (Finals)	Internal Security Coordinating Office	Paulo Pereira de Almeida
<b>Romania</b>	NATO Summit	National Operation Centre	Lt. General Vladimir Secara
<b>Slovakia</b>	Sledge Dog Championships Donovaly, Slovak Republic. Paper Euro money transfer for Euromonetization in Slovak Rep. Bush & Putin Political Meeting	Local Police Headquarters, Branská Bystrica Police Headquarters Police Headquarters	Pplk. Mgr. Marian Korytiak Gen. Mgr. Stanislav Jantovič
<b>Slovenia</b>	Football match between Slovenia and Croatia Euro Demo 2008 (European Demonstrations) FIS World Cup Ski Jumping Final	Police Directorate (Maribor), Uniformed Police Div. Police Directorate (Ljubljana), Uniformed Police Div. <i>same</i>	Colonel JUDr. Jan Packa Zoran Music, Snr Police Inspector Tomislav Omejec, Snr Police Insp Gregor Jarkovic, Snr Police Insp.
<b>Spain</b>	International Exposition Zaragoza 2008 NATO Summit – Sevilla Pope's Visit – Valencia	General Dept. for Public Security (Nat Police Corps). <i>same</i> <i>same</i>	Supt. Head of Nat. Pol. in Region. <i>same</i> <i>same</i>
<b>Sweden</b>	<i>No Data</i>	<i>No Data</i>	<i>No Data</i>
<b>UK</b>	Tour De France UK Visit of the President and First Lady of the USA to UK NFL (US Football Match) at Wembley Stadium	CT Secco Unit Met Police UK <i>same</i> <i>same</i>	Chief Inspector Jonathan Brady <i>same</i> <i>same</i>
<b>Belgium</b>	Non-participant in EU-SEC II		
<b>Czech Rep.</b>	Non-participant in EU-SEC II		
<b>Lithuania</b>	Non-participant in EU-SEC II		
<b>Luxembourg</b>	Non-participant in EU-SEC II		

The events offered in reply to the survey as recent examples of 'Major Events' were self-selected by respondents on the basis of the definition of 'major event' in use at the time for the purpose of the questionnaire. Not all of these events would be regarded as 'Major Events' for the purpose of the House under its revised definition focused on an event's requirement for international cooperation in respect of its security planning.

Regarding the variance of departments responsible for security planning and ranks of commanding officers in operational charge of security during the events, a key question for further consideration would be to ask Member States by what criteria is the security planning for any given event allocated to any particular department and what determines who the officer in operational charge of security during the event is to be.

It should be remembered that the services of the House are being developed in respect of supporting the coordination of international cooperation required for the national level security planning stages of any given event. The event in question should therefore be of sufficient scale to require national level responsibility for its security planning (regardless of territorial location) and of sufficient scope to require international cooperation in that planning (regardless of the event's size or importance) in response to the security threats it poses.

The rank of officer in operational charge should therefore be determined by the authority required to command the level of resources and security measures planned for potential deployment and use to ensure security during the event itself.

## ANNEX B

### ECOSOC Resolution 2006/28

#### International Permanent Observatory on Security Measures during Major Events

##### *The Economic and Social Council,*

*Recognizing* the increasing importance of Major Events, such as large-scale sporting events, including Olympic Games, high-level summits and other mass events such as national and religious festivals,

*Recognizing also* the principle of freedom of assembly,

*Mindful of the fact* that, owing to their scale and/or high visibility, Major Events can be a target for unlawful activities, including for terrorism, and can be exploited by organized criminal groups for their illegal activities,

*Mindful also* that Major Events offer opportunities for host countries to strengthen their capacity to manage security,

*Aware* of the need to share information, in full respect of the principle of data protection, on possible threats to the security of Major Events and to exchange experience and proven practices in addressing such threats,

*Welcoming* the establishment by the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute of the International Permanent Observatory on Security Measures during Major Events,

*Noting with appreciation* the work done by the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute in the framework of the Observatory, such as the development of relevant analytical tools and the organization of expert meetings in China, Italy, Norway, Portugal, the Russian Federation, Spain and the United States of America,

1. *Encourages* Member States, in particular those planning Major Events in the coming years, to strengthen their cooperation, including in the framework of the International Permanent Observatory on Security Measures during Major Events, by sharing knowledge of possible threats to Major Events and relevant practices related to security during such events;
2. *Invites* the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, subject to the availability of extra-budgetary resources, to continue and expand its work on the Observatory, including by providing technical assistance and advisory services on security during Major Events to Member States upon request;
3. *Invites* Member States to make voluntary and in-kind contributions to the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute for the continuation and expansion of the activities of the Observatory, and invites the Institute to mobilize funds from the private sector for such activities;
4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to bring the present resolution to the attention of Member States.

*41st plenary meeting  
27 July 2006*

## ANNEX C

### The European Code of Police Ethics<sup>281</sup>

#### *Objectives of the police*

1. The main purposes of the police in a democratic society governed by the rule of law are:
  - to maintain public tranquillity and law and order in society;
  - to protect and respect the individual's fundamental rights and freedoms as enshrined, in particular, in the European Convention on Human Rights;
  - to prevent and combat crime;
  - to detect crime;
  - to provide assistance and service functions to the public.

#### Legal basis of the police under the rule of law

2. The police are a public body which shall be established by law.
3. Police operations must always be conducted in accordance with the national law and international standards accepted by the country.
4. Legislation guiding the police shall be accessible to the public and sufficiently clear and precise, and, if need be, supported by clear regulations equally accessible to the public and clear.
5. Police personnel shall be subject to the same legislation as ordinary citizens, and exceptions may only be justified for reasons of the proper performance of police work in a democratic society.

#### The police and the criminal justice system

6. There shall be a clear distinction between the role of the police and the prosecution, the judiciary and the correctional system; the police shall not have any controlling functions over these bodies.
7. The police must strictly respect the independence and the impartiality of judges; in particular, the police shall neither raise objections to legitimate judgments or judicial decisions, nor hinder their execution.
8. The police shall, as a general rule, have no judicial functions. Any delegation of judicial powers to the police shall be limited and in accordance with the law. It must always be possible to challenge any act, decision or omission affecting individual rights by the police before the judicial authorities.
9. There shall be functional and appropriate cooperation between the police and the public prosecution. In countries where the police are placed under the authority of the public prosecution or the investigating judge, the police shall receive clear instructions as to the priorities governing crime investigation policy and the progress of criminal investigation in individual cases. The police should keep the superior crime investigation authorities informed of the implementation of their instructions, in particular, the development of criminal cases should be reported regularly.

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<sup>281</sup> Taken from the Council of Europe's 2009 publication *International Police Standards* (CoE, 2009, pp. 8-12)

10. The police shall respect the role of defence lawyers in the criminal justice process and, whenever appropriate, assist in ensuring the right of access to legal assistance effective, in particular with regard to persons deprived of their liberty.

11. The police shall not take the role of prison staff, except in cases of emergency.

#### Organisational structures of the police

##### *General*

12. The police shall be organised with a view to earning public respect as professional upholders of the law and providers of services to the public.

13. The police, when performing police duties in civil society, shall be under the responsibility of civilian authorities.

14. The police and its personnel in uniform shall normally be easily recognisable.

15. The police shall enjoy sufficient operational independence from other state bodies in carrying out its given police tasks, for which it should be fully accountable.

16. Police personnel, at all levels, shall be personally responsible and accountable for their own actions or omissions or for orders to subordinates.

17. The police organisation shall provide for a clear chain of command within the police. It should always be possible to determine which superior is ultimately responsible for the acts or omissions of police personnel.

18. The police shall be organised in a way that promotes good police/public relations and, where appropriate, effective co-operation with other agencies, local communities, non-governmental organisations and other representatives of the public, including ethnic minority groups.

19. Police organisations shall be ready to give objective information on their activities to the public, without disclosing confidential information. Professional guidelines for media contacts shall be established.

20. The police organisation shall contain efficient measures to ensure the integrity and proper performance of police staff, in particular to guarantee respect for individuals' fundamental rights and freedoms as enshrined, notably, in the European Convention on Human Rights.

21. Effective measures to prevent and combat police corruption shall be established in the police organisation at all levels.

##### *Qualifications, recruitment and retention of police personnel*

22. Police personnel, at any level of entry, shall be recruited on the basis of their personal qualifications and experience, which shall be appropriate for the objectives of the police.

23. Police personnel shall be able to demonstrate sound judgment, an open attitude, maturity, fairness, communication skills and, where appropriate, leadership and management skills. Moreover, they shall possess a good understanding of social, cultural and community issues.

24. Persons who have been convicted for serious crimes shall be disqualified from police work.

25. Recruitment procedures shall be based on objective and non discriminatory grounds, following the necessary screening of candidates. In addition, the policy shall aim at recruiting men and women from



various sections of society, including ethnic minority groups, with the overall objective of making police personnel reflect the society they serve.

#### *Training of Police Personnel*

26. Police training, which shall be based on the fundamental values of democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights, shall be developed in accordance with the objectives of the police.

27. General police training shall be as open as possible towards society.

28. General initial training should preferably be followed by in-service training at regular intervals, and specialist, management and leadership training, when it is required.

29. Practical training on the use of force and limits with regard to established human rights principles, notably the European Convention on Human Rights and its case law, shall be included in police training at all levels.

30. Police training shall take full account of the need to challenge and combat racism and xenophobia.

#### *Rights of police personnel*

31. Police staff shall as a rule enjoy the same civil and political rights as other citizens. Restrictions to these rights may only be made when they are necessary for the exercise of the functions of the police in a democratic society, in accordance with the law, and in conformity with the European Convention on Human Rights.

32. Police staff shall enjoy social and economic rights, as public servants, to the fullest extent possible. In particular, staff shall have the right to organise or to participate in representative organisations, to receive an appropriate remuneration and social security, and to be provided with special health and security measures, taking into account the particular character of police work.

33. Disciplinary measures brought against police staff shall be subject to review by an independent body or a court.

34. Public authorities shall support police personnel who are subject to ill-founded accusations concerning their duties.

#### Guidelines for police action/intervention

##### *Guidelines for police action/intervention: general principles*

35. The police, and all police operations, must respect everyone's right to life.

36. The police shall not inflict, instigate or tolerate any act of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under any circumstances.

37. The police may use force only when strictly necessary and only to the extent required to obtain a legitimate objective.

38. Police must always verify the lawfulness of their intended actions.

39. Police personnel shall carry out orders properly issued by their superiors, but they shall have a duty to refrain from carrying out orders which are clearly illegal and to report such orders, without fear of sanction.

40. The police shall carry out their tasks in a fair manner, guided, in particular, by the principles of impartiality and non-discrimination.

41. The police shall only interfere with individual's right to privacy when strictly necessary and only to obtain a legitimate objective.

42. The collection, storage, and use of personal data by the police shall be carried out in accordance with international data protection principles and, in particular, be limited to the extent necessary for the performance of lawful, legitimate and specific purposes.

43. The police, in carrying out their activities, shall always bear in mind everyone's fundamental rights, such as freedom of thought, conscience, religion, expression, peaceful assembly, movement and the peaceful enjoyment of possessions.

44. Police personnel shall act with integrity and respect towards the public and with particular consideration for the situation of individuals belonging to especially vulnerable groups.

45. Police personnel shall, during intervention, normally be in a position to give evidence of their police status and professional identity.

46. Police personnel shall oppose all forms of corruption within the police. They shall inform superiors and other appropriate bodies of corruption within the police.

*Guidelines for police action/ intervention: specific situations*

Police investigation

47. Police investigations shall, as a minimum, be based upon reasonable suspicion of an actual or possible offence or crime.

48. The police must follow the principles that everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be considered innocent until found guilty by a court, and that everyone charged with a criminal offence has certain rights, in particular the right to be informed promptly of the accusation against him/her, and to prepare his/her defence either in person, or through legal assistance of his/her own choosing.

49. Police investigations shall be objective and fair. They shall be sensitive and adaptable to the special needs of persons, such as children, juveniles, women, minorities including ethnic minorities and vulnerable persons.

50. Guidelines for the proper conduct and integrity of police interviews shall be established, bearing in mind Article 48. They shall, in particular, provide for a fair interview during which those interviewed are made aware of the reasons for the interview as well as other relevant information. Systematic records of police interviews shall be kept.

51. The police shall be aware of the special needs of witnesses and shall be guided by rules for their protection and support during investigation, in particular where there is a risk of intimidation of witnesses.

52. Police shall provide the necessary support, assistance and information to victims of crime, without discrimination.

53. The police shall provide interpretation/ translation where necessary throughout the police investigation.

Arrest/deprivation of liberty by the police

54. Deprivation of liberty of persons shall be as limited as possible and conducted with regard to the dignity, vulnerability and personal needs of each detainee. A custody record shall be kept systematically for each detainee.

55. The police shall, to the extent possible according to domestic law, inform promptly persons deprived of their liberty of the reasons for the deprivation of their liberty and of any charge against them, and shall also without delay inform persons deprived of their liberty of the procedure applicable to their case.

56. The police shall provide for the safety, health, hygiene and appropriate nourishment of persons in the course of their custody. Police cells shall be of a reasonable size, have adequate lighting and ventilation and be equipped with suitable means of rest.

57. Persons deprived of their liberty by the police shall have the right to have the deprivation of their liberty notified to a third party of their choice, to have access to legal assistance and to have a medical examination by a doctor, whenever possible, of their choice.

58. The police shall, to the extent possible, separate persons deprived of their liberty under suspicion of having committed a criminal offence from those deprived of their liberty for other reasons. There shall normally be a separation between men and women as well as between adults and juveniles.

#### Accountability and control of the police

59. The police shall be accountable to the state, the citizens and their representatives. They shall be subject to efficient external control.

60. State control of the police shall be divided between the legislative, the executive and the judicial powers.

61. Public authorities shall ensure effective and impartial procedures for complaints against the police.

62. Accountability mechanisms, based on communication and mutual understanding between the public and the police, shall be promoted.

63. Codes of ethics of the police, based on the principles set out in the present recommendation, shall be developed in member states and overseen by appropriate bodies.

#### Research and international co-operation

64. Member states shall promote and encourage research on the police, both by the police themselves and external institutions.

65. International co-operation on police ethics and human rights aspects of the police shall be supported.

66. The means of promoting the principles of the present recommendation and their implementation must be carefully scrutinised by the Council of Europe.

## ANNEX D

### PRÜM DECISION ARTICLES ON MAJOR EVENTS<sup>282</sup>

ACTS ADOPTED UNDER TITLE VI OF THE EU TREATY

**COUNCIL DECISION 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008**

**on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime**

CHAPTER 3

#### MAJOR EVENTS

*Article 13*

##### Supply of non-personal data

For the prevention of criminal offences and in maintaining public order and security for major events with a cross-border dimension, in particular for sporting events or European Council meetings, Member States shall, both upon request and of their own accord, in compliance with the supplying Member State's national law, supply one another with any non-personal data required for those purposes.

*Article 14*

##### Supply of personal data

1. For the prevention of criminal offences and in maintaining public order and security for major events with a cross-border dimension, in particular for sporting events or European Council meetings, Member States shall, both upon request and of their own accord, supply one another with personal data if any final convictions or other circumstances give reason to believe that the data subjects will commit criminal offences at the events or pose a threat to public order and security, in so far as the supply of such data is permitted under the supplying Member State's national law.

2. Personal data may be processed only for the purposes laid down in paragraph 1 and for the specified events for which they were supplied. The data supplied must be deleted without delay once the purposes referred to in paragraph 1 have been achieved or can no longer be achieved. The data supplied must in any event be deleted after not more than a year.

*Article 15*

##### National contact point

For the purposes of the supply of data as referred to in Articles 13 and 14, each Member State shall designate a national contact point. The powers of the national contact points shall be governed by the applicable national law.

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<sup>282</sup> **NOTE:** To be read in conjunction with full text of the Decision, especially Chapter 5 on 'Other Forms of Cooperation' in as much as it concerns joint operations, assistance and Member State liabilities, along with *inter alia* Chapter 4 on 'Measure to prevent Terrorist Offences'. This annex is for **reference only** within the House's Manual



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